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Executive summaryA DIVERGING EUROPE ON THE EDGE
This is the third independent Annual Growth Survey (iAGS), each a
response to the European Commission's AGS, and we have to take note
sadly of the continuation of the crisis. Response to the euro sovereign debt
crisis has been substantial, but we analyse that it was not sufficient to give a
strong enough momentum to the euro area economy in order lastingly to
exit the recession it entered 6 years ago.
Failing to exit the crisis brings many poisons, economic, social, and
political. Unemployment is at high levels, inequality is rising, and conver-
gence between European regions that was once the rule is no longer
occurring. Pressure on wages and the need to restore internal balances
between countries fuels deflation. Debt deleveraging, private or public, is
far from accomplished and the prospect of falling prices may be the mech-
anism by which stagnation is perpetuated. The European project of a
prosperous and inclusive society is going to sink if we fail to rebound.
Monetary policy alone can't solve the problem. Fiscal policy coordina-
tion still does not work well and its bias toward front loading has to be
corrected. In the opinion of the authors, what is needed is to circumvent
the rules of the fiscal compact. The Juncker plan is one attempt to do so, by
proposing to exclude Member State's contribution from national deficit
and debt rules. That is far from sufficient, but it opens the way to find ways
to achieve fiscal stimulus while continuing to exert pressure on national
public finance. Structural reforms cannot be used as a substitute for a stim-
ulus and the possible short term impact on prices or activity should be
considered with extreme care.
The report is organized in 5 chapters, one introduction and a bibliog-
raphy at the end. Table of content precedes. Chapter 1 analyses the
macroeconomic situation, presents our forecast. The debt deflation
dynamic is a present concern and the nominal adjustment needed as well
as fiscal rules increase this risk. Chapter 2 deals with inequality develop-
ment in the European Union. End of regional convergence, absolute
poverty increases, long term unemployment draw a picture of divergence
that goes beyond a sluggish macro outlook. Chapter 3 deals with mone-
tary policy in a fragmented financial system. Monetary policy alone will not
change the course of the events, but quantitative easing is to be pushed
forward. More can be done, with a monetary financing of public invest-
ment. Chapter 4 discus the necessity of “greening” an investment plan and
propose a “carbon fiscal shock” to drive the European economy out of the
crisis and toward low carbon pathway. Chapter 5 evaluates the magnitudeRevue de l’OFCE — iAGS (2015) Third Report 
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report8of the nominal adjustment inside the euro area. Adjusting only countries in
deficit could increase the pressure toward deflation and ask for a balanced
adjustment, involving surplus countries.
We hope you find the iAGS 2015 report a stimulating read, on behalf of
the iAGS team.
Xavier Timbeau (OFCE, iAGS coordinator)
Lars Anderson (ECLM)
Christophe Blot (OFCE)
Jérôme Creel (OFCE)
Andrew Watt (IMK)
IntroductionA DIVERGING EUROPE ON THE EDGE
(…)
“There must be some way out of here,” said the joker to the thief,
“There's too much confusion, I can't get no relief.
Businessmen, they drink my wine, plowmen dig my earth,
None of them along the line know what any of it is worth.”
“No reason to get excited,” the thief, he kindly spoke,
“There are many here among us who feel that life is but a joke.
But you and I, we've been through that, and this is not our fate,
So let us not talk falsely now, the hour is getting late.”
(…)
All along the watchtower, 1968, Bob Dylan
Six years after the world economy entered its deepest crisis since World
War II, most economies are showing some solid signs of recovery. Most, but there
is a prominent exception: the European economy—and within it especially the
euro area—is still stuck in the crisis. Powerful forces of divergence are being fed by
the failure to exit the crisis quickly. The risk of a long-lasting stagnation is real.
The euro area crisis has been a tough test of the construction of the euro. A
lot has been done to respond to the revealed failure of the European institutional
framework, that some rightly denounced years before. Europe is advancing in
crisis, as often said, even if this way to progress is far from efficient and presents
juridical challenges. Having said that, we need to acknowledge and to react to the
fact that presently Europe is not doing what is needed to exit the crisis once and
for all. Losing that opportunity is certainly not acceptable to citizens who already
question a construction that many feel impinges negatively, and no longer posi-
tively, on their lives.
It is no surprise against this background that we have seen the rise of Euros-
ceptic parties on both the Right and the Left calling for the break-up of the euro
area and, in some cases, withdrawal from the EU or for the European integration
project to be thrown into reverse gear. We reject these siren calls. A return to
national currencies and the supposed certainties of national politics is not the way
forward. The costs of a disorderly break-up of the euro area are incalculable, and it
is hard to imagine how an orderly break-up might be brought about. Should a
Eurosceptic majority be elected in one of the Member States the crisis will be
upon us once again. Instead the aim must be to build on what has been achieved
in the past five years and to chart a path towards a euro area that is viable, stable,
vigorous and sustainable.Revue de l’OFCE — iAGS (2015) Third Report 
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Recovery has been announced many times since 2011 (see Table 1 and
chapter 1 of this report). All these hopes have vanished as economic indicators
repeatedly showed that Europe, and especially the euro area, was unable to last-
ingly free itself from stagnation at a much reduced level of output and
employment (Table 2). At the end of 2014, economic activity as measured by
GDP is still below its pre-crisis level and far from its potential. The output gap is
wide open and the per capita GDP comparison –which allows for the more
favourable demographics in the US—is striking (Figure 1).
The Great Recession in 2008-2009 was as deep in the euro area as in the
United States. But recovery has continued overseas whereas it broke down in
2011 in the euro area, precisely when member states engaged a strategy of tough
and synchronized fiscal consolidation and when existing European institutions
were unable to circumvent the sovereign debt crisis.
Table 1. EC and iAGS forecasts and outcomes
In %
EC Autumn forecast in 
year n-1 
iAGS Autumn forecast in 
year n-1 
GDP growth
2012 0.5 -0.7
2013 0.1 -0,3 -0.4
2014 1.1 1.0 0.8
2015 1.1 1.3
2016 1.7 1.6
Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, iAGS.
Table 2. GDP growth rate forecasts
In %
2013 2014 2015 2016
DEU 0.2 1.5 1.4 1.7
FRA 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.7
ITA -1.8 -0.2 0.5 0.7
ESP -1.2 1.3 2.1 2.3
NLD -0.7 0.6 1.4 1.9
BEL 0.2 1.0 1.2 1.6
PRT -1.4 0.8 1.4 2.0
IRL 0.2 4.0 2.8 2.6
GRC -3.3 0.4 1.9 1.9
FIN -1.3 -0.1 1.3 1.2
AUT 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.6
EA -0.4 0.8 1.3 1.6
UK 1.7 3.0 2.1 1.8
UE-28 0.1 1.3 1.5 1.7
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS calculations.
Introduction: A diverging Europe on the edge 11The unemployment rate has been slightly decreasing recently but remains at
historical high levels. Since October 2009, it has been plateauing at a level above
10% of the active population. A profound divide exists between countries experi-
encing unemployment rates around 25% (Spain and Greece) and some nearly at
full employment (Germany and Austria). 
Nearly 12 million people in the EU28 have been unemployed for one year or
more. Young people find it harder to get their first job, their first experience,
which is so important for the rest of their working-life. More and more people
have been thrown out of unemployment benefit schemes and forced to take any
job on offer. Welfare states are being cut back, in some countries slashed, under
austerity programmes and because they are wrongly seen as being at the roots of
the crisis. More and more Europeans are suffering from material deprivation—
absolute poverty—notably in Greece, Hungary, Cyprus or Italy. Falling GDP per
head, the rise of unemployment and the cut in social public expenditures are
highly correlated to the extent of poverty increases in the different EU countries
(chapter 2 of this report). 
Inequalities are widening. A global EU inequality indicator (a gini coefficient)
that—in contrast to an average measurement by country—measures overall
inequality among EU28 or euro area citizens (Figure 2) is striking: the level of
inequality in the EU28 is comparable to that in the United States. It has signifi-
cantly increased since 2009, and euro area also displays such a trend of rising
inequality. Divergence between countries is the main source: regional conver-
gence, once a goal, has stalled in the crisis and gone into reverse (see figure 1
and 2 of chapter 2 of this report).
The current trends of the European economy are not those of an inclusive
society. The severity and particularly the duration of the crisis are compromising
Figure 1. Per capita GDP in the United States and in the euro area
2007 = 100, PPP-1995
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS calculations.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report12the achievement of the Europe 2020 strategy goals. High unemployment is
already pushing real wages downward in many countries. Labour market reforms
have amplified and will probably continue on the race to the bottom already
engaged by countries using relative competitiveness as a mean to compensate
for the negative impact of fiscal consolidation. But this asymmetrical strategy is
bringing inadequate results in terms of adjustment, threatens to exacerbate the
loss of social cohesion and is fuelling disinflation while risking deflation
(chapter 5).
Is Europe condemned to underachieve?
In the heat of the Euro sovereign debt crisis, a lot has been done. Since July
2012, the ECB (European Central Bank) publicly stated a willingness to act as a
lender of last resort, securing sovereign debt markets. The banking union is laying
the ground to end the liaisons dangereuses between banks holding national public
debt and states covering extreme balance sheet risks in the financial sector. Under
the reinforced SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) and its sequel, the fiscal compact,
fiscal discipline has been more under the scrutiny of peers than under the scrutiny
of the market, hence removing speculative attacks.
What was done has certainly contributed to put an end to the double-dip
induced by the euro sovereign debt crisis. Paradoxically though, it has in part also
contributed to this double-dip and risks longer-run stagnation. The counterpart of
the emergency assistance from the European Institutions was the frontloading of
fiscal policy in Member States. The frontloading was done in a time of high fiscal
multipliers and therefore placed a large toll on economic activity. This has been
analysed as a failure or as a lost opportunity in previous reports (iAGS 2013 and
iAGS 2014). There is now a broad consensus ranging from the OECD to the IMF
about the value of fiscal multipliers, and drawing on this consensus, alternative
Figure 2. Evolution of inequality in EU, euro area and United States
Source: EU-SILC, OECD, iAGS calculations.
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Introduction: A diverging Europe on the edge 13scenarios of backloaded fiscal consolidation1 with the same powerful intervention
of ECB and other European institutions (ESM in particular) showed that it was
possible for the euro area to avoid most of the double dip of the years 2011-2012.
The significance is grave: it means that the double dip was self-inflicted.
Failing to exit promptly from the euro crisis and enduring the double dip have
come with consequences: the euro area is now close to deflation and the debt-
deflation dynamic is threatening to prolong stagnation. Moreover, the reinforced
rules of the SGP call for a reduction of the public debt ratio back to 60% within 20
years from now. Low inflation (not to mention deflation) is going to imply higher
structural primary surpluses than those aimed at today. A more restrictive fiscal
stance, in a time when fiscal multipliers are still high in many countries, will close
the fiscal trap.
The ECB is clearly aware of this situation and, even if the board is divided on
the policy implications, stands firm on the “whatever it takes” doctrine. Aggres-
sive monetary policy will be maintained, quantitative easing will be conducted,
even probably extended to sovereign bonds in 2015. The tightening of US and
UK monetary policies, meanwhile, will depreciate the euro against the dollar or
sterling. But many fear that monetary policy alone will not be effective enough to
prevent stagnation. Quantitative easing by the ECB is to be welcomed. But it must
be recognised that it works through indirect channels. In a deflationary environ-
ment with private and public actors struggling to deleverage, it may not be
enough to avoid a continent-wide paradox of thrift, i.e. in the end an increase of
debt to GDP ratios.
There is more. Sustained unconventional monetary policy in a stagnating
economy may bring distributional downsides and negative side effects under the
form of risk mispricing, asset price bubbles, carry trade and exchange rate vola-
tility. This adds to the imperative need to escape the stagnation.
The Annual Growth Survey,2 published by the Commission in November
2014, proposes a three-pillar response to the crisis. The first pillar is the 300bn €
Juncker plan. Presented as a way to revive investment in Europe, back to “normal
and sustainable” levels, the Juncker Plan adds virtually no fresh money. Recycling
funds from the EU budget and the EIB (European Investment Banks), a new
vehicle, the EFSI (European Fund for Strategic Investment) will carry on projects
with an expected leverage of 1:15, thus expanding 21bn € to 315bn €. It is not at
all clear that, in the current environment, the incentives offered will be anywhere
near sufficient to induce additional private investment of this order of magnitude.
It is highly likely that any investment forthcoming under the Juncker plan will be
in large measure a reflection of reduced investment elsewhere (substitution) or
will be investment that will have occurred in any case (deadweight). The scheme
is a step in the right direction but it would be foolhardy to rely on such an inher-
ently uncertain pillar to jolt Europe out of crisis. 
1. Backloaded fiscal consolidation alternative scenarios have been simulated by iAGS 2014 and
iAGS 2015. These alternatives are calculated such as to bring the same debt to GDP ratios as in the
frontloaded fiscal consolidation 20 years from now. The better outcome in term of GDP and
unemployment is due to fiscal multipliers being lower when output gap is closed than when output
gap is largely negative.
2. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/2015/ags2015_en.pdf
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tions. Promoting legitimate evolutions of the competitive framework might be
genuinely beneficial in the long run. But the real question remains: is that going
to help to change the course of events in the next few years? On that matter,
empirical evidence leaves no doubt and suggests that most structural reforms may
have negative effect on activity or prices in the short term. Any payoffs come
much later and are themselves contingent on adequate expansion of demand. 
The third pillar is the streamlining of the fiscal governance architecture.
Indeed, the current fiscal governance is complex and biased toward frontloading.
It is profoundly inadequate to deal with a sustained period of low inflation not to
speak about a deflation. Streamlining the fiscal governance could end in the
deepening of the fiscal trap. The Commission rightly points out that some coun-
tries have fiscal space and could compensate countries in consolidation.
Unfortunately, —not for the counties themselves, but for policymaking at the
European level—those countries with fiscal space—the only one with the poten-
tial to have substantial spillovers to other countries is Germany—are countries
with low unemployment, not likely to boost an economy seen as being already
close to a steady-state path. Hence, the spillovers one can expect from a positive
fiscal stance in a country like Germany are highly unlikely to be strong enough to
alleviate the burden of consolidating countries.
To repair the damages of past frontloading, more than less frontloading—
utilising the flexibility opened for countries in the preventive arm of the SGP—is
needed. Overall, the three pillars strategy of the Commission, as proposed in the
AGS, is likely to miss the target. Underachieving policies while claiming to enforce
a stricter discipline will end in a loss of confidence in European institutions and the
integration process more generally. The advances from the common market to
the single currency and the painful and slow establishment of a more democratic
Europe in 28 countries are promises we cannot break.
Beyond the fiscal compact
More is needed. Suspending the SGP is unfortunately not an option, in the
short term. The SGP and its reinforcement with the TSCG (Treaty on stability,
coordination and growth) is one of the pillars of the nascent solidarity that ended
the euro sovereign debt crisis. Weakening or renegotiating it could reopen a
period of large uncertainty in which the euro may not survive. Asking more from
countries where political and social discontent is everyday fuelled by the crisis can
reveal the European fiscal governance weakness. Peers have no democratic legiti-
macy to define national policies except where there are clear consequences on the
common house. Peers face no responsibility nor accountability, and, conse-
quently, have no coercive power on national policies. In the end, current
European governance rely on the willingness of member states to apply recom-
mendations. The bias toward frontloading thus ensues: discipline only works out
of fear, not out of responsibility and accountability. It fuels distrust in Europe and
peers, perceived as advisors defending their own interest.
It is not going to be possible to exit from the crisis and have a sustained
upturn while sticking to the letter and spirit of all the rules (see Box 1). At the very
least we are going to have to creatively use all the legal ambiguities and all the
Introduction: A diverging Europe on the edge 15backdoors we can to overcome the limits the fiscal compact imposes. The Juncker
Plan has opened a breach, excluding Member States participation in the EFSI from
the deficit and debt rules. A proposition similar in spirit is to be found in the
recent Franco-German joint report by Enderlein and Pisani-Ferry.3 Fresh money,
borrowed using present-day very low rates, channelled through a supranational
vehicle and targeted on specific uses can ease the acceptance of peer pressure on
national fiscal policy, as long as it excluded from calculation of the national debt
or deficit. It is a way to give room of manoeuvre while monitoring specific policies
through the control of the funds reinvested. It is a way to backload fiscal consoli-
dation while at the same time safeguarding fiscal discipline and moderating its
negative impacts.
As we show in chapter 5 of this report, although some progress has been
made in bringing about an adjustment in competitiveness, the remaining nominal
adjustment requirement is still large. Solving it with a (further) decrease of
nominal wages in deficit countries will precipitate deflation. The fiscal cost of the
real public debt appreciation will exert further deflationary pressure resulting in a
vicious circle. Reflation of surplus countries is an important objective to rebalance
European competitiveness issues. Increasing wages is not something you can
decide by law or by government action. We advocated in iAGS 2014 a differenti-
ated evolution of minimum wages norms based on current account (or preferably
on structural current account) positions. The implementation of a minimum wage
in Germany is one step forward and this policy proposal still stands. More gener-
ally, a strengthening of capacities at both national and European level to ensure
balanced wage and price developments and prevent beggar-thy-neighbour strat-
egies is needed in the medium run.
We should assess the scope for further-reaching measures which should be
prepared for use and that would lead to direct impacts on investment and the
economy, rather than relying on measures that work through indirect channels. A
fiscal carbon shock and a targeting of investment in transition toward a low
carbon economy could add 200bn € a year in investment and produce the
needed boost. The key element is political acceptance of the implementation of a
price of carbon using either a cap-and-trade mechanism (ETS) or a carbon tax. A
transition fund, fed by member states and exempted from the SGP accounting,
could finance over-compensation to Member States of the resources withdrawn
via the tax, and support action with significant contribution to the economy and
particularly in the area of climate-change-prevention (this is developed and simu-
lated in chapter 4 of this report). Public investment on this scale would be enough
to counter the stagnation, especially if, as the IMF now estimates, the multiplier
for public investment in the current environment could be as high as 3.
Ultimately consideration needs to be given to financing public investment
through purchases of newly created EIB bonds by the ECB on secondary markets
and the distribution of resources to Member States for the purposes of public
investment (this proposal is discussed in chapter 3 of this report). The bonds are
held by the ECB for an agreed period, and this forms part of its QE program, with
3. http://blog.en.strategie.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Rapport-Henderlein-Pisani-EN-
final-1.pdf
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report16the difference that real spending in the economy is assured without initially raising
the government debt burden. Different modalities for distributing the resources
and paying down the loans are discussed, along with a mechanism to ensure
compatibility with the ECB’s mandate to ensure price stability. 
Once again Europe finds itself in a critical situation. A change of policy course
is required. The existing policy space needs to be exploited to the full. And more
unconventional policies need to be readied in the case of a failure to emerge from
what otherwise threatens—secular stagnation.
Box 1. Four trilemmas
The crisis opened in 2008 implies that the Euro area is confronted with at
least 4 trilemmas. Retrieving a stable macroeconomic equilibrium requires a
different strategy for the European economy. iAGS 2015 develops on this.
Trilemma 1: achieving inflation at target (of 2% per year in the mid term),
endorsing structural reforms (flexibilising goods and service or labour markets)
and achieving fiscal discipline (60% debt-to-GDP ratio in the mid term) is not
possible at the same time. Fiscal discipline and structural reforms pave the way
for deflation. Fiscal discipline and inflation at target produce high social costs to
structural reforms (fiscal discipline urges a mix of higher taxes and lower
spending in high-employment countries, those where structural reforms are
urged; inflation at target without nominal wage increase reduces purchasing
power) and make their endorsement unlikely. Inflation at target and structural
reforms are inconsistent with fiscal discipline: a rise in inflation reduces the real
debt burden and governments face incentives to use the proceeds to increase,
not decrease, public deficits, and the (short-run) costs of structural reforms
need to be mutualized. 
Trilemma 2: achieving inflation at target (of 2% per year in the mid term),
financial stability and having a conservative central banker (with a relative high
aversion against inflation) is not possible. If the ECB is leaning against the wind
to achieve financial stability, hence implementing a restrictive monetary policy
to dampen financial bubbles, the ECB will underperform its inflation target.
Experience has finally shown recently that inflation close to target with a
conservative ECB has been inconsistent with financial stability. Consequently,
achieving the inflation target and financial stability requires an accommodative
monetary policy.
Trilemma 3: achieving inflation at target (of 2% per year in the mid term),
endorsing structural reforms and having a conservative central banker is not
possible. A conservative ECB achieving its inflation target sets high real interest
rates which increase the opportunity cost of implementing reforms in the real
sector, hence benefiting the financial sector where real yields are rising. A
conservative central banker and endorsement of structural reforms lead to
below-target inflation. Inflation at target and structural reforms therefore
require an accommodative monetary policy.
Trilemma 4: achieving inflation at target (of 2% per year in the mid term),
under fiscal discipline, and achieving financial stability is not possible. Inflation
at target and fiscal discipline prevent the endorsement of structural reforms
(see trilemma 1) and limit the attractiveness of the real sector at the benefit of
Introduction: A diverging Europe on the edge 17the financial sector: investors buy more private financial assets, hence paving
the way for a disconnection between the real and the financial sectors which
fuels new bubbles. Recent experience has also shown that despite fiscal disci-
pline and inflation close to target, the euro area has been hurt by financial
instability. Inflation at target and financial stability require a balanced portfolio
of risk-free and risky assets: they are not consistent with fiscal discipline of all
euro area countries alike. Achieving financial stability and fiscal discipline
requires to limit leverage, not only from governments but also from private
firms (high leverage is one important component of the global financial crisis);
it would thus lead to below-target inflation because of low overall activity level.
These 4 trilemmas are strikingly interconnected (see the four triangles in
figure 3 below). It thus appears that to solve these trilemmas, only two changes
are required; replacing the conservative central banker with a social central
banker, and fiscal discipline with fiscal accommodation. Of course, a general
overhaul of monetary and fiscal policies in the euro area would be the first-best
option. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these changes would be accepted all
over the euro area. The second-best option is to have a central banker who
endorses unconventional monetary policies (the current one does) and imple-
ments them. In this latter case, we propose a plan by which some monetary
financing of domestic public spending with positive spillovers to all member
states which could start the process. As for fiscal accommodation, the latter
plan, including a reform of the carbon tax, would give an impetus to euro area
economic growth in the short run but also an improvement in the path
towards a sustainable economy in the longer run.
 
 
Figure 3.  Four trilemmas in a graph
     Source: iAGS calculations.
 
Conservative 
ECB
Inflation=2% 
Structural 
reforms
Financial 
stability
Fiscal 
discipline

Chapter 1DEFLATION IS COMING: 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES FOR THE EURO AREA 
AND EURO AREA COUNTRIES IN 2014, 2015 AND 2016
Six years after the start of the Great Recession, the economic and social
situation in the euro area is still depressed and fragile as shown by key macroeco-
nomic indicators. Growth will not exceed 0.8% in 2014 after two consecutive
years of recession. The risk of deflation is increasing as inflation has now been
below 0.5% since May 2014. Employment has improved moderately but unem-
ployment remains at an unacceptably high level. Consequently, inequality and
the risk of poverty are increasing significantly.1 In short the euro area still suffers
the aftermath of the crisis and has not yet engaged in a buoyant recovery. 
Recovery had been expected for 2014 as fiscal consolidation was weakening.
It has yet not materialized (Table 1). Fears of a new recession even resurfaced
during the autumn. Christine Lagarde, Head of the IMF, estimated in October
2014 that the probability of a recession in the euro area at the end of 2014
ranged between 35 and 40%. Recession has been avoided thus far but GDP
growth reached only 0.2% in the third quarter of 2014 after 0.1 in the previous
quarter. The risk of a sustained period of low growth has been reinforced. The
threat of deflation is becoming more prevalent. With high unemployment, high
public and private debt and banks’ fragility, the decline in inflation could precipi-
tate some countries, then the rest of the euro area, into a vicious circle of rising
public and private real debt leading to a new recession. At best, the euro area will
be bogged down in a low growth and low inflation trap if no additional measures
to stimulate growth are taken. The downward revision of growth expectations for
2014 reflects the premise of this situation. Even Germany has shown signs of
cooling down. GDP growth has come to a halt during the last two quarters.
It remains the case that taking the year as a whole, Germany will remain the
main driver of the euro area, with GDP increasing by 1.5% in 2014. With a 0.4%
growth expected in 2014 as in 2013, France remains in virtual stagnation. Italy is
still mired in recession, it has recorded 13 consecutive quarters of decline of the
GDP. On a yearly basis, the recession will amount to -0.2% in 2014 after -1.8%
the previous year. Italy will be the only euro area country alongside Finland to be
in recession. On the other hand, growth has gained momentum in Ireland and
Spain. Irish GDP grew by 2.8 and 1.5% in the first two quarters of 2014. After a
sharp reduction in economic activity in 2011 and 2012, Spanish GDP has grown
for five quarters and is forecast to end up the year 2014 with 1.3% growth
(Table 2). The economic outlook is gradually improving in the Netherlands and
Portugal. Both countries have reported positive growth in 2014 after recessions in
2013. Greece will also grow by 0.4% in 2014, after a 6-year slump where the fall
in activity exceeded 25%. Finally, Austria has been characterized by slow growth
for the first three quarters of 2014, which is mainly due to weak activity in the rest
of Europe. Over the full year, growth is expected to reach 0.7%.
1. See Chapter 2 of this report for more details on rising inequalities in the EU.Revue de l’OFCE — iAGS (2015) Third Report 
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report20Although fiscal impulses remained negative, they have been decreasing,
raising hopes for an acceleration of growth, as the negative impact of austerity
would have been mitigated. Recent evidence has thwarted these expectations,
however. Austerity and other factors have slowed down economic activity. Disin-
flation has pushed upward real financing conditions. In some countries, it has
completely offset the observed reduction in official interest rates. Furthermore, the
euro also appreciated between July 2012 and the end of 2013, reinforcing disin-
flation, although there has been a correction more recently. The ECB is also
concerned with the appreciation of the euro observed in 2013 and the height-
ened risk of deflation. It has announced new monetary policy measures targeting
notably credit distribution to non-financial corporations. While essential, these
measures may have limited impacts on credit growth. 
Within the euro area, exchange rate adjustments cannot be used, forcing
countries to resort to internal devaluations to fight against unemployment. Such
strategies are also supported by the new macroeconomic governance of the euro
area and emphasized by the European Commission in yearly in-depth reviews.
Gains in competitiveness are obtained, not by currency devaluation, but by down-
ward adjustment in production costs. The aim is to reduce current account
imbalances and boost growth by stimulating exports. But efforts of first-movers
are quickly thwarted by those engaged in the same beggar-my-neighbour
strategy. There is here a powerful mechanism that pushes the entire euro zone to
deflation. In iAGS 2014 report, we stressed the need to implement wage coordi-
nation mechanisms to avoid the shortcomings related to this race to
competitiveness.2 This idea is more than ever relevant.
Finally, financial constraints still weigh on households, enterprises and govern-
ments, and reduction in the inflation rate makes deleveraging more difficult.
Besides, non-performing loans are not yet fully cleared in many European banking
systems. Household or non-financial corporates’ debt remains high. In the euro
area, deleveraging of private agents has been rather slow so the process is set to
continue. That would then weigh down investment, consumption and employ-
ment perspectives, risking leading the euro area in a vicious circle similar to
Japan’s Lost Decade during the 1990’s. Debt reduction efforts will still be signifi-
cant for some governments. Constraints for reducing public debt have now been
enshrined in the new institutional set-up. Countries will have to make efforts to
reduce structural deficits in order to converge towards a ratio of debt-to-GDP ratio
Table 1. EC and iAGS forecasts errors 
In %
EC Autumn forecast 
in year n-1 
iAGS Autumn forecast 
in year n-1 
GDP growth
2011 1.5 1.7 1.8
2012 0.5 0.9 -0.7
2013 0.1 -0.3 -0.4
2014 1.1 1.0 0.8
Sources: Eurostat, European Commission, iAGS forecasts (for 2011 and 2012).
2. Competitiveness issues are analysed in depth in chapter 5 of this report.
Deflation is coming: Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries 21of 60% in 20 years (see Box 1 for more details on current fiscal rules). Austerity is
far from over, which could make it difficult to support initiatives for public invest-
ment. Under these conditions, the risk of weakening growth goes largely beyond
short-term perspectives. The Europe 2020 targets for smart, sustainable and inclu-
sive growth, already distant, would become entirely unattainable.
Box 1. Short description of current fiscal rules
There are currently five fiscal rules which must be fulfilled by EU Member
States. Except for one fiscal rule exclusively related to the Fiscal Compact—the
new medium-term fiscal objective, see fifth fiscal rule below—all EU fiscal rules
have been in force since at least November 2011. 
First, the cornerstone of European fiscal rules remains the public deficit to
GDP limit at 3%. Deficits above this threshold can be labelled “excessive defi-
cits”, setting in train an excessive deficit procedure.
Second, the public-debt-to-GDP ratio must be limited to 60% of GDP or it
must be decreasing towards this level.  
The first and second fiscal rules are embedded in the Stability and Growth
Pact originally introduced in 2005.3 They were confirmed by the revised
Table 2. GDP growth rate forecasts
In %
2013 2014 2015 2016
DEU 0.2 1.5 1.4 1.7
FRA 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.7
ITA -1.8 -0.2 0.5 0.7
ESP -1.2 1.3 2.1 2.3
NLD -0.7 0.6 1.4 1.9
BEL 0.2 1.0 1.2 1.6
PRT -1.4 0.8 1.4 2.0
IRL 0.2 4.0 2.8 2.6
GRC -3.3 0.4 1.9 1.9
FIN -1.3 -0.1 1.3 1.2
AUT 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.6
EUZ -0.4 0.8 1.3 1.6
GRB 1.7 3.0 2.1 1.8
UE-28 0.1 1.3 1.5 1.7
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS forecasts.
3. The first rule has been the cornerstone of European fiscal rules since 1997 and the first version
of the Stability and Growth Pact, whereas the second rule was only a convergence criterion between
1997 and 2005, before it was introduced in the first reformed version of the SGP. Legally speaking,
the debt-rule was not a binding constraint on Euro area members states between 1999 (creation of
the euro) and 2005. 
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report22Stability and Growth Pact adopted in November 2011 under Council Regula-
tions 1173/2011, 1175/2011 and 1177/2011.
Third, if the public-debt ratio is above the threshold limit, the ratio will be
considered to diminish at a sufficient pace if the difference between actual debt
and the 60%-of-GDP limit has been decreasing during the three preceding
years at an average yearly rate of 1/20th of the difference. This 1/20th debt rule
is incorporated in the revised Stability and Growth Pact adopted in November
2011 under Council Regulation 1177/2011, (article 2, (1bis)). It has also been
included in the Fiscal Compact, article 4, of the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance in the EMU of March 2012. 
Fourth, if a Member State is under an excessive deficit procedure, Council
Regulation 1177/2011, article 3, states that: “in its recommendation, the
Council shall request that the Member State achieve annual budgetary targets
which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are
consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0.5% of GDP as a
benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary
measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the
deadline set in the recommendation”. In its article 5, Regulation 1175/2011
restates the same benchmark of a yearly improvement of 0.5% of GDP of the
cyclically-adjusted deficit to reach the medium-term fiscal objective of a
balanced-budget expressed in structural terms. 
Fifth, the medium-term fiscal objective was made more precise in the Fiscal
Compact, article 3. It states that general government budgets shall be balanced
or in surplus, a criterion that “shall be deemed to be respected if the annual
structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-
term objective, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower
limit of a structural deficit of 0.5% of the gross domestic product at market
prices”. The limit is set at 1% for countries with debt below 60%.
Some of the above-mentioned rules make provision for exceptional circum-
stances. Such has always been the case for the first rule. However the strictness
of exceptional circumstances has largely changed over the years. Between 1999
and 2005, exceptional circumstances meant a recession: a yearly real GDP
contraction of at least -2% permitted automatically delayed austerity to
converge towards the 3%-of-GDP limit for the public deficit and balanced
budget in the mid-run. A yearly real GDP decline of at least -0.75% permitted
delayed austerity provided a majority of member states approved these excep-
tional circumstances. In 2005, the scope of exceptional circumstances was
widened to encompass the implementation of structural reforms that were
elaborated to cope with the Lisbon agenda strategy, and the implementation
of public investment. Moreover, an unexpected economic slowdown could be
considered as exceptional circumstances. 
The 2011 body of legislation—the 6-pack—recalls the reform of the 1997
version of the SGP. It opens up a scope to use pension reforms as authorizing a
public finances' gap vis-à-vis the convergence path towards the medium-run
deficit objective (article 5, regulation 1175/2011). The fiscal compact intro-
duced the following (complementary) definition of exceptional circumstances:
“an unusual event outside the control of the (MS) which has a major impact on
the financial position of the general government or periods of severe economic
downturn as set out in the revised SGP, provided that the temporary deviation
(…) does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium-term” (article 3, (b)).
The definition of an “unusual event” remains unclear. 
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Austerity in the euro area: Slow but steady …
Since 2010, European countries have implemented restrictive fiscal policies to
reduce budget deficits (Table 3), with highly negative fiscal impulses4 (-4.3 points
of GDP in the euro area). These policies have put an end to the emerging
recovery. In the euro area, the institutional crisis triggered a sharp increase in
interest rates in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, after a decade of
convergence within euro area countries, which followed the adoption of the euro.
The revision of the Greek fiscal deficit in late 2009 brought to light the risks of
public finance unsustainability in Greece and highlighted the institutional weak-
nesses of the monetary union, shortcomings that were already identified at the
start of EMU.5 
Government bond rates rocketed, thus accelerating fiscal consolidation poli-
cies which were in any case necessary to comply with the Stability and Growth
Pact. Facing market pressures, governments have sought to gain credibility and
rapidly endeavoured to cut down budget deficits. This strategy was first imple-
mented by governments for which access to market financing was restricted or
denied (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). In these countries, accumulated negative
fiscal impulses reached unprecedented levels, exceeding 19 points of annual GDP
in Greece, 13 points in Ireland, 11 points in Portugal and 9 points in Spain. In
Italy, despite difficulties similar to those faced by Spain, the cumulated negative
fiscal impulse was lower. However, as fiscal stance was less expansionary in Italy in
2008 and 2009, the cumulated fiscal stance over 2008-2013 has been signifi-
cantly negative and on average more restrictive than in France. In other European
countries, austerity policies were carried out in the Netherlands, in Belgium, in
Austria and to a lesser extent in Germany. Fiscal policy was nearly neutral over the
period only in Finland.
These policies, however, have moved again the euro area into recession6 and
failed to restore credibility in crisis countries, notably those countries which bene-
fited from financial assistance and were under the surveillance of the Troïka.
Despite fiscal consolidation, CDS premiums continued to increase in 2010 and
2011 and have receded only after Mario Draghi pronounced the “Whatever it
takes…” in July 2012 (Figure 1). Countries have then gradually regained access to
financial markets (see Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff, 2014). The restrictive fiscal
policy stance will lessen considerably in the euro area in 2014 and 2015. Beyond
this, stability programs forecast further consolidation, but at a moderate pace
because most countries won’t be concerned anymore by the excessive deficit
procedure. Fiscal consolidation will then depend on medium-term fiscal objectives
and the ability of countries to converge towards the threshold for the debt-to-
GDP ratio of 60% (see Part III of this chapter).
4. Fiscal impulse measures the fiscal stance (generally measured by a change in structural fiscal
balance). A negative fiscal impulse is a restrictive fiscal policy.
5. See Bordo & Jonung (2003) and more recently de Grauwe (2012).
6. The macroeconomic and social impacts of these strategies have been widely discussed in the
two previous reports of IAGS (see OFCE-ECLM-IMK, 2012 and 2013).
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In % of GDP
2008-2009 2010-2013 2014 2015 2016-2018
DEU 0.5 -0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2
FRA* 2.9 -4.6 -0.3 -0.3 -1.0
ITA 1.0 -4.0 0.2 0.0 -0.6
ESP 4.3 -9.1 -1.0 -0.4 -1.3
NLD* 4.1 -5.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1
BEL 2.5 -2.6 -0.5 -0.7 -1.6
IRL 8.3 -13.1 -1.8 -1.1 -0.8
GRC 6.0 -19.3 -1.7 -1.9 n.a
POR 5.6 -11.4 -1.0 -0.5 -0.9
AUT -0.2 -3.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.5
FIN 1.7 0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.6
EUZ 2.2 -4.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4
GBR 2.9 -5.4 -0.7 -0.7 n.a
USA 6.3 -6.8 -1 .1 -0.6 n.a
* Data available until 2017 in the P-stab.
Source : iAGS forecasts, National Stability Programmes.
Figure 1. Credibility of fiscal adjustment plans or credibility of the ECB
In pts
Note: The solid line represents the montly estimate of a 1-point increase of public debt on CDS premia
(simple linear regression with a constant term). Regressions are run for 11 euro area countries (excluding
Greece).The grey areas represent the range with +/- 2 standard-type errors.
Source: iAGS forecasts.
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the size of fiscal multipliers, which varies with the macroeconomic outlook,7 finan-
cial and monetary conditions. Composition of the adjustment also matters—
whether it is an expenditure-based or fiscal revenue-based adjustment. Thus, the
fiscal multiplier increases when unemployment—or the output gap—is high,
when credit conditions are more restrictive, or when the financial situation of
agents is worsening. Non-financial agents are more sensitive to a decrease of
income because they cannot offset it by credit access as a result of liquidity/
solvency constraints. Moreover, while the effects of fiscal policy are normally miti-
gated by monetary policy, this is not the case when the interest rate hits the zero
lower bound. Finally, at the low (respectively high) point of the cycle, the multi-
plier effect is higher (resp. weaker) for expenditures than for revenues.
In the euro area, the arguments previously highlighted suggest that the size of
the multipliers is still high. The unemployment rate remains close to an all-time
record level. It has just stabilized in France and is still rising in Italy. The assump-
tion of a weaker multiplier—around 0,5—applies above all for Germany, the only
country close to full employment and with an output gap close to zero. Moreover,
banks’ situation in the euro area is not totally cleaned as non-performing loans
continue to rise (notably in Italy, Portugal and Spain) and as balance sheets of
non-financial private agents are still deteriorated because of a deleveraging
process barely started. Finally, in some countries, particularly in France, fiscal
consolidation is now realized by expenditures’ cuts in a context of high unem-
ployment. Consequently, the fiscal impulse, even though it is much smaller than
in recent years, will still negatively affect the growth in most countries of the euro
area, including Germany, where the negative impacts will stem from the fiscal
impulse of the other countries. These differences between fiscal impulses affect
the growth of the euro area countries and explain to a considerable extent the
heterogeneity of growth paces between countries (Figure 2). 
In this context, the direct effects of austerity will still be significant in 2015,
particularly in France, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and
Finland. In the other countries, such as Germany, Italy or Austria, where fiscal
impulse are neutral or slightly negative, growth will be slowed down because of
the indirect effects of fiscal policy conducted abroad. Some measures will have
more persistent effects and cut the growth beyond the year of implementation.
Moreover, while growth dynamics in 2012 and 2013 was deeply affected by
restrictive fiscal policies, other factors have hampered growth in 2014 (real
interest rates, exchange rate appreciation and private deleveraging). Among these
factors, some will still play in 2015 (notably private deleveraging) while other
dragging factors will progressively fade away (a euro’s depreciation is expected)
explaining growth’s acceleration.
7. For a more detailed discussion, see Blot, Cochard, Creel, Ducoudré, Schweisguth and Timbeau
(2014) or Creel, Heyer and Plane (2011) or Gechert and Rannenberg (2014).
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report26Increasing real interest rates
Between January and September 2014, the yield on 10-year benchmark
government bonds decreased from 3% to 1.8% in the euro area. Even though
some spreads remain with the German rate, the yield on Italian and Spanish
bonds has decreased below 2.5% since the summer of 2014 (Figure 3). Ireland
and Portugal have succeeded in issuing bonds on the financial markets and were
able to get long-term funding at 1.7% and 3.2% respectively in October 2014. In
spite of the decrease of the sovereign-debt interest rates, the pass-through to the
Figure 2. Per capita GDP in the main euro area countries
        Constant price $2005, ppp 2005
Source: iAGS forecasts.
Figure 3. 10-year sovereign bonds yield
 In %
Source: Datastream.
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Deflation is coming: Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries 27private retail bank interest rates is slow and partial. These heterogeneities are
explained by the characteristics of mortgaged credits, banking systems, and by
the health of the banking system. Differences have widened because of the frag-
mentation of the banking systems (see chapter 3 for more details). So, despite the
drop of the public bond rates, retail bank interest rates on new business have not
declined as much as market rates. Moreover, the drop in the inflation rates
observed in every country has increased real interest rates (Figure 4). Conse-
quently, in real terms, the cost of credit for the non-financial sector has increased
since the beginning of 2013. 
Exchange rate appreciation
Exchange rate developments may also explain the lag between the recovery
in the euro area and with respect to other advanced economies, especially the
United States. Between mid-2012 and June 2014, the euro has appreciated
against the US dollar by 10% and by more than 40% against the Yen. The joint
movements of these bilateral exchange rates have contributed to a real apprecia-
tion of the euro of 9 %, which has negatively weighed on exports.
To a large extent the appreciation of the euro can be explained by monetary
and financial events. First, the perceived risk of default of sovereigns or of with-
drawal from EMU of one or more countries decreased substantially during second
semester of 2012. This trend started after the well-known speech of the President
of the ECB, M.Draghi, of July 2012 announcing that “the ECB is ready to do what-
ever it takes to preserve the euro”. Afterwards, in September 2012 the launch of
the OMT program (Outright monetary transaction) confirmed the credibility of the
former speech and restored confidence in the common currency which appreci-
ated strongly despite successive cuts on interest rates. Meanwhile, the balance
sheet of the ECB has decreased by more than 10 points of GDP (Figure 5) while
the Fed continued to expand its balance sheet by a further 8 points. The fall in the
Figure 4. Real retail bank interest rates to non-financial corporations
In %
Note: Nominal bank interest rates are deflated with the 1-year average headline inflation.
Source: ECB, Eurostat.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report28ECB balance sheet does not reflect a conscious withdrawal of unconventional
monetary policy, but is explained by a lower demand for liquidity from banks. The
joint impact of higher real interest rates and more limited liquidity signals tighter
monetary conditions in euro area which also contribute to a relative appreciation. 
Another pressure on the euro exchange rate was the significant improvement
in the current account balance (from a balanced position in 2011 to a surplus of
more than 3% of GDP in 2014, see Figure 6). This improvement reflects the asym-
metric correction of country-level imbalances. While deficit countries, like Spain,
Ireland or Greece, have improved their position, surplus countries (mainly
Germany and the Netherlands) have maintained theirs.   
All other things held constant, the appreciation of the euro weighs on activity
through its impact on net exports. However, this effect has been offset by adjust-
ment of labour costs in some countries. In this regard, Spanish cost-
competitiveness has improved significantly since the start of the crisis and despite
the evolution of the euro (Figure 7). French cost-competitiveness has worsened
since the start of the crisis despite its improvement between 2009 and 2012. If
German competitiveness has improved since 2010, from its already high level, this
trend has been interrupted lately, in line with the joint effect of euro appreciation
and a faster wage growth than most of its Eurozone partners. Finally, among the
biggest Euro Area countries, the Italian situation is the more worrisome as its cost-
competitiveness has continued its deterioration.
The link between export-competitiveness and GDP growth depends on the
weight of exports in total demand and on the elasticity of exports to prices.
Germany may seem to be the large country most dependent on international
trade according to the share of exports in total GDP (45 %, while this figure
is 34 % in Spain, 29 % in Italy and 28 % in France), but external demand for
German goods is less sensitive to price developments. According to recent
Figure 5. Size of central banks’ balance sheet
GDP points
Sources: ECB, BoE, BoJ, Federal Reserve, National accounts.
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Deflation is coming: Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries 29estimates,8 the price-elasticity of exports is equal to 0.4 in Germany, 0.6 in
France and Italy and 0.95 in Spain. All in all the euro’s appreciation has influ-
enced growth at the end of 2013 and at the beginning of 2014, largely
explaining the slowdown of economic activity in the euro area. However, in
countries that     realized a severe wage adjustment international trade may have
supported growth in 2013, like in Spain (contribution of 1.6 point to GDP
growth) where exports rose by 4.9 % while imports decreased slightly (-0.4 %).   
8. See OFCE (2014).
Figure 6. Current account balance in the euro area
In %
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 7. Real effective exchange rates (ULC based)
    2007 = 100
Source: IMF.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report30The appreciation of the euro was reversed starting in mid-2014 and we
expect the trend to continue, in line with the divergence of monetary policy
between ECB and the Fed. First, the measures announced by the ECB in order to
fight against deflation should weight on the euro exchange rate. Second, the fast
decrease of US unemployment has already led to the cessation of asset purchases
by the Fed and should push the Fed to tighten its monetary policy in 2015 as its
forward guidance policy suggests. Currency depreciation will serve to counter
somewhat the disinflationary forces in the euro area. 
Among Eurozone countries, wage moderation will persist in Spain as the high
level of unemployment will continue to undermine the bargaining power of
employees. Effort has also been made to cut down labour costs through reduc-
tions in public sector wages or freezing of minimum wages (see Box 2). Besides,
labour market reforms have also been promoted to increase flexibility. In France,
the strategy of competitive disinflation will be accentuated with the progressive
implementation of the CICE9 and of the Pacte de responsabilité, which will lead to
cuts in labour costs. In Germany, the recent wage acceleration should persist. The
higher growth, the decrease of unemployment and the introduction of a
minimum wage should favor wage dynamics. Nevertheless, German firms have a
comfortable profitability and low debt and they could absorb the anticipated
growth of wages and limit the impact on price-competitiveness. Hence, German
market shares are expected to decrease, but only modestly, during the next years.
Box 2. Labour markets’ reforms: Case-studies
Spain
Since 2010, some key reforms have been undertaken on the Spanish labor
market. The most important was the reform adopted in 2012 with the Royal
Decree Law 3/2012 on urgent measures to reform the labor market. On
28 February 2014, a new plan on urgent measures to promote employment
creation and indefinite hiring was adopted. All these packages aim at increasing
the internal and external flexibility, reducing the labor market duality (due to
the over use of temporary employment) and enhancing the workers ‘employa-
bility through liberalization of regulation. They involve measures on: 
Job protection legislation
From 2012, firm-level collective agreements prevail over other levels in a wide
range of issues, including working conditions, wages, paid overtime, working
time and other elements decided upon by higher level agreements. The preva-
lence of firm level agreement was already foreseen if not otherwise established
by higher level agreements. With this new legislation, the employer may
decide, via an agreement with workers representatives, not to apply for
economic, technical or organisational reasons (i.e. the same reasons considered
for a substantial change in working conditions) the terms of a collective
contract. The economic reasons that warrant these changes occur when reve-
nues or sales falls for at least 2 consecutive quarters. Job categories have been
9. Crédit d’impôt, pour la compétitivité et l’emploi (Tax rebate for competitiveness and
employment).
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to adapt to changing conditions. Firms are also allowed to make substantial
changes to individual or collective contracts. In case of changes to the indi-
vidual contract, the notice period has been reduced from 30 to 15 days, and to
7 days in case of no agreement in the consultation with workers' representative
on collective changes. End of the so-called ultra atividad: an expired agreement
has no validity beyond one year after the expiry date.
External firm flexibility, dismissal and unemployment benefits
From 2012, specification of the conditions for justified dismissals is broad-
ened to a situation of a persistent reduction (effective or expected) in the level
of sales (previously only revenues were considered). A persistent reduction
occurs when sales or revenues fall for 3 consecutive quarters. Removal of the
administrative authorization required for collective dismissals or other business
decisions, such as the suspension of contracts or the temporary reduction of
working hours for economic or business-related reasons. Also the notification
period for justified dismissals is reduced to 15 days compared to 30 previously.
In the event of unfair dismissal, reduction of the compensation that all workers
on permanent contracts receive, from 45 days’ pay per year worked for a
maximum of 42 months to 33 days’ pay for year worked for a maximum of
24 months. After a rise of the working time to 37.5 hours a week in 2011, in
the public sector (central government), public administration can make collec-
tive redundancies for economic or business-related reasons. These measures are
permissible specifically in cases of “insufficient budget” or for other technical or
organizational reasons.
Fiscal incentives on labor costs
With the 2012 reform, introduction of an indefinite contract for young and
unemployed workers—called “support to entrepreneurs”—, which can be used
by companies of less than 50 employees. Companies that hire young unem-
ployed workers under permanent contracts receive a €3,000 tax reduction
upon first hire. Moreover, if the new worker had been receiving unemployment
benefits, the tax reduction is equal to 50 per cent of the amount the worker
was receiving in unemployment benefits at the time of hire. Other financial
incentives include discounts in social security contributions for hiring an unem-
ployed worker aged 16 to 30 years or over the age of 45 on a permanent
contract, and for hiring a woman in an industry where females are under-repre-
sented. Incentives are conditional to keeping the worker at least 3 years in the
firm (some exceptions are foreseen). The new contract will remain in force until
the unemployment rate in Spain falls to under 15%. With the 2014 reform,
introduction of temporary single monthly contributions to Social security (for
common contingencies such as pensions, health and safety) of 100 euros
(instead of 23,6% employer contribution rate) for all firms and self-employed,
during 24 months, who increase their level of net indefinite employment and
maintain it for at least 36 months. The new contracts have to be executed
between February 25, 2014 and December 31, 2014. The new flat rate is
regardless of the size and whether the recruitment is full or part time. In case of
part-time contracts, the company’s contribution will amount Euro 50 or 75 per
month depending on the working times being up to 50% or 75% of a full time
contract. These reductions apply for a period of 24 months, and during the
following 12 months, companies with less than 10 employees are also entitled
to obtain a reduction of 50% of contributions. 
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Cut in public sector wages by an average of 5% in 2010 (cut by between 8%
and 15% for high-ranking officials and between 0.56% and 7% for those on
lower pay). Public sector wage freeze since 2011.
Greece
In the framework of ‘Measures for the immediate reduction of public expend-
iture and the creation of a favorable investment environment, of 6 May 2010
and of Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP) of 2011 set up with the Troïka
support (IMF, ECB and EU), Greece has launched a reform programme aimed
to undermine the collective agreements from the ‘social Pact of 1990’ and
reduce the labor costs. The main measures are as follows:
About Job Protection
2010 Lowering the thresholds for collective dismissals. Abolishing the prin-
ciple of the “implementation of more favourable provision”, that the
terms of company agreements apply only when they are more favour-
able than the terms of sectoral agreements, which, in turn, apply only
when they are more favourable than the terms of the General Confed-
eration of Greek Workers. Shortening significantly the notice period for
terminating white-collar workers’ open-ended employment agree-
ments. This amounts to an indirect reduction of white-collar workers’
severance pay by 50%. Extension of probationary period from
2 months to 1 year. Extension of maximum work period under tempo-
rary work agencies.
2011 Expanding use of fixed-term contracts.    
2012 Reducing the length of the periods of notice for terminating an open-
ended employment contract (from 1 to 2 months according the
seniority in the firm). Reduction of severance pay on dismissal. All rules
providing special protection (banks, public sector companies) against
dismissal are to be abolished and only the common regulations of
dismissal shall apply. 
About Wage Setting 
In the public sector
2009 Freeze of basic salaries of civil servants and public sector pensioners.
2010 20% Cutbacks in the earnings of all persons employed in the wider
public sector. 30% reduction in the maximum limit of overtime after-
noon hours. Introduction of a ratio of one hire to five departures for
permanent employees and for those with indefinite-term private law
employment contracts—except in health, safety and education sectors.
Readjustment of bonuses, the Christmas, Easter and holiday bonuses
which amount to two monthly salaries and are referred to as the 13th
and 14th month salary.
2011 Increase in working hours in government sector to 40 hours per week.
Cut in productivity allowance to 50% for ordinary staff for one year.
Introduction of a single wage grid. Freeze of government wage drift.
Reduction in maximum hours of overtime– ordinary staff only – from
40 to 20 hours.
2012 Reduction in salaries of special wage regimes of general government.
Abolition of the remainder of Christmas, Easter and summer allowances
(1000 per year). Postponing the implementation of the productivity
allowance of Law 4024/2011 (after 2016)
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2010 Introducing the possibility to derogate from conditions set at higher
level agreements
Introducing a new type of company-related Collective Employment
Agreement (CEA), the ‘special company-related CEA’, which may
provide for remuneration and other working terms that are less favour-
able than the remuneration and working terms provided for by the
respective sectoral CEA. Minimum wages and minimum working
conditions at national and intersectoral level are still laid down by the
EGSSE. Freeze of Minimum wage frozen for three years (2010-2012)
and decreasing for workers under 25 years of age, to 84% of the
minimum national wage and for underage workers aged 15-18 years to
70% of the minimum wage through the conclusion of apprenticeship
agreements
2011 The suspension of the favourability principle implies that firm-level
agreements prevail over sector and professional agreements for the
duration of the EAP (2011-2016). Suspension of the extension of occu-
pational and sectoral collective agreements to non-signatory parts for
the duration of the EAP. Possibility of undercutting wages set in collec-
tive agreements by up to 20% for the hiring of new workers between
18 and 25 years old
2012 Reducing the 'after-effects' regime of expired collective agreements to
3 months. If, after this period, no new collective agreement has been
signed, the ‘after-effect’ principle means that after which some allow-
ances can be suspended until a new contract is signed. Maximum
duration of collective agreements set at 3 years. Cut of 22% of the
minimum wage (32% for workers under the age of 25). Temporary
suspension of automatic wage increases
2013 Approbation of a new statutory way to set the national minimum wage 
About labor costs
2010 Reducing overtime costs by between 5% and 10%. Abolition of tripar-
tite financing of the social security fund   
2011 Working time arrangements have been made more flexible
2012 Reduction in social contribution rates for employers by 1.1 percentage
points
2012-2013  Abolishing regulations limiting commercial shop opening hours
About unemployment benefits
2011 Cap on duration of unemployment benefits (450 days over a four-year
period as of 1 January 2013—400 days as of 1 January 2014). Cut in
unemployment benefits paid around Easter and Christmas
2012 Reduction from 12/3/2012, of the basic unemployment benefits by
22%
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/economic_reforms/
labref/
Ireland
Despite an attractive labour market regulation for firms, Ireland has put in
place some new measures to deepen flexibility and stimulate job creation.
Active labour market policies are very used but government has also imple-
mented several reforms
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2012 Reduced State rebate on statutory redundancy lump sums  from 60%
to 15%.
About Wage Setting
In the public sector
2009 End of social partnership as public sector talks collapse. 
Public service wages were cut on average by about 14% over 2009 and
2010
2010 Four year ‘Crooke Park’ Agreement (2010-2014):less generous pension
scheme for new recruits; increased room for flexibility, mobility and
redeployments; and increase in working time in certain sectors.  
2013 Four year ‘Haddington Road’ Agreement (2013-2016): temporary cuts
(from 5,5% to 10%) on salaries above €65.000; increase of the
standard working hours. additionnal Flexible working arrangements
In the private sector
2010 Reduction of statutory minimum wage by 1 euro (or 12%), down to
7.65 euros
2012 Regulation by the Government of the wage bargaining framework (e.g.
extension of collective agreements, representativeness of social part-
ners, etc.)                 
About labor costs
2010 Exemption from social insurance contributions for 12 months in case of
hiring of unemployed for 6 months or more
2013 JobsPlus incentive programme to recruit long-term unemployed people:
€7.500 for recruits unemployed for more than 12 but less than
24 months and €10.000 for recruits unemployed for more than
24 months. To date over 1.800 jobseekers have benefitted from this
subsidy, ca. 60% of whom were two years unemployed
About unemployment benefits
2009 Reduction of Unemployment benefits by 4,1%      
2010 Reduction of Unemployment benefits by 4,1%      
2011 Penalty measures for beneficiaries not in compliance with job-search
conditionality
2012 Reduction of the duration of Jobseeker's Benefit by 3 months (from
12 months to 9 months for recipients with 260 or more contributions
paid; and from 9 months to 6 months for recipients with less than 260
contributions paid) and the benefits are now linked to previous earn-
ings. Withholding or reducing up to 9 weeks under certain
circumstances (refusal to take up a suitable job offer or to participate in
the activation process.
2013 Reducing duration of JobPlus scheme for those younger than 26.
Reduced Jobseeker's Allowance for those younger than 26.
Sources : http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/economic_reforms/
labref/, National Reform Programme, Ireland, April 2014, Macroeconomic Imbal-
ances, Ireland 2014, EUROPEAN ECONOMY, Occasional Papers 181, March 2014.
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Beyond these factors, the absence of significant recovery, coupled with a
slowing inflation rate and weak credit conditions highlight a deeper crisis, which
is reminiscent of the Japanese situation in the early 1990s. Some seven years after
the financial crisis broke out, the euro area GDP is still 1.6% below its pre-crisis
level. Between 2007 and 2013, growth averaged -0.2%. By way of comparison,
Japanese GDP grew by 0.5 % per year on average between 1992 and 1999
during the so-called “lost decade”. Can the euro area also end up in a situation of
deflation and anaemic growth? There is a real risk and the literature on financial
crises highlights that recessions which occur in such circumstances are longer
and more costly (Claessens, Kose and Terrones, 2011). Post-financial crisis
periods are characterized by weak credit and investment, due to deteriorating
financial intermediation and deleveraging by private agents (Jorda, Schularick
and Taylor, 2013). The euro area banking system, which plays a major role in
financing non-financial agents, was severely undermined by the subprime and
sovereign debt crises.
Moreover, the crisis stems from excessive private debt which created real-
estate bubbles, especially in Spain and Ireland. Under these conditions, non-finan-
cial agents (households and non-financial corporations) need to clean up their
balance sheet before activity can recover. These two elements—fragility of the
banking system and balance-sheet deleveraging of non-financial agents—epito-
mizes the idea of balance-sheet recession, which was described by Koo (2011).
The consequence is a weak internal demand, especially as regards investment.
This situation fuels deflationary pressures, which in turn deteriorate the situation
of indebted agents and makes monetary policy ineffective.   
After the two crises which hit the euro area banking system, the question of its
soundness remains. The recent AQR led by the ECB has clarified some doubts on
the risk of insolvency, but vulnerabilities remain, notably because their leverage
effect10 is still high. European banks were very exposed to toxic assets (structured
products, subprime). They were also exposed to the sovereign risk of their home
country, and to the sovereign risk of other countries11 in the euro area, because of
an increasingly integrated of EU bond market during the 2000s. The collapse of
the market for structured products, followed by the fall in the price of some sover-
eign bonds reduced banks’ access to liquidity and threatened their solvability. This
led the ECB to intervene by proposing fixed rate refinancing (FRFA) and longer
maturities (LTRO and VLTRO). Non-performing loans have not been completely
cleared from the banks’ balance sheets (in Spain, in Italy, Table 4): this reduces
the banks’ risk appetite and reinforces the fragmentation in European banking
systems. The high level of non-performing loans hampers the distribution of new
credits by banks, in spite of the ECB’s very accommodating monetary policy, and
of the recent TLTRO program. 
10. The leverage effect is measured by the ratio between equity and non-weighted assets. When it
comes to the calculation of solvency ratios, assets are weighed according to the associated risk
level. Thus, public bonds, which are regarded as riskless, are not taken into account in the
weighted assets.
11. See Davies and Ng (2011).
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corporations. Credit flows are negative since the start of 2013 (Figure 8). The SAFE
survey, realized by the ECB on the access to finance of enterprises, also indicate
that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are facing funding difficulties. In
Greece 32% of SMEs report that access to finance was their most pressing
problem between April and September 2014 (Table 5). These percentages
amount to 18% in Ireland and 17% in Spain and Portugal, while German and
Austrian firms encountered less difficulties since access to finance is the most
pressing problem for only 9% and 7% of SMEs. 
Table 4. Major trends in non-performing loans between 2008 and 2013, 
in some euro area countries
Bank Regulatory 
Capital/Risk-
Weighted Assets
Variation 
in % points
Non-performing 
loans/total loans
Variation 
in % points
 2013 2008-2013 2013 2008-2013
AUT 18.0 5.1 2.9 1.0
BEL 18.7 2.3 4.3 2.7
DEU 19.2 5.6 2.7 -0.2
ESP 13.3 2.0 9.4 6.6
FIN 16.0 2.4 0.5*       0.1*
FRA 15.4 4.9 4.5 1.7
GRC 13.5 3.5 31.9 27.2
IRL 20.4 8.4 25.3 23.4
ITA 13.7 3.3 16.5 10.3
NLD 14.9 3.0 3.2 1.5
PRT 13.3 3.9 10.6 7.0
* 2012 figures.
Source: FMI Financial Soundness Indicators, octobre 2014.
Table 5.  Access to finance of firms in the euro area
BEL DEU IRL GRC ESP FRA ITA NLD AUT POR FIN EUZ
% of SMEs for which the most pressing problems is access to finance  
Oct-13/Mar-14 9.2 6.2 21.6 39.8 16.6 11.9 16.3 16.0 8.0 18.3 9.1 13.4
April-14/Sept-14 11.2 8.8 17.6 31.7 17.3 11.2 14.4 14.1 7.1 17.0 10.4 13.2
BEL DEU IRL GRC ESP FRA ITA NLD AUT POR FIN EUZ
% of SMEs that did not apply for bank loans because of possible rejection 
Oct-13/Mar-14 4.4 1.9 13.1 22.3 5.4 8.0 7.8 9.9 1.7 7.5 2.8 6.3
April-14/Sept-14 3.9 6.3 14.9 29.4 9.1 5.6 9.5 9.9 4.4 8.6 3.7 8.4
BEL DEU IRL GRC ESP FRA ITA NLD AUT POR FIN EUZ
 % of SMEs that did not apply for bank loans because of sufficient internal funds  
Oct-13/Mar-14 54.9 53.3 53.5 22.8 36.2 30.9 31.1 51.4 65.0 30.8 55.2 40.4
April-14/Sept-14 37.6 48.5 39.6 25.7 34.0 33.8 23.5 36.5 50.2 37.8 33.8 36.2
Source : ECB (SAFE survey).
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rationing) and reduction of credit demand. The Bank Lending Survey (BLS), also
conducted quarterly by the ECB, stressed that banks from the euro area have
reported that demand factors have been as important as supply factors. From the
banks’ perspective, the refusal to provide credit may reflect a deterioration in the
average quality of borrowers. But the borrower would here consider that credit
supply was rationed if he has been denied a request for funding. Moreover, even if
debt securities issuance has increased, it is far from compensating the decline in
bank lending. In addition, equity financing has also declined so that total non-
financial corporations financing flows are lower than in 2003. The weak demand
for credit in the euro area reflects both the slowdown in economic activity but also
the deteriorating financial situation of non-financial agents.
Access to external funding may be restricted for firms or households if they
suffer from a fall in their income or profitability, or if they are not able to provide
adequate collateral. External financing (funding from banks or financial market)
becomes more expensive. In practice, enterprises (or households) reduce their
funding requests because they know that their situation has deteriorated and
therefore cannot benefit from attractive financing conditions. This self-selection
process has concerned 36% of SMEs in the euro area according to the SAFE survey
(Table 5), notably 48.5% of German or 50% of Austrian firm against less than
26% of Greek SMEs for which the fear of a possible rejection was the main reason
given for not seeking funding. However, it can be considered that the difference
between these two motivations is rather subjective. These two factors may then
reflect the weakening of the financial situation of small and medium firms in the
euro area.
Spending is then constrained either because of the inability to get credit or by
the need to reduce debt. Deleveraging generally takes a considerable time
explaining why post-financial crisis periods are characterized by low growth. In
Figure 8. Euro area financing flows of non-financial corporations
     4-quarter cumulated flows, euro billions
Source: ECB.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report38the euro area, household debt has fallen by 3 points since 2011, which is still very
limited compared to the previous increase of 25 points between 2000 and 2010
(Figure 9). Household debt has declined in all countries but France, Belgium and
Finland. Debt has decreased at a very moderate pace in Italy and more signifi-
cantly in Spain, Ireland and Portugal. In Austria, the level of household debt at the
end of 2013 is slightly lower than its 2006 level and Germany is the only country
for which household debt is decreasing since 2000, where it amounted to 106.6%
of disposable income against 83.3% in 2013.
For firms, strong heterogeneity remains across countries in the euro area. The
reduction of corporate debt is particularly marked in Spain but less marked in
Germany and Italy, while in France, corporate debt has stabilized at around 127%
of value added (Figure 10). Deleveraging may not have come to an end but it is
yet difficult to assess its likely duration, not least because the target value of debt
for households and corporates is not known. According to the European Commis-
sion12, it might be a long-lasting process which is expected to hamper investment
spending by non-financial corporations and households (housing investment) and
consumption spending. Medium-term growth will then be negatively impinged.
In this environment, monetary policy may play a crucial yet limited role. It is
crucial to avoid a credit crunch as banks and non-financial agents’ balance sheets
are impaired. Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2012) analyse the impact of monetary
policy through the bank lending channel in Spain. They suggest that rejection of
loans decreases when the ECB cuts interest rates. The effect is stronger for fragile
banks (less liquid or capitalized). Thus, monetary policy plays an important role in
reducing the effects of credit supply restriction. But the impact on demand may
be limited when financial net worth of firms is impaired. Bech, Gambacorta and
Figure 9. Change in household debt in the euro area
   In % of gross disposable income
Source: ECB.
12. See European Commission, Autumn forecasts, 2014 (box I.1, I.2 et I.3)
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Deflation is coming: Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries 39Kharroubi (2012) find indeed that monetary policy is less effective during recov-
eries following financial crises. The interpretation is that spending is weakly
supported by loose monetary policy as long as deleveraging is the priority for the
non-financial sector. However, the exchange rate channel of monetary policy may
be powerful during these periods as it improves competitiveness and boosts
external demand. Although the exchange rate is not a target of the ECB, recent
statements of Mario Draghi have illustrated that ECB is showing stronger interest
in the value of euro. The aims of ECB measures taken in June 2014 was at least
indirectly to bring down the euro and reduce the risk of deflation.
2. Risk of deflation and hysteresis 
Harmonised consumer price inflation was 0.4% in October 2014, at constant
tax rates the rate stood at only 0.2% (figure 11). In the past 12 months, the
decline has been largely due to lower import prices, especially energy prices. But
already a year ago headline inflation was well below the ECB’s target of 1.9%,
reaching only 0.7% in October 2013 and 0.8% in November 2013. The core HICP
rate excluding energy, food alcohol and tobacco better reflects the underlying
inflation dynamic. It has fluctuated between 1.0% and 0.7% during the past 12
months and is currently at 0.7%. The euro area is in the midst of a longer period
of too-low inflation, with several countries registering negative rates, i.e. deflation.
Inflation expectations have continually declined over the past year (Figure
12). This applies to short-term, medium-term and long-term expectations. Lower
inflation expectations imply higher real interest rates. In a simulation for the euro
area, IMK (2014) found that a decline in inflation expectations by 1 percentage
point would depress euro-area GDP by 0.9 percentage points (Figure 13).    
Figure 10. Non-financial corporate debt in the euro area
   In % value-added
Source: Banque de France.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report40Only the real-interest effect is captured by the simulation. Beyond this effect,
lower longer-term inflation expectations negatively impact on investment and
consumption demand by raising uncertainty: They signal that market participants
are less confident that the ECB will be able to meet its inflation target. Lower infla-
tion expectations and lower inflation also increase the debt burden of consumers
and enterprises which further reduces aggregate demand and investment,13 in
Figure 11. Harmonized consumer price index (HICP)
y-o-y, %
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 12. Inflation expectations (Survey of Professional forecasters)
  HICP, y-o-y, % 
Note: In 1999 and 2000 the SPF collected five-years ahead inflation expectations only in the first quarter.
Source: ECB (Survey of professional forecasters).
13. See Eggertson and Krugman (2012) for a recent theoretical approach on Fisherian debt
deflation mechanisms.
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Deflation is coming: Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries 41particular. If inflation expectations turn negative, i.e. deflation sets in, matters are
made worse as consumers and investors defer purchases in expectation of lower
prices. Once inflation is very low, the ECB’s policy rate become ineffective,
because it has a nominal lower bound of zero. As inflation expectations decline,
the real rate of interest increases, effectively robbing the central bank of its key
policy instrument. This is one reason why central banks have an inflation target
well above zero. The inflation target has to provide a “sufficient safety margin
against deflation“ (ECB 2003, p. 17).
The ECB currently expects inflation rates to remain well below its inflation
target in the longer term. According to its latest forecast in September 2014, the
ECB expects an inflation rate of 0.6% in 2014, 1.1% in 2015 and 1.4% in 2016.
Monetary policy makers still have tools available and are currently using them: a
negative deposit rate, long-term fixed rate refinancing operations and security
purchases, in particular the purchase of covered bonds and ABS. But there is little
empirical data to gauge the effect of these instruments. Waiting to see whether
deflation takes hold to implement them—as recently suggested by the German
Council of Economic Experts (2014, p. 163)—seems highly unwise.
The safety margin against deflation is no longer sufficient. This alone justifies
that the ECB has adopted new policy measures to prop up demand and inflation.
But aside from the risk of deflation, another strong argument for more expan-
sionary macro policy is to be found in the long duration of the current crisis. Low
inflation is indicative of a large output gap as well as low investment opportunities
and aggravates the euro area’s problem of high indebtedness. Firms and house-
holds are faced with higher real debt burdens as incomes fall short of their
expected nominal values. The unemployment rate in the euro area has been
above 10% for almost 5 years. Currently it is at 11.5% and well above this level in
many euro-area countries, reaching around 25% in both Spain and Greece.
Figure 13. Lower inflation expectation: Impact on euro area GDP
1 Lower 10-year inflation expectations in the euro area by 1 percentage point compared to baseline.
Source: IMK (2014), NiGEM.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report42Resources are wasted and future potential output is impaired as youth unemploy-
ment is well above the average rate, reaching more than 50% in both Spain and
Greece (see also Chapter 2). The longer GDP remains below its potential level and
the higher remains the unemployment rate, i.e. the longer a negative output and
unemployment gap persists, the more likely it becomes that potential output
declines as well. This risk is significant today as unemployment rates still reach
record levels in some euro area countries (Figure 14) and may persist given our
current growth forecasts.
Potential output is the sustainable, non-inflationary output an economy can
produce. The key factors that affect the level of potential output are the capital
stock, the labour force and productivity. As investment comes to a halt, the capital
stock declines due to depreciation. With low investment and reduced expenditure
on research and technology, the rate of innovation slows impacting negatively on
total factor productivity. And as unemployment spells lengthen, the unemployed
may experience a loss of skills and human capital and become discouraged. This
causes the labour force to decline as both the inflation-stable rate of unemploy-
ment (NAIRU) rises and the participation rate falls (Ball 2009, Logeay/Tober
2006). Through these so-called hysteresis effects, the level of potential output is
thus affected by the level of actual output. In this vein, ECB-president Draghi also
argued for more expansionary macroeconomic policies in the euro area when he
stated in August 2014:
“Demand side policies are not only justified by the significant cyclical compo-
nent in unemployment. They are also relevant because, given prevailing
uncertainty, they help insure against the risk that a weak economy is contributing
to hysteresis effects.” (Draghi 2014)
Potential output is endogenous to the actual level of economic activity not
only on the theoretical, but also on the empirical level. Unfortunately, in empirical
estimations potential output adjusts to actual output largely for econometric
Figure 14. Unemployment rate
In % of labour force
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS forecasts.
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Deflation is coming: Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries 43rather than economic reasons.14 During a long-lasting crisis such as the current
crisis in the euro area the estimated potential output is revised downwards: the
output gap may as a consequence appear to be smaller than it is and with it the
perceived necessity of expansionary macroeconomic policies.
In the case of the inflation-stable unemployment rate (NAIRU) the procyclical
development recently led the EU Commission to change the specification of the
NAIRU model for several countries, most prominently Spain (European Commis-
sion 2014a). As can be seen in Figure 15, in Autumn 2013 the EU Commission’s
forecast of the Spanish NAIRU for 2014 almost equaled the forecast of unemploy-
ment for that year. As Spanish unemployment was declining at the time, the
actual unemployment rate was likely to be lower than the estimated NAIRU in
2015. An unemployment rate of above 20% entailing youth unemployment of
more than 50% was thus being interpreted as labour market equilibrium or even
labour market tightness, i.e. an overutilization of labor. Given this implausible
outcome, in the Spring 2014 forecast the EU Commission changed the model
specification of NAIRU. Rather than climbing to 26.6% in 2015, the new NAIRU
now increases to only 20.5% in 2015.
Despite the change in model specification, the NAIRU estimate is still procy-
clical, albeit less so. This is relevant for economic policy, because the NAIRU
estimate affects the estimate of potential output and thereby also the structural
deficit of euro-area countries. On average, an increase in the EU-Commission’s
14. For a discussion of the dominance of time series properties in the estimates of the EU
Commission’s NAIRU, see Gechert/Rietzler/Tober (2014), who show that the European
Commission’s NAIRU is mostly driven by actual unemployment and turns out to be quite resilient to
structural reforms.
Figure 15. EU Commission estimates of the Spanish NAIRU at different publication 
dates
 In %
Sources: European Commission, Economic Forecasts, European Economy and CIRCA website.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report44NAIRU by 1 percentage point lowers the output gap by 0.65 percentage points
which, in turn, increases the structural deficit by 0.4 percentage points (EU
Commission 2014b: 29).
Economic growth is a major factor not only in attaining low unemployment
but also in achieving sustainable public finances. If GDP is 2% higher, the deficit
will be 1 percentage point lower, given a budgetary semi-elasticity of 0.5. Analo-
gously, if potential output is 2% higher, the structural deficit will be 1 percentage
point lower. There is thus a risk of a vicious circle in which persistent low growth
leads to upward revisions of the NAIRU, reduced estimations of potential output,
higher structural deficits and thus pressure for greater fiscal consolidation, which
in turn depresses output further.
Given a shortage of aggregate demand and a lack of investment in part due
to adverse profitability prospects, more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies
are required to boost economic growth. If successful, there is even the real
chance, that the euro area enters a virtuous cycle of higher growth and employ-
ment as well as fiscal consolidation with a declining inflation-stable
unemployment rate, a rising labour participation rate, more capital investment
and a higher rate of productivity growth.
3. The risk of a new wave of austerity 
Though it has still significant impact on economic activity, austerity has been
lessened in 2014 and 2015. Two arguments may explain this slowing pace of
consolidation. On the one hand, countries have benefited from extended dead-
lines in 2013 for correcting the excessive deficit. Spain, France, the Netherlands
and Portugal were notably concerned. New headlines deficits targets were set by
the European Commission, which also mentioned careful attention would be paid
to the reduction of structural deficits. The aim was not to allow countries to
reduce their effort of fiscal consolidation, but rather to take into consideration the
fact that former targets were not achievable given the deterioration of the
economic outlook. With these new deadlines, excessive deficits should have been
corrected in 2014 for the Netherlands, which is the case, in 2015 for France and
Portugal and in 2016 for Spain. On the other hand, some countries are already
under the 3% threshold and have exited the excessive deficit procedure:
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Luxembourg,
Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia. Although Greece is still in the excessive deficit
procedure, the headline deficit is expected to be below 3% of GDP in 2014. Given
GDP forecasts and voted fiscal impulses for 2014, the situation should not change
in 2015, as France, Portugal and Spain will not reach the target, whereas Ireland
would exit the EDP (table 6).
But austerity has not yet not come to an end, as fiscal rules were reinforced in
2011 with the fiscal compact. Beyond the deficit rule according to which headline
deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP, a debt rule was introduced, stipulating that
debt-to-GDP ratio should reach 60%. Besides, the medium term objective (MTO)
sets a maximum value for structural deficits that should not exceed 0.5% (or 1%
for countries where debt is below 60%). Considering the current level of public
debt, countries will hardly benefit from fiscal space even if they have succeeded to
reduce the headline deficit below 3% and are no longer in the excessive deficit
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period is over. The aim of this last section is precisely to assess the amount of
consolidation that will be needed to comply with fiscal rules. To that end, we run
simulations based on the iAGS model.15 The first step involves simulating the
macroeconomic dynamic with current expected fiscal impulses already decided
for 2015 and expected according to the Stability Programmes for the period
2016-2018 (see table 3). Simulations start in 2015 and initial values, as well as the
main features of the model are detailed in Box 3.
Box 3. Short description of the model and main hypotheses 
for the baseline simulations
The key features of the model are the following: 
■ It allows for an explicit representation of the main euro area countries:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal and Spain. An aggregated euro area is also computed.
■ On the demand side, an open economy aggregate demand function is
represented, with fiscal and monetary policy, external demand (a channel
for intra EU interdependencies) as well as exogenous shocks on the output
gap (the gap between actual and potential GDP). The equation is written as
an error-correction model. The stabilization of the economy stems from
adjustments in the long-term interest rates and competitiveness, which
have feedback effects on the output gap. The stabilisation may then hinge
on private demand (through interest rates adjustment and monetary
policy) and on external demand (through the decrease in relative prices).
15. A full representation of the model is given by Blot, Cochard, Creel, Ducoudré, Schweisguth and
Timbeau (2014).
Table 6.  Fiscal balances
In %
2014 2015
DEU 0.5 0.4
FRA -4.5 -4.3
ITA -3.0 -2.9
ESP -5.0 -4.2
NLD -2.9 -2.2
BEL -2.6 -1.9
PRT -3.8 -2.4
IRL -3.6 -2.6
GRC -1.6 -1.0
FIN -2.7 -2.4
AUT -2.5 -1.4
EUZ -2.3 -2.0
Source : Eurostat, iAGS forecasts.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report46Exchange rate is exogenous. The calibration allows to simulate standard
hypotheses as well as alternatives, checking the dependence of results on
different sets of hypotheses. Furthermore, the size of fiscal multipliers is
allowed to vary along the business cycle. The ineffectiveness of monetary
policy is made possible when the economy hits the zero lower bound (ZLB). 
■ External demand is modelled using a bilateral trade matrix representing
interdependencies between countries. The trade matrix is also used as a
basis for imbalances analysis. 
■ We model prices by a generalized Phillips curve relating current and
expected inflation to the output gap, imported inflation and other exoge-
nous shocks. Expectations can be modelled as adaptive (backward-looking)
or rational (forward-looking).
■ A Taylor rule sums up monetary policy, except under the Zero Lower
Bound. 
■ Changes in the short-term monetary policy rate are then passed through
the long-term interest rates. Hence, according to the expectations theory,
the long-term interest rate for German public bonds is set equal to the
expected sum of future short-term interest rates (Shiller, 1979), with short-
term interest rates set by the (European) central bank. The long- term
public rate for Germany is considered risk free, and long-term public rates
for other countries include a risk premium that is set exogenously. We also
temporarily set exogenously the long-term rate for countries that entered
the EFSF to account for a lower interest rate on debt refinancing. Finally, for
each country the long-term interest rate on private bonds is equal to the
public one plus a risk premium that is set exogenously.
■ The stance of monetary policy remains expansionary as long as the euro
area aggregate output gap is negative and if inflation is below the 2%
target. In case of a negative idiosyncratic demand shock, the convergence
to the potential growth rate hinges partly on the effects of common expan-
sionary monetary and on a competitiveness effect. Due to hysteresis effect,
the output level may be permanently affected by a negative demand shock.
Trend growth of the potential output will always converge to an exoge-
nously set path. 
■ The public balance separates interest payments, cyclically-adjusted balance
and cyclical components, in order to properly assess the fiscal stance, i.e.
the part of fiscal policy which is under the direct control (discretion) of
current governments. We then derive public debt projections for euro area
countries.
Simulations begin in 2015. To do so, we need to set some starting point
values in 2014 for a set of determinant variables. Output gaps for 2014 come
from OECD forecasts. These hypotheses, as well as those for long-term growth
projections are necessarily open to debate. Simulations are provided to assess
the sensitivity of our result on the output gap and long-term growth.
Concerning fiscal policy and budget variables, the main assumptions are as
follows:
— Public debt and public balance in 2014 come from iAGS forecasts;16
16. There might be some small differences with previous tables or with country-tables in the
appendix for fiscal balance, public debt or fiscal impulses as simulations have not necessarily been
realized with the latest available information.
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fiscal impulses implied by the Stability and Growth Pact reported in the
“Stability Programmes” presented in 2014 by each country.
— Sovereign spreads come from iAGS forecasts under the hypothesis of
convergence of long-term interest rates completed in 2017. 
With current fiscal impulses (corresponding to the current stance for 2015
and to P-stab forecasts for 2016-2018), we first illustrate the debt dynamic until
2034. A 20-year horizon was chosen here to stick to the horizon set in the fiscal
compact for achieving the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio. The 60% threshold would not
be reached by France, Italy, Spain and Finland. It must be stressed here that initial
values on structural balance are critical to assess the relative position of each
country in 2034. Debt dynamics hinge on the critical gap between real interest
rate and real GDP growth rate. Given the model properties, the critical gap
converges to zero17 so that the structural balance matters to explain differences
across countries in the baseline’s projections for public debt. As fiscal impulses
beyond 2015 remain limited, the initial value for structural deficit is a critical
hypothesis. This hypothesis is here strongly related to the output gap. For a given
headline deficit, the higher is the output gap, the smaller is the structural deficit.
This may explain here why situation is more favourable in Spain than in France.
Though the Spanish headline deficit is higher, the structural deficit would be
smaller, so that debt-reduction by 2034 is more substantial in Spain than in
France. It must be added that structural balance between 2014 and 2034 will also
depend on expected fiscal impulses and on the dynamic of potential output. With
hysteris effects, a reduction in activity leads to a decrease in the potential output
and everything else equal a rise in the structural deficit, because the decrease in
potential output triggers a permanent reduction in fiscal receipts.
Table 7. Main hypotheses for 2014
In %
 Public debt Fiscal 
balance
Structural 
balance
Primary 
structural 
balance
output gap Inflation 
rate
potential 
growth
DEU 75.6 0.2 0.2 2.2 -0.1 1.0 1.0
FRA 93.9 -4.5 -2.6 -0.4 -3.9 0.7 1.4
ITA 131.6 -3.0 -0.3 4.8 -5.4 0.2 0.2
ESP 98.4 -5.5 -2.1 1.3 -6.8 0.1 1.4
NLD 75.6 -2.9 -0.5 1.2 -4.3 0.4 1.3
BEL 102.3 -2.6 -1.6 1.5 -1.9 0.8 1.5
PRT 131.5 -3.8 -0.6 3.7 -7.0 0.2 1.0
IRL 118.7 -3.6 -0.4 4.3 -8.0 0.4 1.8
GRC 176 -3.3 2.4 7.4 -13.1 -0.9 1.0
FIN 61.3 -2.7 -0.6 -1.6 -4.2 1.3 1.6
AUT 76.1 -2.9 -1.4 0.7 -3.3 1.6 1.4
Sources: OECD, European Commission, iAGS forecasts.
17. In the long run, real interest rate is equal to the potential output growth rate to make sure that
output gap converges to zero.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report48In Table 8,18 output gaps are closing between 2015 and 2019 explaining why
GDP growth rates are above long-term growth rates. Inflation is below 2% for all
countries and reverts to the ECB target after 2020. 
The next step is to assess whether countries are able to meet the ceiling by
2034. As for last report, the aim is to reach 60% for all countries so that for coun-
tries which are below 60% in table 8, we consider positive fiscal impulses. These
countries have fiscal space (this point is also discussed in Box 4 to take into
account the constraints coming from the MTO). Considering current fiscal rules,
we apply fiscal impulses capped at +/-0.5. Successive positive (if country-debt is
below 60% in table 8) or negative (if country-debt is above 60% in table 8)
impulses are implemented until the debt-to-GDP reaches 60%. We find that all
countries would be able to comply with the fiscal rule on public debt. Yet, it may
involve a significant additional effort. The cumulated effort to reach the 60% ratio
would amount to 3.4 points in France (Table 9) instead of 1.3 in table 8. Italy,
Spain and Portugal would be constrained to additional efforts of 0.7, 0.5 and
0.7 point of GDP. Considering fixed annual value for fiscal impulses of 0.5, addi-
tional effort for Italy, Spain and Portugal would not go beyond 2 years. Germany
would benefit from fiscal space according to the debt criteria and may implement
a fiscal stimulus of 2.1 points (approximatively 4 years of positive fiscal impulses of
0.5 point of annual GDP. It must be stressed that Ireland and Greece would also
have fiscal space in this scenario. This conclusion critically hinges on the initial
18. Simulations are based on the main hypotheses table for 2014. Public debt figures may be
slightly different than expected in country-tables.
Table 8. Baseline scenario
In%
Public debt Structural balance CFI Average 
growth rate
Min-
OG
Average infla-
tion rate
2015 2020 2034 2015 2020 2034 2015-
2018
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
DEU 73 60 29 0.4 0.7 1.2 0.3 1.2 1.0 0.0 1.2 2.0
FRA 96 94 86 -2.4 -2.0 -2.6 -1.3 1.8 1.5 -3.6 1.0 2.0
ITA 133 119 67 -0.2 1.0 2.3 -0.6 0.9 0.2 -4.5 0.8 2.0
ESP 101 96 66 -1.7 -0.8 -0.3 -1.7 2.0 1.5 -5.3 0.6 1.9
NLD 76 69 49 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 2.0 1.3 -3.6 0.4 2.0
BEL 102 86 33 -0.7 1.2 2.3 -2.3 1.7 1.5 -1.9 0.7 2.0
PRT 131 114 60 -0.4 0.7 1.9 -1.4 1.8 1.1 -5.8 1.2 2.0
IRL 116 95 14 0.8 2.4 4.8 -1.9 2.9 1.9 -6.1 -0.1 2.0
GRC 172 141 50 2.6 2.4 4.9 -0.9 2.7 1.0 -10.5 0.4 1.9
FIN 64 64 73 -0.8 -2.0 -3.5 -1.0 2.1 1.6 -3.9 0.9 2.0
AUT 77 71 57 -1.3 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 1.8 1.4 -3.0 1.4 2.0
EUZ 96 86 56 -0.7 -0.1 0.2 -0.7 1.5 1.1 -2.9 0.9 2.0
CFI: Cumulated fiscal impulse.
Source: iAGS forecasts.
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Greece. Considering the extreme case where the entire headline deficit is struc-
tural, conclusions would be significantly modified. This alternative scenario is
considered in table 10 where we have made the extreme hypothesis that output
gap is zero. Deficts are now fully structural explaining why all countries but
Germany, Belgium and Ireland would have to consent to significant fiscal consoli-
dation efforts. The cumulated restrictive fiscal stance between 2015 and 2034
would now exceed 5 GDP points for France, Italy, Spain and Greece. 
A more positive scenario may also be considered if long-term growth is
higher. An increase in potential growth may stem from an initiative for investment
as the ones described in iAGS report 2014 or in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report.
This may also be the objective of the recently announced Junker investment initia-
tive but we may cast some doubts on its ability to boost investment and growth
(see Box 5). The ability to comply with the debt-rule is then assessed when long-
term growth rates are higher19 (Table 11). The values for long-term growth in this
new scenario are shown in column 7. 
 
19. The values for these long-term growth rates are taken from OECD estimates (see Johansson
et al., 2012). We have computed a weighted average over the period 2014-2050.
Table 9. The cost of reaching 60% debt-to-GDP
In %
Public debt Structural balance CFI Average 
growth rate
Min-
OG
Average infla-
tion rate
2015 2020 2034 2015 2020 2034 2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
DEU 73 64 60 0.4 -1.4 -1.7 2.4 1.4 1.0 -0.1 1.3 2.0
FRA 96 93 60 -2.4 -0.6 0.1 -3.4 1.7 1.5 -3.6 1.0 1.9
ITA 133 119 60 -0.3 1.5 3.1 -1.3 0.8 0.3 -4.5 0.7 2.0
ESP 101 95 60 -1.7 -0.3 0.4 -2.2 2.0 1.5 -5.3 0.6 1.9
NLD 76 71 60 -0.3 -1.1 -1.3 0.3 2.1 1.3 -3.7 0.5 2.0
BEL 102 91 60 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1 -0.6 1.9 1.5 -1.9 0.8 2.0
PRT 131 118 60 -0.5 0.7 2.2 -2.1 1.4 1.2 -5.9 1.0 1.9
IRL 116 98 60 0.8 -0.6 0.2 1.7 3.4 1.8 -6.1 0.1 2.0
GRC 172 138 60 2.6 1.5 3.6 0.4 3.1 1.0 -10.5 0.6 2.0
FIN 64 62 60 -0.9 -1.2 -2.3 -2.0 2.0 1.6 -4.0 0.9 2.0
AUT 77 72 60 -1.4 -1.2 -1.3 -0.4 1.8 1.4 -3.0 1.4 2.0
EUZ 96 87 60 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 1.5 1.1 -2.9 0.9 2.0
CFI: Cumulated fiscal impulse
Source: iAGS model.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report50Table 10. 60% debt-to-GDP with higher initial structural deficits
In %
Public debt Structural balance CFI Average 
growth rate
Min-
OG
Average infla-
tion rate
2015 2020 2034 2015 2020 2034 2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
DEU 73 64 60 0.4 -1.3 -1.6 2.3 1.4 1.0 -0.1 1.3 2.0
FRA 97 99 60 -4.1 -2.2 1.7 -6.8 1.2 1.4 -0.9 1.3 1.9
ITA 135 131 60 -2.8 0.2 4.7 -5.4 0.0 0.2 -1.2 1.1 1.9
ESP 102 104 60 -4.4 -2.0 1.6 -5.9 1.2 1.4 -0.7 1.2 1.9
NLD 77 74 60 -2.4 -1.0 -1.2 -2.0 1.3 1.3 -0.6 0.7 2.0
BEL 102 92 60 -1.7 -0.6 0.0 -1.5 1.6 1.5 -0.5 0.9 2.0
PRT 132 121 60 -3.3 -0.4 2.7 -4.6 0.9 1.0 -0.7 1.8 2.0
IRL 116 105 60 -2.0 -0.6 0.7 -1.5 2.1 1.8 0.0 0.6 2.0
GRC 172 154 60 -2.3 0.4 5.3 -5.9 0.9 1.0 -0.4 1.5 1.9
FIN 65 67 60 -2.8 -2.0 -1.7 -4.2 1.5 1.6 -0.9 1.2 2.0
AUT 78 75 60 -2.8 -1.1 -1.1 -1.9 1.3 1.4 -0.9 1.6 2.0
EUZ 97 92 60 -2.2 -1.2 0.7 -2.9 1.2 1.1 -0.4 1.2 1.9
CFI: Cumulated fiscal impulse.
Source: iAGS model.
Table 11. 60% debt-to-GDP with higher long-term growth
In %
Public debt Structural balance CFI Average 
growth rate
Min-
OG
Average infla-
tion rate
2015 2020 2034 2015 2020 2034 2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
DEU .73 64 60 0.4 -1.5 -1.8 2.5 1.5 1.1 -0.1 1.3 2.0
FRA 96 91 60 -2.4 -0.6 -0.2 -3.1 1.9 1.7 -3.6 1.0 1.9
ITA 132 114 60 -0.2 0.6 2.1 0.0 1.7 0.9 -4.5 0.8 2.0
ESP 100 94 60 -1.7 -0.7 0.0 -1.7 2.4 1.8 -5.3 0.6 1.9
NLD 76 70 60 -0.3 -1.4 -1.6 0.6 2.6 1.7 -3.7 0.5 2.0
BEL 102 90 60 -0.7 -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 2.3 1.9 -1.9 0.8 2.0
PRT 130 110 60 -0.4 0.0 1.2 -0.4 2.6 1.6 -5.8 1.3 2.0
IRL 116 97 60 0.8 -0.6 0.0 1.9 3.6 2.0 -6.1 0.1 2.0
GRC 171 134 60 2.6 0.9 2.9 1.3 3.7 1.5 -10.5 0.6 2.0
FIN 64 61 60 -0.9 -1.4 -2.4 -1.8 2.4 2.0 -4.0 0.9 2.0
AUT 77 72 60 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 -0.3 1.9 1.5 -3.0 1.4 2.0
EUZ 96 86 60 -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1 1.8 1.4 -3.0 1.0 2.0
CFI: Cumulated fiscal impulse.
Source: iAGS model.
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Beyond debt constraints, countries also have to stick to medium-term objec-
tives, which are country-specific. According to the reformed Stability and
Growth Pact, stability programmes and convergence programmes present
a medium-term objective for the budgetary position. It is country-specific to
take into account the diversity of economic and budgetary positions and devel-
opments as well as of fiscal risks to the sustainability of public finances, and is
defined in structural terms (see structural balance).
In its overall assessment of the 2015 Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs) [http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/dbp/2014/
communication_to_euro_area_member_states_2014_dbp_en.pdf],
the Commission considers that the neutral fiscal stance is an appropriate balance
for the euro area but it also considers that “there is a need to closely monitor on its
distribution across member States in relation to the room available under the Stability
Growth Pact (SGP). In particular, maintaining a neutral aggregate fiscal stance, while
some Member States are called to increase their efforts in order to comply with the SGP
implies a degree of fiscal support coming from the exploitation of the fiscal space avail-
able elsewhere.”
This approach would work at the euro area level if efforts made by countries
at risk of non-compliance with the SGP are effectively compensated by the use
of the fiscal space for countries which are not constrained. But this recommen-
dation may stumble on two hurdles:
1. Only three countries (Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands) in the euro
area have already reached their Medium Term Objective (MTO) and do possess
some fiscal space. These countries account for 35% of the GDP of the euro
area. At the opposite, the DBPs of seven countries (Belgium, Spain, France,
Italy, Malta, Austria and Portugal) pose a risk of non-compliance. These coun-
tries represent 57% of GDP. Thus, there is disequilibrium between countries
which have fiscal space and countries which do not and have to make more
efforts to comply with the SGP. For the euro area to keep a neutral aggregate
balance if not a positive one, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands would
have to implement more expansionary fiscal policies than the seven other
countries that will still need to consolidate; 
2. The economic context for compliant countries does not push them to
stimulate their economies and even if they do it, it might be inefficient in order
to spur growth in the euro area.20 The three compliant countries having
already reached their MTO have the lowest unemployment rate in 2014 of the
euro area and are probably close to full-employment. For instance, Germany,
which represents nearly 30% of the GDP of the euro zone, has an unemploy-
ment rate of 5.0% and is benefiting from a very expansionary monetary policy.
Even if considerable labour reserves remain, it is probably more prone to accu-
mulate budget surpluses in order to absorb the impact of ageing on their
public finances rather than to seek a reduction in unemployment.21 At the
20. See Blot, Cochard, Creel, Ducoudrén Schweisguth and Timbeau (2014), “Fiscal consolidation,
public debt and output dynamics in the Euro Area: lessons from a simple model with time-varying
fiscal multipliers”, OFCE Working Paper, 2014-14.
21. Symptomatic is a plan currently under discussion within the German government for a €10
billion investment package. This is not to start until 2016 and will be spread over three years,
representing about 0.1% of German GDP each year. This is despite years of negative net public
investment in the country (Rietzler 2014).
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report52opposite, the majority of countries, for which there is a risk of non-compliance,
have high unemployment. This is the case for Spain, Portugal, Italy, and to a
lesser extent, France and Belgium. Their output gap and unemployment situa-
tion calls for a more lax fiscal policy but the Commission recommends more
budgetary efforts to ensure compliance with the SGP. 
Moreover, European Commission’s recommendations for compliance with
the SGP are clearly more binding (ending in sanctions if failed) than the call to
use fiscal space when available. As a consequence, if France, Belgium and Italy
are forced to increase their fiscal adjustment before March, as it can be
expected from the DBP assessment, the forecast of a neutral fiscal stance for the
euro area as a whole for 2015 may be put into question and pose new risks to
the recovery.
Box 5. Juncker’s investment plan for Europe: Much ado 
about nothing?
Investment is one of the three main pillars of the Commission’s strategy for
2015. Indeed, the Commission has presented an Investment Plan for Europe,
which should provide at least 315 billion euros of extra public and private
investment over a three-year period (2015-2017). The plan relies on a new
ad-hoc fund—the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). This Fund
Figure 16. Gap between structural balance (2014,% of GDP) and MTO 
and unemployment rate for countries in the euro area
Note: In green , countries which have a fiscal space. In blue, countries which are compliant or broadly
compliant with the SGP provisions. In red, countries which pose a risk of non-compliance.
Sources: European Commission, DBP’s, iAGS calculations.
BEL
DEU
EST
IRL
ESP
FRA
ITA
LVA
LUX
MLT
NLD
AUT
PRT
SVN
SVK
FIN
-4.0
-3.5
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
Unemployment rate (2014, in %)
Spread between structural balance (2014, % of GDP) and MTO
Deflation is coming: Economic perspectives for the euro area and euro area countries 53will be granted 21 billion euros: 16 billion euros of guarantees drawn from the
2014-2020 EU budget and 5 billion euros of capital injection from the Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB). The Commission estimates the 21 billion euros will
allow the EIB to raise €60bn by issuing new bonds, and that this cash will be
leveraged by contributions from the private sector: on this basis, the Fund is
expected to reach 315 billion euros. 
Yet, Mr. Juncker’s proposals have been under fire since they were unveiled by
the Commission. First of all, the Fund will be created with no “fresh” money:
apart from an extra 5 billion euros from the EIB, it will be based on recycled EU
resources. An opening has been made to allow member states to contribute
and to exclude such contributions from the constraints of the fiscal compact.
But contributions can’t be targeted to contributing countries and, moreover,
the lack of consensus among members States has constantly prevented them
from reaching a more ambitious agreement. In June 2012, the Rome summit
was largely dedicated to investment. Several proposals were discussed, notably
the recapitalization of the EIB, the reallocation of non-used structural fund
resources, the idea of project bonds. Yet, the bones of contention remain the
same. Even though France defended the idea that more resources were neces-
sary to supplement the Fund, it faced reluctance from multiple sides. The UK
strongly opposed an increase in the EU budget, while Germany refused a larger
contribution from the EIB that might have jeopardized the EIB’s triple A credit
rating. Besides, Central and Southern European countries are reluctant to use
the European structural and cohesion funds, because it would jeopardize their
public balance because of project co-financing. Precisely, EU structural and
cohesion funds, which also have a leverage effect, have been notably under-
used. It is therefore hard to believe that the EFSI could fare better. Moreover,
many critics highlighted that the plan was extremely optimistic as regards the
willingness of the private sector to invest massively. Many observers doubt that
the capital base will be sufficient to raise enough money to fund projects.
Therefore, the Juncker plan is likely to fail to deliver on its promises. 
Debt-deflation dynamic and fiscal rules
The ability to reduce debt may also depend on the inflation dynamic. As
emphasized in debt-deflation spiral, the real debt burden becomes higher when
countries enter into deflation. Taking into account the constraints imposed by the
TSCG, may then force governement to further austerity measures reinforcing the
deflation risk and increasing the debt burden. We illustrate this scenario by
considering alternative negative shocks to the inflation rate. For each scenario, we
run the same simulations as in Tables 9 to 11 in order to assess whether public
debt for each euro area country can reach 60% by 2034. Negative or positive
fiscal impulses (capped at +/-0.5) are implemented for countries until they reach
the 60% threshold. Four scenarios (described in Box 6) are considered: 3 of them
are based on a symmetric shock as inflation rates decrease for all euro area coun-
tries. The last shock is asymmetric as we consider that the risk of deflation is
certainly higher in some countries (in Spain or Greece rather than in Germany or
the Netherlands). Besides, EC's recommendation made within the macroeoco-
nomic imbalances procedure have promoted measures favouring competitiveness
in countries that had current account deficits before the crisis. A symmetric adjust-
ment is certainly needed as emphasized in iAGS report 2013 and 2014 but it
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report54would imply a relative increase in inflation for Germany, Austria and the Nether-
lands while other countries would need to restore competitiveness for their net
external position to be sustainable. But, it seems more likely that the adjustment is
realized asymmetrically, so that inflation in deficit countries may be significantly
lower for a sustained period. We have then considered the case of an asymmetric
shock in Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy Portugal and Spain. The adjust-
ment is supposed to take place over a 20-year period. The calibration of the shock
for each country is based on chapter 5 simulations where the aim is to reach a
sustainable external position.
The consequences of a symmetric reduction of the inflation rate are rather
small in the model. When euro area inflation in reduced by more than 1.2 points
during 2 years, the cumulated additional fiscal impulse needed to reach the 60%
debt-to-GDP ratio increase by 0.2 on average for the euro area. More efforts are
needed in Portugal and Greece. Actually, the model would trigger a significant
reduction in the interest rate as the monetary policy rule implies a reduction in the
short-term interest rate. This implies a reduction in long-term interest rates, which
are forward-looking, computed as the weighted average of present and future
short-term interest rate. For a symmetric shock, ZLB constraint is not binding
beyond 2017. Forward-looking long-term interest rates would also be significantly
lower except for Greece and Portugal where intial inflation rates are already low so
that real interest rates would increase at the time of the shock. 
Yet, it must be stressed that potential costs of deflation are certainly underes-
timated in the model and for symmetric shock. Monetary policy authority is
supposed to be quite reactive in the model and would keep substantial leeway to
cut down interest rate. ZLB constraint binds only temporarily. For the ZLB
constraint to be effectively binding for a sustained period, it would imply substan-
tial costs, much higher than those estimated here. Recent evidence has indeed
shown that the ECB is facing real difficulty to cope with deflation's risk as detailed
in Chapter 3. Besides, inflation expectations in the model are also anchored and
always revert to the inflation target and private debt are not introduced of the
model limiting the scope of debt-deflation spiral.
Turning to the asymmetric shock leads to more significant effects, notably
because the ECB would react only to the extent that euro area inflation is
decreasing. The decrease of monetary policy rate and of long-term interest rates
are then limited and would not fully offset the reduction in inflation rates
observed in adjusting countries. The critical gap becomes positive, increasing the
debt-to-GPD ratio. For those countries, the 60% threshold might still be achieved
but with substantial additional austerity. Such a consolidation might be unrealistic
because it would imply high macroeconomic and social costs in countries already
suffering from past and current austerity. Costs may even be larger if monetary
policy is less reactive than supposed in the model and if private deleveraging
would be taken into account. Debt rule may automatically become more strin-
gent triggering a vicious debt-deflation spiral. Lower inflation increases the debt
burden driving away the country from the 60% threshold. Further austerity is
then needed to comply with the rules. If deflation risk is isolated, this country (or
this group of countries) may not benefit from additional monetary stimulus as
long as average inflation is close to the target. On the one hand, it may improve
competitiveness and foster growth that way—depending on the relative size of
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fiscal rules harder. 
Then dealing with the risk of deflation remains a priority. Besides, internal
devaluation strategies are also risky and may diffuse debt-deflation spiral in more
fragile countries. 
These long-term scenarios show that additional austerity may occur when
countries have exited from EDP. Fiscal rules set up in the Fiscal compact may
hamper growth for a sustained period in the euro area, increasing poverty and
inequalities. These rules certainly go beyond the requirement of public finance
sustainability. There is a significant risk that the euro area enters a stagnation trap
or even a deflation trap if economic policies are not significantly revised. The Fiscal
compact has already imposed and will still impose too much austerity and
constraints on growth. It is still time to reconsider it and to substitute alternative
rules, which are growth-friendly.
Box 6. Debt-rule and the risk of lower inflation 
The ability to reduce debt may also depend on the inflation dynamic. As
emphasized in debt-deflation spiral, the real debt burden becomes higher when
countries enter into deflation. Taking into account the constraints imposed by
the TSCG, may then force governement to further austerity measures rein-
forcing the deflation risk and increasing the debt burden. To this end, we
analyse the consequences of a decrease of the inflation rate under 4 alternative
scenarios (3 symmetric shocks on the inflation rate and 1 asymmetric shock):
— Symmetric shock S1: a transitory inflation shock (-1 the first year and -0.5 in
year 2), which may result from a negative oil price shock. Due to the inflation
dynamic in the model, the shock is long-lasting (see figure 17). Inflation in the
euro area is reduced by 1.2 point the first two years and goes back progres-
sively to 2% by 2022.
— Symmetric shock S2: a transitory shock on expected inflation (-1 the first
2 years and -0.5 for the 4 following years). Here, inflation in the euro area is
reduced by 0.6 point for a 5-year period and goes back progressively to 2% by
2023. 
— Symmetric shock S3: a drop in the target for inflation over all the period
(2015-2034). We consider a 0.5 point decrease.
For shocks S1 and S2, even if euro area inflation reverts to the 2 % target no
later than in 2023, heterogeneities remain across countries as initial values for
inflation rate are different (see table 7 with the main hypotheses). Yet, all infla-
tion rates converge to 2%. For shocks S3, there is a permanent fall in the
inflation rate of each country.
— Asymmetric shock S4: based on Chapter 5 estimates, we have calibrated
negative shocks over a 20-year period. Stabilizing external position would then
imply a yearly long-lasting reduction of inflation rates, which would amount to
0.2 point in Belgium, 0.1 point in Finland, 0.9 point in France, 0.7 in Greece,
0.6 in Italy, 0.1 point Portugal and 0.4 in Spain.
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a 60% ratio by 2034 and the additional fiscal impulse needed to reach the 60%
debt ratio (Table 12). In the first scenario, it would imply additional austerity
measures which would amount to 0.2 on average for the euro area. The rather
limited impact results from model properties. Actually, the model would also
trigger a significant reduction in the interest rate. For a symmetric shock trig-
gering a decrease in the euro area inflation rate, the monetary policy rule implies
a significant reduction in the short-term interest rate. With a standard Taylor
rule, for a 1 point reduction in the inflation rate, ECB would cut the policy rate by
1.5 point, if and only if the ZLB constraint is not binding. This implies a reduction
in long-term interest rates, which are forward-looking, computed as the
weighted average of present and future short-term interest rate. 
Therefore, the negative impact of declining inflation on debt will occur if and
only if monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. Here, ZLB constraint is
binding until 2017 for these 3 shocks so that a lower inflation imply higher real
short-term rate for a limited period. The critical gap between real interest rates
and real GDP growth rate, does not increase permanently and significantly
because monetary policy is reactive and also because expected inflations
remain anchored to the 2% target. The additional efforts are generally higher
in scenario S3. The highest effort should be implemented in Greece because of
higher initial public debt and lower initial inflation rates. For Greece, the ZLB
would be more constraining as a significant deflation would occur. For other
countries, real long-term interest rate would adjust downward, limiting the
debt-deflation vicious circle. 
We then consider that not all euro area countries face the same risk of defla-
tion or of a sustained period of low inflation. The risk is indeed higher for Spain
and Greece than for Germany or the Netherlands. We focus here on countries
for which a current account adjustment is needed (Belgium, Finland, France,
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Even if current account deficits have turned
to surpluses for some countries (figure 6), part of the adjustment have resulted
from the fall in internal demand so that current account may revert to deficits
once the output gap will be closed. 
Figure 17. Difference with baseline inflation rate
Source: iAGS model.
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inflation for a 20-year period, the time needed to achieve the current account
adjustment. The inflation shock would be weak but sustained. It would trigger
a deflation in France, Italy and Greece. Even if euro average inflation would be
reduced, it would decrease less than in scenarios where shocks are applied to all
countries. The reaction of monetary policy and long-term interest rates would
then not fully offset the reduction in inflation rates observed in adjusting coun-
tries. The critical gap would become positive, increasing the debt-to-GPD ratio.
For those countries, the 60% threshold might still be achieved but with
substantial additional austerity (Table 13).   
Table 12. 60% debt-to-GDP with different deflationary shocks
Difference with table 9
CFI2015-2034 Inflation 2015-2019*
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
DEU -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
FRA -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
ITA -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
ESP -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
NLD 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
BEL -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.4
PRT -0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6
IRL -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
GRC -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5
FIN 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
AUT -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
EUZ -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
CFI: Cumulated fiscal impulse.
* Beyond 2020. inflation reverts to the target except for scenario S3 where we have implemented a per-
manent shock.
Source: iAGS model.
Table 13. 60% debt-to-GDP with asymmetric disinflationary shocks
In %
Public debt Structural balance CFI
Average 
growth rate
Min-
OG
Average infla-
tion rate
2015 2020 2034 2015 2020 2034 2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
2015-
2034
2015-
2019
2020-
2034
DEU 73 62 60 0..5 -1.1 -2.0 3.5 1.5 1.0 0.0 1.3 2.1
FRA 98 101 60 -2.3 -0.3 2.5 -5.2 1.7 1.5 -3.9 -0.7 -0.2
ITA 134 125 60 -0.2 2.5 4.4 -1.9 0.8 0.4 -4.6 -0.4 0.6
ESP 101 98 60 -1.7 0.3 1.1 -2.4 2.0 1.5 -5.4 -0.2 0.9
NLD 76 70 60 -0.2 -1.6 -1.6 1.4 2.3 1.3 -3.5 0.5 2.1
BEL 102 93 60 -0.7 -0.5 0.3 -0.1 2.0 1.5 -1.9 0.3 1.5
PRT 131 115 60 -0.5 0.7 2.0 -0.9 1.9 1.1 -5.9 0.9 1.7
IRL 116 95 60 0.9 0.0 -0.3 3.0 3.5 1.9 -5.9 0.0 2.0
GRC 175 164 60 2.5 3.8 7.1 -3.9 1.9 1.2 -11.1 -1.2 0.2
FIN 64 61 60 -0.8 -1.5 -2.3 -1.2 2.2 1.6 -3.8 0.8 1.9
AUT 77 72 60 -1.3 -1.6 -1.4 0.7 2.1 1.4 -2.8 1.5 2.1
EUZ 96 89 60 -0.6 -0.1 0.3 -0.5 1.6 1.2 -3.0 0.3 1.2
CFI: Cumulated fiscal impulse.
Source : iAGS model
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Recovery has not happened yet and deflation is still threatening eurozone
countries. The impact of austerity has declined but has still a negative impact,
weighing down demand. Deleveraging may also drag down private spending.
There is then a real threat of a persistent stagnation trap (low growth – low infla-
tion) in the euro area. 
Moreover, fiscal consolidation is not over and will affect a number of Euro-
pean countries even after they exit from the EDP. This is due to the other rules in
the European fiscal framework, notably the debt-rule and the need to reach a
fiscal MTO (medium-term objective) in structural terms. Fiscal space is therefore
limited. Required additional fiscal efforts would be significant for France, Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Finland. These efforts would even be larger if some countries
enter into deflation. These are the countries suffering most from depressed
demand and high unemployment. A small number of countries, especially
Germany, does have fiscal space. However it is only limited incentives to use it.
Without any change in the macroeconomic strategy, unemployment will be
long-lasting triggering negative hysteresis effects, increasing inequalities and
poverty (see chapter 2 for details). 
Monetary policy has a crucial role but cannot do all the job. The effects of
unconventional measures are uncertain and may be limited (see chapter 3 for
details). Empirical literature emphasized the lower effectiveness of monetary
policy in post-financial crisis periods, due to deleveraging. A solution might be to
trigger a depreciation of the euro to foster an increase in extra-EMU demand. This
is partly (and indirectly) the aim of measures taken by ECB in June 2014. To make
quantitative easing more effective and achieve results rapidly, it is necessary for
the ECB to widen its scope to include government bonds in its secondary-market
asset purchases.
Regarding fiscal policy, the first-best solution would be to abrogate the fiscal
compact. The debt rule has no strong theoretical or empirical support. It would
also be appropriate to exclude productive public investment from fiscal rules as it
makes economic sense, in terms of efficiency and inter-generational equity, to
credit-finance projects that generate long-term returns.22 A crucial need both to
support short-term growth and to increase potential output is for countries to
increase both public and private investment. The Juncker Investment Plan seems
likely to deliver only a fraction of the promised €315 billion in additional invest-
ment. An alternative proposal to increase investment in the area of climate-
change prevention is detailed in chapter 4. 
The European Banking Union represents an important instrument helping to
establish future financial market stability. However, there are challenges to take
beyond the current stage: In particular, a more effective backstop mechanism has
to be implemented and the too-important-to-fail problem has to addressed.
22. See Creel, Hubert and Saraceno (2013).
APPENDIX: 
Country analyses

Appendix AGermany:
Low economic momentum
The economic situation in Germany continues to be lackluster in 2014.
Strong growth in the first quarter was followed by a decline in GDP in the second
quarter, and the third quarter brought little more than stagnation (0.1%). Despite
the expansionary monetary environment and favourable lending conditions
investment activity remains weak. This is partly the result of low global growth,
especially in the other euro area countries, but also mirrors the lingering high
uncertainty about economic developments in the euro area.
The robustness of the labour market in Germany continues to be a stabilizing
factor. Despite the low growth rates, the level of employment has continued to
expand, and wage increases remain relatively strong by historical comparison,
picking up again after weakening in 2013. As a result, incomes continue to rise
noticeably and private consumption contributes most to growth.
Against this backdrop, the GDP in Germany is expected to increase by 1.5%
in 2014, with the number of people employed slightly higher and the number of
unemployed slightly lower than in the previous year. There is no indication that
the economy will shift into a phase of self-sustaining economic growth. The
potential for such a shift is there, but the strain of the euro crisis in terms of
depressed exports, high uncertainty and fiscal restraint is still too strong and
prevents more dynamic investment.
The primary risk in the economic outlook is a deterioration of the outlook for
the euro area as a whole. Should the deflationary tendencies become stronger or
the euro crisis reignite, Germany could easily slide toward recession.
The depreciation of the euro, low lending rates and robust consumption
demand contribute to a strengthening of economic activity in the forecast period.
Exports will pick up both to the other euro area countries and to the rest of the
world. Imports will increase more rapidly than exports during 2015, after slower
growth in 2014, but the contribution to GDP from external trade will be slightly
positive in both years. Domestic demand will remain the most important
economic pillar.
Capital expenditure and investment in construction are trending upwards,
albeit at relatively low rates. Private consumption remains—as in recent years—
the central engine for domestic demand. Given slightly higher economic
momentum as of the fourth quarter of 2014, German GDP will increase by 1.4%
in 2015. The level of employment will increase slightly, with the number of unem-
ployed dropping somewhat.
With a rate of 1.0% in 2014 and 1.2% in 2015, German inflation will be half a
percentage point above the euro area average in both years but still far below the
ECB’s inflation target. The fiscal budget will be in surplus for the forecast period,
and the gross-debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to decline.
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Germany
% 2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP 0.2 1.5 1.4 1.7
Private consumption 0.9 1.1 1.7 1.9
Investment -0.4 3.0 1.6 3.2
Public consumption 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.4
Exports 1.7 4.0 6.3 6.7
Imports 3.2 3.8 7.6 7.8
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.6
     External trade -0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
     Inventories 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0
Unemployment rate 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.7
Inflation 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.3
Public balance 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.4
Fiscal impulse -0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
Public debt % GDP 76.9 73.5 70.5 67.3
Current account % GDP 7.0 6.8 7.0 7.0
Source: National accounts, iAGS forecasts.
Appendix BFrance:
Duty-free growth
In early 2011, France was one of the few developed countries having fallen
back to its pre-2008 level in terms of GDP. Growth recovered to 2 percent, and
even 3 percent y-o-y in 2011Q1. However, these favorable developments did not
persist. The recovery has stalled and growth, although slightly positive, is close to
zero from 2011Q2 on average. This break in the recovery was due to four damp-
ening factors.
First of all, fiscal consolidation conducted since 2010 severely dragged down
activity, when fiscal impulses where stopped to make way for restrictive fiscal
policy. Not only France but many European partners adopted the same strategy,
so that the internal domestic restrictive effect of the fiscal stance has been wors-
ened by recessionary effects resulting from the slowdown in external demand.
The fiscal strategy has been the main factor explaining the downturn of the
French economy. Other factors, such as the resumption in oil price, the unusual
credit conditions driven by the sovereign debt crisis and the deterioration in price
competitiveness from 2012 have been less crucial, although further dampening
French growth.
Some see in this long period of lack of growth the result of the impact of the
2008/09 recession on potential GDP. Firm bankruptcies and low investment may
have flattened the productivity trend and the rise in long term unemployment
may have increased the NAIRU. As a result, both a downward shift of the potential
output and a slowdown in the potential GPD growth may have occurred since
2008. However, even if such developments are likely although difficult to quan-
tify, the capability of the French economy to rebound is not void. Many
institutions, OECD, IMF, EC, French government, OFCE estimate a large negative
output gap for France, lying between -4 and -2.5 percent. Business survey data
support the same idea with still high production capacity margins and a majority
of firms reporting demand difficulties rather than supply difficulties. At the same
time, labour productivity is still lower than its trend level, suggesting that firms are
constantly overstaffed.
Dampening factors will remain active in 2014. Again, the fiscal stance will be
the main brake to growth, although in a lesser extent than previous years. At the
same time, competitiveness of the French economy will deteriorate due to the
appreciation of the euro up to mid-2013 and to higher competition from Euro-
pean countries where wage deflation has started. As a result, positive points of
growth stemming from the weakening of the negative fiscal impulse will be offset
by a weaker external demand.
By reorienting the economic strategy in favor of firms, the French government
expects better supply conditions to restore the competitive position of France.
While the fiscal package—“Crédit d’Impôts pour la Compétitivité et l’Emploi
(CICE)”—became effective in 2014 and will be supplemented in 2015 with the
“Pacte de Responsabilité et de Solidarité”, full positive impacts from the lowering
of firm tax burden should not be expected in 2014 and in 2015. On the contrary,
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mented with the view to curb the public deficit when tax revenue on firms will be
lightened. Positive multipliers involved by tax incentives set up to stimulate the
supply side of the economy are far lower than negative multipliers generated by
higher taxes on households. The overall impact of this strategy is a lower negative
fiscal impulse in 2014 and in 2015 than during the former years but with a much
strong negative impact on GDP.
Furthermore, the behaviour of the firms, which will benefit from the fiscal
packages, can hardly be anticipated. In the context where operating surplus ratio
seriously worsened since 2008 as a result of labour hoarding and of a marked
deceleration of inflation, firms will probably try to ensure better financing condi-
tions rather than lower selling prices. A positive impact on overall employment can
be expected from tax cuts, but it will probably rely on maintaining jobs rather than
job creation or wage increase. Another consequence of this conservative attitude is
that investment should not recover: substitution of capital for labour would result
from maintaining employment which will not help investment in a context where
the accelerator effect will not play its normal role as it usually did past upturns.
Private consumption will still be dampened both by a heavier tax burden in
2014—the increase in VAT and some additional taxes—and by a continued rise in
unemployment up to 2015. Employment in private sectors will not fully benefit
from the weak growth pattern given the need for firms to restore productivity. In
2014 and 2015, employment growth would be twice as low as it was in 2010 and
2011. Active labour market policies, including subsidized jobs in the non-profit
sector, will help to job creations but it will not prevent a further rise in unemploy-
ment to 9.9 percent of the workforce.
Table 15. iAGS macroeconomic forecasts
France
In % 2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.7
Private consumption 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.7
Investment -0.8 -2.2 -1.6 0.9
Public consumption 2.0 1.8 1.1 0.8
Exports 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.3
Imports 1.9 2.4 1.2 2.0
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand 0.4 0 0.6 1.3
     External trade 0.1 0 0.4 0.4
     Inventories -0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate 9.9 9.7 9.8 9.7
Inflation 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9
Public balance -4.1 -4.5 -4.3 -3.6
Fiscal impulse -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5
Public debt % GDP 92.2 95.4 97.4 99.8
Current account % GDP -1.5 -1.2 -0.8 -0.2
Source: National accounts, iAGS forecasts.
Appendix C Italy:
Endless quagmire
In the first half of 2014, Italy saw its GDP fall for two quarters in a row.
Combined with a negative carry-over effect inherited from 2013, Italy seems
unable to find its way out of the recession. Growth should remain subdued in the
second half of 2014, thanks to a stabilization of private consumption. In 2015,
internal demand should support a fragile recovery. After a dip into deflation terri-
tory at the end of 2014, inflation should remain at low levels in 2015 (0.3% in
average), preventing real interest rates from declining. Public deficit would reach
3.0% in 2014, and 2,9% in 2015, and primary structural balance should slightly
improve by 0,1 point.
Hopes for a recovery were rapidly dampened by the bad economic perfor-
mance in the first half of 2014. Indeed, the downward trend in investment has
been going on, and external demand has contributed to growth negatively. The
only good news is that household consumption seems to stabilize at last.
Compared to 2013, the year 2014 war marked by the end of austerity measures as
regards tax rises and the implementation of some fiscal measures in favor of low
income households: thus, in May 2014, the employees earning up to 1 500 euros
saw a 80 euro increase in wages. This contributed to raising the savings rate and
improving the situation of households. On the contrary, investment contracted
further, and capacity utilization rate has been stagnating since 2013.
The Italian GDP will be negatively impacted by several effects in 2014. First
and foremost, credit conditions would worsen, lowering growth by 0.7 point.
Indeed, lower public interest rates did not lead to lower nominal interest rates for
households and firms. Public rates decreased by 125 basis points between January
and July 2014, versus 27 bp for household housing and 32 bp for non-financial
corporations. Besides, Italy has been experiencing a fall in HIPC since the begin-
ning of 2014, and it entered into a period of deflation in August 2014 (notably
due to the strong decrease in energy prices), which triggered a rise in real interest
rates. Deteriorating price competitiveness would also have a negative impact of
0.2 point on GDP growth rate. Fiscal measures would also contribute negatively to
GDP growth: even though the national fiscal stimulus remains neutral (0.2 point
of GDP) thanks to the payment of overdue debts by public administration, fiscal
austerity in the euro area would shave 0.5 point off GDP growth in 2014. 
In 2014, private consumption should remain subdued for two reasons: an
increase in unemployment on the one hand, an improvement in credit conditions
on the other hand. As regards investment, external demand would stagnate and
internal demand would be insufficient to drive up investment. In 2015, the
neutral budgetary policy should have a more positive impact on income growth.
Firms could benefit from lower tax rates. Notably, the IRAP (regional tax on
production) rate would decrease by 10%, financed by a tax on financial activities.
The repayment of overdue debts to private companies would keep on in 2015.
Even though firms mostly focus on their deleveraging process, our scenario fore-
casts a recovery in productive investment. Besides, the pace at which investment
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private rates (pass-through). As regards the households, tax cuts of 10 billion euros
have been promised by 2015, and therefore we anticipate a growth in demand
for durable goods. Yet, recovery will be fragile because households fall prey to a
high level of unemployment, a persistency of wage freeze in the public sector, a
weak inflation forecast, and a rising savings rate.
Unemployment should remain at its record level, around 12.6% because of a
stagnating labor force, and partial unemployment disposals which remain at a
high level. Employment per head should increase slightly in 2015.
Non-performing loans (NPL) are on the rise: in Italy, they account for 10.9%
of outstanding loans in June 2014, among which 70% are due to non-financial
corporations. NPL rate increased most for non-financial firms (with a 55 bp
increase between January and June 2014), compared to a 3 bp rise for individual
firms and 2 bp for households. This highlights the fact that firms are still in poor
financial health. Moreover, while waiting for the results of the Asset Quality
Review, Italian banks had been cautious and selective, and had curbed the access
to credit, notably to SMEs. Given the failure of nine Italian banks to pass the stress
tests designed by the ECB in October 2014, banks are likely to give the priority to
the restoration of profit margins rather than credit distribution. Hence, the pass-
through of monetary policy towards private rates could be very incomplete.
The warning of the European Commission, which urged Italy to reconsider its
draft budget for 2015 and to speed up the pace of structural deficit reduction, we
make the hypothesis that Italy will reduce its structural deficit only by 0.1 point in
2015. Indeed, Italy can claim exceptional circumstances due to the long-lasting
recession and pending structural reforms.
Table 16. iAGS macroeconomic forecasts
Italy
In % 2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP -1.8 -0.2 0.5 0.7
Private consumption -2.6 0.1 0.6 0.6
Investment -4.6 -1.8 0.4 1.3
Public consumption -0.8 0.5 0.3 0.0
Exports 0.0 1.6 0.6 1.3
Imports -2.9 1.3 0.9 1.2
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -2.5 -0.1 0.5 0.6
     External trade 0.8 0.1 -0.1 0.1
     Inventories -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0
Unemployment rate 12.2 12.6 12.6 12.4
Inflation 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.5
Public balance -3.0 -3.0 -2.9 -2.7
Fiscal impulse -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0
Public debt % GDP 127.9 131.6 134.1 133.6
Current account % GDP 1.0 -0.1 1.0 1.2
Source: National accounts, iAGS forecasts.
Appendix DSpain:
The end of the slump
In Spain, the worst seems definitely over. After 6-year recession, growth is
positive again. In the third quarter of 2014, GDP has increased by 1.6% in annual
change. On the whole year, we foresee a 1.3% growth, after a drop of 1.2% in
2013. In 2015 and 2016, growth is expected to accelerate at 2.1% and 2.3%
respectively. The recovery is largely supported by the strengthening of the
domestic demand, in a context of loosening financial conditions.
This recovery is allowed by the reversal on the labor market. After a fall of
19% of the full time equivalent employment on a 5.5-year period, employment
picked up in the beginning of 2014 and the move is projected to keep on. In this
context, unemployment has continued to decline. After a peak at 26.3% in the
first quarter of 2013, the unemployment rate declined to 24.2% this summer and
is projected to around 20% in 2016. Despite the fall, it still remains very high, and
put strong downward pressures on wages. As employment begins to recover,
wage moderation is very anchored. Wages are progressing at a very low path and
are even decreasing in the third quarter 2014. Nevertheless, despite this slow-
down, the gross income of households has progressed again. Moreover, helped
by the very low or negative inflation in the last months (-0.5% in November), the
real income has been allowed to progress faster. That should consolidate house-
hold consumption in the next years to increase at a path expected at around 2%.
The other support to Spanish recovery is the easing financing conditions.
Since the middle of 2012, public long term interest rate has decreased by more
than 4 points. They finish the year under 2%, which has never been seen in Spain.
This decrease will be transmitted to households which are Indebted in variable
rates and facilitate their financial adjustment. In this positive context, prospects
are improving and companies have restored their margins and can finance their
expenditures. Productive investment can stay dynamic. 
But some problems remain present. Debt of households is high and some
imbalances on the real estate sector still goes on, although the adjustment in
construction is close to its end. The house prices stopped to decline and are barely
stabilizing. Investment in residential sector was still decreasing in the second
quarter 2014. But the drop could stop in the second half of 2014. We foresee an
modest increase of 0.8% in 2015. 
In spite of certain progress, banking sector is fragile because of the impor-
tance of the doubtful loans. Bankruptcy have decreased rapidly in 2014 but are
still at around 2000 proceedings on an annual base. That exert a strong constraint
on the credit activity.
External sector will stop supporting the activity. Net exports contribution
could be slightly negative in 2014 and almost neutral in 2015 and 2016 because
of the acceleration of imports. Unit labor cost could cease to decrease from 2015
but some further gains in competitiveness are still expected. After a poor perfor-
mance in the first half of 2014, exports could gain momentum from the second
half of the year. Fiscal consolidation will continue. In 2014, the fiscal impulse is
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report68expected to be of 1 point negative. In 2015 and 2016, the adjustment effort
should be weaker (-0.4 point and -0.6 point). Public deficit could be just above
3% of GDP in 2016. But this sizable budget deficit combined with a still low
nominal GDP growth could push the public debt ratio to around 101% in 2015.
 In this context of slackened growth, high output gap and high unemploy-
ment, the growth is not exempted of risks. The wage moderation could get into a
deflationary process and made more difficult the economic recovery, particularly
because the real adjustment become more difficult.
Table 17. iAGS macroeconomic forecasts
Spain
In % 2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP -1.2 1.3 2.1 2.3
Private consumption -2.1 2.0 1.5 2.1
Investment -5.1 0.6 2.8 2.9
Public consumption -2.3 1.5 0.4 0.9
Exports 4.9 3.3 4.1 3.5
Imports 0.4 4.5 2.4 2.9
Contribution to growth
     Internal demand -2.7 1.5 1.5 1.9
     External trade 1.4 -0.3 0.6 0.3
     Inventories 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unemployment rate 26.1 24.5 22.8 20.2
Inflation 1.5 0.1 0.2 0.6
Public balance -7.1 -5.5 -4.2 -3.3
Fiscal impulse -1.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.6
Public debt % GDP 93.9 98.4 100.4 101.1
Current account % GDP 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.7
Source: National accounts iAGS forecasts.
Chapter 2RISING INEQUALITY IN THE EU
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
Rising inequality is the elephant in the European room: everybody knows it
is there and that it is an obvious problem, but no one wants to either discuss the
problem or address it. Macroeconomic issues have taken the front seat, and
inequality might be dropped in the conversation when it has relevance from a
macroeconomic perspective: maybe we should reduce inequality to fight secular
stagnation (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011), especially because inequality can be
self-reinforcing through secular stagnation; maybe we should reduce inequality to
enhance growth in a world of credit-constraint households, because growth is the
final goal of our policies (Birdsall et al. 1996). The fact that, maybe, we should aim
for socio-economic equality for itself and not for some other macroeconomic
objective seems to have disappeared in the presence of other urgencies. Paradox-
ically, Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century has spurred a global debate, but
not a European one. The Capital is on everybody’s lips from New-York to Hong-
Kong through Rio, but not in Brussels—although it is in everybody’s mind, hence
the Elephant in the Room. But, perhaps it is so because Piketty has placed atten-
tion on high and very high income, which is less of a subject in stagnating
economies.
Important questions are not being raised, or are not heard enough: what does
socio-economic equality even means in a European perspective? Should we worry
about regional convergence as we traditionally do in Europe? We see in the
present chapter that European regional convergence stopped with the crisis.
Should we worry about household income inequality at the national level? The
situation is more ambiguous, some countries are experiencing a decrease in
inequality while others are experiencing an increase. In many countries, social
transfers have so far mitigated the rise in market income inequality. Should we
worry about absolute or relative poverty? We show that absolute poverty, meas-
ured by material deprivation has risen a lot in recent years. Or, should we worry
about household income inequality at the European level? Eurostat does not
follow the path of Milanovic (2012), formerly at the World Bank, who advocates
the use of a Global Income Gini which analyses the distribution of individual
income around the world regardless of national residence. The only EU Income
Gini calculated by Eurostat is the average of national Gini coefficients. National
and regional convergence are also analyzed but both approaches (between-
groups and within-groups inequality) are never combined. Household inequalities
are always measured at the national level, and not at the European level. It has
been argued it is legitimate because it is the level of the political community, at
which public policies are implemented. But what are the European Union and the
euro area if not political communities of some sort? Aren’t public policies imple-
mented as well throughout the European Union and the Eurozone? When
18 nations share a common currency and pursue fiscal consolidation in the name
of a common public good, isn’t it time for them to think of a way to consider the
question of justice, at least in its economic dimension? Revue de l’OFCE — iAGS (2015) Third Report 
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erate choice of an absence of between-states solidarity, has not really spurred the
global debate over euro area or EU Economic justice, even though there are some
partial debates, notably over the Banking Union, and a European Unemployment
Insurance Scheme (Jara and Sutherland, 2013). The analysis included in this
chapter shows an increase in European inequality and poverty following the crisis,
in part due to rising unemployment. If on average, national Gini coefficients are
fairly stable over time, the global European Gini has risen since 2009, 97% of the
increase being the consequence of the rise of inequality between countries.  
In his book, Piketty argues for the implementation of a Wealth Tax at the
European Level, at first at very low rates. One point is that with taxation comes
knowledge. Indeed, it’s very difficult to know today the level of concentration of
wealth in Europe: as discussed in the chapter, surveys of wealth have considerable
flaws. Our knowledge of the distribution of income is due to the implementation
of income tax. Income tax data are a lot more reliable than declarative survey
data. Taxing wealth even at very low rates would therefore improve our knowl-
edge of the world. It would not be absurd to do it among the countries which
form the banking union. Definitely, a banking union implies some solidarity. From
an individual perspective, there is a Deposit Guarantee Scheme (harmonized but
left to national responsibility) that covers deposits up to €100.000. However, in
the absence of wealth consolidation across banks, the protection ceiling must be
understood per depositor per bank, meaning the same depositor can be covered
up to €1.000.000 if she deposits in 10 different banks. This seems neither equi-
table nor efficient. Individual wealth taxation, and therefore wealth tax returns,
would give knowledge of whom, individually, is actually rescued when the banks
are rescued or deposits guaranteed, a first small step towards European economic
justice. Cyprus has proven that the worst case scenario can happen and that
justice is then a primary concern: perceived injustice might hinder a swift response
in case of emergency. 
With better knowledge, we believe there will come better deliberation and
therefore better policies. But knowledge comes first, which is one reason we do
not engage in a detailed policy agenda at this point. Europe is in a unique situa-
tion because nation-states have not given up sovereignty but shared it with a
higher level. The European Union is not one single nation, like the United States,
and it probably never will be. We probably need to adopt a cosmopolitical
perspective with several levels of interaction: within nations, between nations, but
also between individuals across the European political community. European insti-
tutions are needed to animate this public debate (Parodi, 2013). European
economic justice is a missing part in Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century, which
might also explain why inequalities are like an elephant in the European room. 
1. The end of regional convergence
Regional convergence is the traditional way to assess inequality across the
European Union. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), established
in 1975 is the first, and still main policy instrument aimed at reducing inequality
across Europe. Prior to the crisis, a regional convergence could be observed.
Figure 1 shows that between 2000 and 2008, the Nuts 2 regions which enjoyed
the greatest average annual growth are also the ones with the lowest initial level
Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 71of GDP, which implies convergence between European regions. It can be argued
that this convergence was obtained at the cost of an unsustainable dynamic (like
in Greece). This point is rather difficult to prove or to dismiss, and can be made as
a general caveat to all kind of convergence processes. Nevertheless, by itself
convergence is not unexpected from a theoretical point of view, and it seems that
the burden of the proof should be on the doubters.
The great recession has not been felt equally in Europe. Obviously, some
regions have been hurt more than others. Figure 2 shows a different picture from
figure 1, consistent with the end of regional convergence. It can however be said
that the crisis has stopped regional convergence in the EU.  
Map 1 shows which regions benefited from the highest growth between
2008 and 2011. It is clear that national borders keep their importance: regions
which enjoy lower growth are found mostly in Greece, Spain, United Kingdom,
while German, Swedish and Bulgarian regions enjoy higher growth. Despite that
observation, regions of a given country do not share a common evolution.
Regions of Italy, Spain or UK are decidedly heterogeneous in their fate.
Figure 1. 2000-2008: Regional convergence in the EU
Note: Size of circles are proportional to population.
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS calculations.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report72Figure 2. 2008-2011:The end of Regional convergence in the EU
Note: Size of circles are proportional to population.
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS calculations.
Map 1. Change of GDP per inhabitant by NUTS 2 Regions, 2008-2011 (In %)
Source: Eurostat.
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Six years after the economic crisis, European labour markets still suffer in the
wake. Although it seems that the tide is turning, unemployment rates are still sky
high in many countries. Employment, depressed by the crisis has continued to
decrease after the European countries took austerity measures in 2011, but has
finally begun to increase in 2013, since that year employment is up by 2 million
people. Combined with a shrinking labor force, this has caused a turnaround in
the unemployment rate in 2014. But the recovery is still very slow.
The level of long-term unemployment is still dangerously high. Figure 3
shows that long-term unemployment in EU28 is slowly decreasing, but the level is
still very high with just over 5 percent of the labor force, corresponding to some
12 million people, having been unemployed for a year or more. After a rapid rise
in the Euro area since 2011, long-term unemployment seems to have stabilized
during the last year, but with more than 6 percent of the labor force corre-
sponding to some 9½ million people, who have been without work for more than
12 months, long-term unemployment within the Euro zone remains at its highest
level since the outbreak of the crisis.
Increasing unemployment has impacted each member state differently.
Figure 4 shows the long-term unemployment rate before and after the crisis.
Germany is the only country which has a lower rate of long-term unemployment
today than before the crisis broke out in 2008. The countries with increases below
one percentage point are Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Finland and Belgium. At
the other end of the scale Spain has had an increase of 11 percentage points and
Greece of almost 15 percentage points.
Figure 3. Unemployment
  In %                                                                                                                                   
Note: 2015 iAGS forecast.
Source: Eurostat.
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2015. In 2015 long-term unemployment could well be around 11½ million
people in the EU-28 and around 9 million in the Euro area. From a historical point
of view these are still alarming levels of long-term unemployment.
The slow speed of the economic recovery in Europe may marginalize people
in even longer-term unemployment. Even though long-term unemployment and
unemployment in general is decreasing in EU28, the number of people being
unemployed for more than 48 months is still increasing. This suggests that long-
term unemployed bear a high risk of being marginalized and have a harder time
finding a job after being away from employment. In EU28 the number of people
being unemployed for more than 48 months has increased from 1.8 million
people before the crisis to 3.1 million people in the second quarter of 2014. For
the euro area the number has increased from 1.5 million people to 2.6 million
people in the same period. This means that one in four long-term unemployed
have been away from employment more than 48 months. There is an imminent
risk of long-term unemployment becoming structural and there is therefore need
for more active labor market policy and economic growth to reverse the trend in
order to prevent hysteresis effects.
Young people have struggled to find work during the crisis. The level of youth
unemployment remains high. In the EU28, 5 million people between 15-24 years
are unemployed, while the number is 3.3 million people in the euro area. Of the
5 million unemployed young people in EU28 more than 1.8 million, or more than
one in three, have been unemployed for more than 12 months. In the euro area
the number is more than 1.3 million people which correspond to around
40 percent of youth unemployment also being long-term unemployment.
In some countries the youth unemployment rate has skyrocketed with unem-
ployment rates exceeding 50 percent. Many young people are however not
an active part of the labor market and instead of looking at the traditional youth
Figure 4. Long term unemployment
In %                                                                                                                                      
Note: Prior to crisis is 2008 and today is 2013.
Source: Eurostat.
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the number of young unemployed as a share of the population (Figure 5 and
Figure 6). 
The unemployment ratio for the 15-24 year olds is around 10 percent in both
the EU and the Euro area which from a historical perspective is a very high level.
Youth unemployment ratios are very high in the troubled countries in
southern Europe. Thus in Spain and Greece 16.5 percent and 21 percent of the
youths are unemployed while it is only around 5 percent of the youths in
Luxembourg, Germany and Austria.  
Figure 5. Youth unemployment ratio
 In %                                                                                                                                   
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 6. Youth unemployment ratios, selected countries
 In %                                                                                                                                    
Note: seasonally adjusted data. Prior to crisis is 2008 and today is 2013.
Source: Eurostat.
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young people who no longer at school but can’t find a job one can also look at
NEET-rates that measure the share of young people active or not active who are
Not in Employment nor in Education or Training (hence, NEET). 
Figure 7 shows the NEET-rates in the individual EU-countries for the 15-
29 year olds prior to the crisis (2008) and today (2013). As one can see many of
the countries that experience the highest unemployment rates among young
people are also among the countries that have the highest NEET-rates.
Map 2 shows the regional evolution of unemployment between 2008 and
2011. We can see that regions in Southern Europe and Ireland clearly suffered the
sharpest increases. It is especially striking to see how easily recognisable national
borders are. For example, German territories are not easily mixed up with French
territories and French territories are not mixed up with Spanish ones.
Figure 7. NEET-rates (young people not employed nor in education or training)
In %                                                                                                                                  
Source: Eurostat.
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Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 77Box 1. Recession and austerity: Gender equality jeopardized 1
The crisis that began in 2008 has hit European countries diversely, causing
economic and labour market disequilibria of greater or smaller magnitude. As
with past global crises, the current one has gendered implications. While
women’s employment is said to be preserved relative to men’s in the early
stage of a recession, austerity plans implemented in several countries to limit
public deficits and debts are deemed to affect female workers more deeply. A
special issue of the Revue de l'OFCE (Eydoux et al., 2014) sheds light on the
gendered dimensions of the current crisis and related policies' impacts on Euro-
pean labour markets. It notably points out the (temporary) protective role of
the gendered segregation of labour markets (i.e. the fact that women and men
do not work in the same sectors or occupations): male-dominated sectors
(construction, industry, etc.) are generally first hit in recession, while female-
dominated sectors (services and the public sector) remain quite sheltered from
a quick drop in the demand for labour—but are exposed to job losses at a later
stage. This special issue explores the relevance of common hypothesis about
the gender impact of recession and austerity: the segregation and buffer effects
on the demand side and the discouraged-worker or added-worker effects on
the supply side of the labour market. The timing of recessions also differs across
Map 2. Change in unemployment by NUTS 2 Regions, 2008-2011 (In %)
Source: Eurostat.
1. This box is a contribution from Anne Eydoux (CEE), Antoine Math (IRES) and Hélène Périvier
(OFCE)
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report78countries. Several phases with different gender implications often alternate: the
recession, the austerity phases, and an intermediate phase of recovery. When it
comes to the analysis of crisis related policies, the phases may however be over-
lapping instead of alternating, for instance when austerity measures are
implemented prior to the crisis—eventually in line with European economic
governance rules or with a previous downturn. 
In Germany, female employment has apparently been spared from the effects
of recession in quantitative terms, the focus is on the low quality of women's
jobs. In central and eastern Europe, as well as in southern countries such as
Greece, Portugal and Spain, male and female employment has been so deeply
affected that poverty and material deprivation have increased for all. In the UK,
the impact of the recession and austerity has been selective, increasing existing
inequalities by gender and by ethnicity, as well as within each category. In
Sweden, where the public sector is widespread and female-dominated, the
impact of recessions on women's employment has been delayed, occurring in
austerity phases through the downsizing of the local government sector.
Finally, the long-term changes in labour market or public policies induced by
the recession and austerity affect the trends in female and male employment.
In many European countries, changes in public policies are liable to jeopardize
the progresses towards gender equality.
3. Rising poverty and material deprivation
Many Europeans have experienced decreases in living standards during the
crisis, resulting in increases in poverty rates. The anchored risk-of-poverty rate is
the preferred measure when analyzing changes in poverty over time, as the
median income is anchored in a specific year, in this case 2008 (see chapter 2 in
the iAGS 2014 for an elaboration on the difference between different poverty
measures and the difference between anchored and un-anchored poverty rates). 
An increase in the anchored poverty risk over time indicates that the living
standards of low-income households are worsening compared to the base year
(2008), and a decrease indicates that living standards are improving. The risk of
poverty has increased mostly in a number of southern and eastern European
countries (Figure 8). Greece stands out with an increase in the risk of poverty of
nearly 25 percentage points, and this from one of the highest starting points: the
risk of poverty has increased from 20 pct. to nearly 45 pct. (with respect to 2008
median income), with the largest increases in the last two years. On the other
hand the risk of poverty has decreased in eastern European countries like Poland,
Slovakia and Romania. 
The change in the anchored poverty rate since 2008 is highly correlated with
the change in GDP, confirming that the countries which have been hit the hardest
during the crisis are also the countries which have experienced the highest
increase in poverty (relative to 2008 income) (See Figure 9).
The severe material deprivation rate is another poverty indicator. Instead of
looking at income, the severe material deprivation rate shows how individuals
experience inadequate access to basic amenities. Severe material deprivation is a
more narrow indicator than the at-risk-of-poverty rate. Other measures such as
Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 79the poverty rate and Gini-coefficient of income can be difficult to compare
between countries and over time because they measure relative inequality. The
severe material deprivation rate is defined as the declared inability to pay for a
certain number of necessary items (see box 2 for a more detailed description of
the severe material deprivation rate).   
Figure 8. Change in the risk of anchored poverty 2008-2013
In %
Note: (*) latest data from 2012. (**) latest data from 2011 due to breaks in time series. (***) latest data
from 2012 due to breaks in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 9. Correlation between change in GDP/capita and change
in anchored poverty 2008-2013
                                                                                                                                             In %
Note: (*) latest data from 2012. (**) latest data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report80Box 2. Definition of severe material deprivation rate
The severe material deprivation rate is an EU-SILC indicator based on the
affordability of a selection of items (goods or services) considered to be neces-
sary or desirable for people to have an 'acceptable' standard of living in the
country where they live. The indicator distinguishes between individuals who
cannot afford a certain good or service, and those who do not have this good
or service for another reason, e.g. because they do not want or do not need it.
The severe material deprivation rate is defined as the enforced inability to pay
for at least four of the below-mentioned items. 
1.  to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills;
2.  to keep their home adequately warm;
3.  to face unexpected expenses;
4.  to eat meat or proteins regularly; 
5.  to go on holiday;
6.  a television set;
7.  a washing machine; 
8.  a car;
9.  a telephone.
Souce: EU-SILC (Eurostat).
Figure 10 shows the change in the severe material deprivation rate since
2008. Greece and Hungary, followed by a number of southern and eastern Euro-
pean countries, have experienced the highest increases in severe material
deprivation. 
Figure 11 shows the change in the severe deprivation rate for children. The
ranking among the countries mirrors to a large extent the ranking for the overall
severe deprivation rate. In Hungary and Greece severe material deprivation has
increased by 13 percent or more since 2008. There is a tendency that the rate
among children has increased more than the average rate, indicating that chil-
dren are hit harder by material deprivation than other age groups. Growing
deprivation among children is very concerning since lack of opportunities during
childhood is likely to have long-term consequences for the concerned individuals
as well as for society as a whole.
As shown in Figure 12, the increase in the severe material deprivation rate is
mainly driven by an increase for the unemployed and other inactive persons (i.e.
not retired). In other words, the rate has increased much more for people outside
the labour market than for employed and retired individuals, resulting in close to
one out of four unemployed experiencing material deprivations.  
 Figure 13 shows the correlation between change in GDP and change in
severe material deprivation from 2008-2013. There is a clear negative relation-
ship, meaning that the countries whose economies where hit the hardest during
the crisis are also the countries that have experienced the highest increases in
severe material deprivation.
Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 81Figure 10. Change in severe material deprivation rate 2008-2013
Change in percentage points                                                         
Note: (*) latest data from 2012. (**) latest data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat
Figure 11. Change in severe material deprivation among children 
(0-18 years) 2008-2013
 Change in percentage points                                                       
Note: (*) latest data from 2012. (**) latest data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report82The same picture is shown when looking at changes in unemployment and
changes in severe material deprivation. There is a clear positive correlation
between the two, indicating that a large increase in unemployment results in a
large increase in severe material deprivation.
Figure 12. Development in severe material deprivation by activity status 
in the euro area
 In %                                                                                                                                     
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 13. Correlation between change in SMD and change in GDP/capita 
2008-2013
In %
Note: (*) last data from 2012. (**) last data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 834.  The drivers of material deprivation
The descriptive analysis above clearly suggests that there has been some
correlation between the changes in GDP, unemployment, social protection
expenditures the severe material deprivation across Europe.
In the following we have taken an econometric approach in looking at the
drivers of material deprivation. By panel data estimation we have estimated the
following equation:
ΔSMD = α ΔGDP + β ΔGDP-1 + γ ΔLTUNR-1 + δ ΔSPE-1 + C + μ
where the dependent variable is:
ΔSMD, the change in the severe material deprivation rate
and the explanatory variables are:
ΔGDP, the growth rate in GDP per capita
ΔLTUNR-1, the lagged change in the long term unemployment rate
ΔSPE-1, the lagged percentage change in social protection expenditure
(SPE) volumes (euros/inhabitant)
C, a constant term 
and μ,the error term
Figure 14. Correlation between change in unemployment and change in SMD 
2008-2013
In %
Note: (*) last data from 2012. (**) last data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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The change in GDP per capita both in the same as well as in the year before has a
very significant negative influence on the change in material deprivation,
meaning that negative growth in GDP per capita tends to increase the severe
material deprivation rate both in the current year and the year after. If GDP per
capita (in volumes) shrinks by 1 percent it will on average pull up the severe
material deprivation rate by 0.1 percentage points in the current year and in the
year after. 
Also, long-term unemployment is an important driver for material depriva-
tion. If long-term unemployment increases by one percentage point the severe
material deprivation rate will follow in the year after with an increase corre-
sponding to 0.3 percentage points. When determining some of the drivers of
material deprivation, we also tried including the change in unemployment in the
equation, but the change in unemployment turned out to have a less significant
influence on material deprivation compared to long-term unemployment. This
result confirms the expectation that unemployment in itself does not necessarily
lead to material deprivation, as people tend to start using their savings when they
get unemployed. Once they have been unemployed for a while the savings run
out, however, and the unemployment leads to material deprivation. Long-term
unemployment (but not necessarily short-term unemployment) is therefore an
important source of poverty and material deprivation.
Finally we find a significant negative effect from the change in the expendi-
tures on social protection. This indicates that austerity is also a leading driver
increases in material deprivation. The estimates suggest that that the more a
country tightens its fiscal policy, in the form of decreasing social protection
expenditures, the larger the increases in material deprivation. If social protection
expenditures (in volumes euros per inhabitant) decrease by one percent then it
will lead to an increase in the severe material deprivation rate of 0.04 percentage
points in the year after. 
The regression results support the idea that poverty and material deprivation
are closely connected to not only the economic cycle and the development on
the labour market, but also to policies influencing social protection. 
Table 1. Effects on the change in severe material deprivation (ΔSMD)
Coefficient  Std     T-value
Growth rate in GDP/per capita (α) -0.115 0.032 -3.65
Lagged growth rate in GDP/per capita (β) -0.113 0.040 -2.79
Lagged change in the long term unemp.rate (γ) 0.313 0.117 2.68
Lagged percentage change in SPE (δ) -0.039 0.013 -3.06
Constant 0.102 0.113 0.90
R2 = 42
Number of countries : 27
Number of observations : 185
Wald (joint):Chi2(4) = 48,46 [0.000]
Note: We tested for both autocorrelation and unit root and neither are found in the data.
Sources: Eurostat and iAGS calculations.
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When it comes to measuring income distribution and relative inequalities,
the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income is the main indicator. The
Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where the Gini is zero in a country where all
people have the same equalized disposable income (perfect equality), and 1 in
the case where one person has all the income (perfect inequality). Gini is an indi-
cator of relative inequality in the sense that if all income increases or decreases
by the same percentage the Gini will not change. For the last 5 years, since the
crisis broke out, there is large spread in the variation of the Gini coefficient
throughout Europe. There are large increases in some countries, notably
southern European countries such as Cyprus, Spain, Italy and Greece. On the
other hand income inequality has decreased in the Netherlands and Portugal
(Figure 15). In Portugal this is explained by the fact that top income were hurt
even more than low-income. 
Another way to measure income inequality is through income decile shares.
This allows us to decompose inequality change into what is driven by the bottom
and what is driven by the top of the income ladder. Figure 16 shows the evolution
of inequality in the top of the income scale (S10/S6) as well as the evolution in the
bottom (S6/S1). S10/S6 is the ratio of the share of income earned by the richest
10 pct. (S10) to the share of income earned by the 6th decile of equalized income
(S6). An increase in S6/S1 indicates an increase in inequality in the bottom part of
the income ladder since the income earned by the poorest has decreased rela-
tively to the income received by the 6th decile. We can see in Figure 16 that the
rise in inequality in Spain, Greece, and Italy is mainly driven by a rise in inequality
in the bottom part of the distribution. In Portugal and in Romania, the rise in
Figure 15. Change in Gini coefficient 2008-2013
Note: (*) last data from 2012. (**) last data from 2011 due to break in time series. (***) last data from 2012
due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report86inequality in the bottom part of the distribution is offset by a decrease in
inequality in the top part of the distribution. Between 2008 and 2013, most coun-
tries that experienced a decrease in the Gini coefficient have seen a fall of
inequality in the top of the distribution.     
Concerning regional inequality of disposable income, we can see the same
convergence/divergence trends as with GDP (Figures 1 and 2): the convergence
that was occurring before the crisis stopped after 2008. 
Figure 17 compares the global European Gini of household equivalised
disposable income to the level of national Gini coefficients. The global European
Gini compares household income regardless of national residence. Eurostat does
not calculate a European Gini: we used microdata (EU-SILC) to do it. There might
be some small differences with the Gini coefficients calculated by Eurostat, partly
explained by the treatment of negative income (we exclude them). 
The Figure shows that Europe as a whole is more unequal than any other
country in the union. Inequality in the European Union is in fact comparable to
that prevailing in the United States. 
Figure 18 shows the evolution of European global inequality, which compares
all households regardless of residence. In the European Union as a whole, while
inequality was rapidly falling between 2008 and 2009, it has been rising since
2009. In 2012, global inequality is slightly higher in the European Union than in
the United States. Global inequality is much lower in the Eurozone but it is also
rising since 2010. The Gini in the EU27, as calculated by Eurostat is also shown in
the figure. It is much lower than the global European Gini. It is also stable between
2009 and 2012 whereas global Gini is strongly increasing. Eurostat's statistics on
inequality do not reflect the divergence between countries since 2009. 
Figure 16. Evolution between 2008 and 2013 of share of national equivalised 
income
 In percentage points                                                      
Note: (*) last data from 2012. (**) last data from 2011 due to break in time series. (***) last data from 2012
due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 87For the EU, the Figure uses both the Gini and the Theil index. The Theil index
is another statistic used to measure economic inequality. It is very comparable to
the Gini coefficient. As the Figure 18 shows, the differences in the evolution of the
two measures are fairly small.  
Figure 17. Gini of household equivalised disposable income across Europe 
and European global Gini 
Sources: EU-SILC, iAGS calculations. 
Figure 18. Evolution of inequality in EU, Eurozone and United States  
Sources: EU-SILC, OECD, iAGS calculations.  
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report88Unlike Gini, Theil index can be decomposed into between-groups inequality
and within-groups inequality. The decomposition allows us to distinguish what
part of inequality is due to inequality within the groups, here within member
states (MS), and what is due to inequality between MS. The within-group
inequality is just the weighted average of the Theil index within each nation. The
between-group inequality is the inequality that would prevail if individuals (here,
households) within each MS earned the average national income, i.e. if there were
no inequality within each nation. Figure 19 shows that the increase in inequality
since 2009 is mainly due to an increase in between-countries inequality. In fact,
97% of the increase in global European inequalities since 2009 is due to the diver-
gence between countries.
6. High concentration of wealth in the Eurozone2
Since the onset of the economic and financial crisis, there has been a growing
interest in assessing the financial stability of the household sector. This is closely
related to the distribution of wealth in private households in the Eurozone.
Against this background, the European Central Bank collected data on private
wealth with the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) for the first
time in 2010. This survey provides a unique opportunity to analyse harmonised
information on household wealth in 17 Eurozone countries. Even though the
development over time will only be visible after the second wave of the survey in
2014, the HFCS provides the best prospects for future research on wealth
inequality in Europe.
Figure 19. Within/between-country decomposition of the evolution 
of the Theil index
Sources: EU-SILC, iAGS calculations.
2. This section is a contribution from the Austrian Institute AK Wien.
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Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 89The HFCS uses a rather narrow, “accounting-style” definition of wealth.
Wealth, according to this definition, consists of economic assets which can yield
returns. It must be possible to valuate and sell them, to use them as collateral for
loans, and to attribute them to persons. This means that a number of wealth cate-
gories are excluded, such as social assets (e.g., pay-as-you-go pension systems,
unemployment insurance, health insurance), environmental assets (e.g., clean
water, clean air, a lack of noise pollution), and human capital (i.e., the human
capacity to produce returns). The household balance includes assets and liabilities.
Assets include real assets (such as the main residence, additional real estate, vehi-
cles, and company shares) and financial assets (such as checking and savings
accounts, funds, stocks, and bonds). Liabilities include secured and unsecured
debts. The result of assets minus debts is net wealth.
Figure 20 shows the distribution of net wealth across the Eurozone. The
median household, which marks the line between the richest and the poorest half
of the population, has a net wealth of around 109.000 euros. However, the mean
net wealth of households is roughly 231.000 euros and hence lies significantly
above the median. This big difference is a first sign of an unequal distribution,
since some rich households pull up the mean. For the poorest 10 per cent of
households, assets just barely exceed liabilities; their nearly zero net wealth of
about 1,000 euros is not even visible in the graph. The net wealth of the bottom
5 per cent is actually negative, that is, they are indebted. At the other end of the
distribution, the bottom household of the top 10 per cent has a net wealth of
around 506.000 euros (ECB 2013).
Thanks to an ex-ante harmonisation of the survey design and the methods
used, the data is comparable across the Eurozone. However, it is important to
note that a comparison of absolute wealth levels, both of means but especially of
medians, is not a very useful undertaking. Since the data covers only private
Figure 20. Net wealth of selected percentiles
       Euros
Source: ECB 2013, p. 75, authors’ illustration.
0
100 000
200 000
300 000
400 000
500 000
600 000
10 30 50 70 90
Percentile of Net Wealth
Mean
Median
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report90household wealth, demographic and differing institutional and political set-ups
between countries are likely to lead to varying levels of private wealth. For
instance, it is to be expected that countries with well-developed public housing or
pension systems reduce the need for private households to accumulate assets. For
example, far more than half the households in Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, or Slovakia
own their primary residence, while the majority of households in Germany and
Austria rent their home and consequently do not own any real estate.
Comparisons of absolute levels of private household wealth across Eurozone
countries are thus not likely to yield meaningful results. In contrast, the data is
well-suited to investigate the distribution of wealth between private households.
Figure 21 ranks countries by their Gini-coefficient for net wealth of private house-
holds. Comparing countries across Europe, Austria has the highest wealth
inequality, followed by Germany, Cyprus, and France, which also have a rather
unequal distribution of wealth. Slovakia has the lowest Gini of 0.45 index points,
but even there the distribution is skewed: the top 10 per cent own about a third
of the wealth. 
Another approach is to look at the contribution of different wealth categories
to the total inequality of wealth. In Belgium, unequal distribution of financial
assets is the main reason for wealth inequality. In countries such as Luxemburg,
Greece, or Slovakia it is real estate. In Germany, Austria, France, or Portugal, the
unequal distribution of business assets contributes the most to wealth inequality
(Sierminska and Medgyesi 2013).
An important aspect which needs to be considered in wealth surveys is the
potential under-reporting of wealth. The question is how well surveys with volun-
tary participation—as well designed as they may be—can cover the actual wealth
spectrum. For some countries, for example, administrative data is available from
wealth and inheritance taxes. For these cases, the hope is that state authorities
have consistently enforced the obligation to report and the full spectrum of trans-
Figure 21. Gini-coefficients of net wealth of private households, 2010
Gini coefficient                                                                                                  
Source: Sierminska and Medgyesi 2013, p. 10.
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Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 91ferred assets is recorded. In wealth surveys based on voluntary participation,
researchers must be conscious of the fact that different positions in the distribu-
tions come with different probabilities to participate and reply. While experience
shows that this is also true for the bottom of the distribution, household non-
response is a much bigger problem at the top end. In addition, the probability of a
rich household to be drawn in a sample of a few thousand is extremely low, which
further exacerbates the underestimation of total wealth and of wealth inequality.
This weakness becomes tangible when comparing of HFCS data with infor-
mation from the Forbes Rich List (Vermeulen, 2014). The richest household in
the German part of the HFCS owns 76 million euros, while the “poorest” person
of the 52 Germans on the Forbes list has a wealth of 818 million euros. The data
for Austria shows an even more dramatic gap of 22 million (HFCS) and
1,560 million euros (Forbes). These examples show that the super-rich are not
represented in the data, which inevitably leads to distorted results. One possi-
bility to close this gap is to carefully estimate missing assets at the top end of the
distribution. The starting point for such an estimate is the so-called Pareto distri-
bution, which academic studies show describes the missing top of the wealth
distribution very well.
Vermeulen (2014) has done such estimations for a number of Eurozone coun-
tries. These provide lower and upper bounds for the bias due to under-reporting
of the largest fortunes, which are used to calculate corrected estimates
(Figure 22). According to HFCS data, the richest per cent in Germany owns a
share of 24 per cent of the total private wealth. After correcting for under-
reporting, this share is between 26 and 33 per cent. For other countries, the
correction shows that the concentration of wealth is probably significantly higher
than indicated by the HFCS data, as well.
Figure 22. Share of the richest 1% in the total net wealth 
of private households, 2010
Share in %                                                                                                                  
Source: Vermeulen 2014, p. 29.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report92It needs to be emphasised that the HFCS was carefully prepared and imple-
mented both in terms of content and design, while drawing on many years of
experience of the US Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). This included, for
instance, a comprehensive collection of metadata beyond personal interviews as
well as a thorough training of interviewers. Still, due to the difficulties in capturing
the high wealth households described above, results based on the HFCS represent
the lower limit of the actual concentration of wealth – but this lower level alone
already points to a concerning level of inequality.
The high Gini-values up to 0.77 in figure 21 show that inequality of wealth is
much higher than that of incomes. In all countries examined, the Gini-coefficients
of household wealth are higher than those of household incomes. ECB calcula-
tions also provide evidence for this fact. The richest 10 per cent of households
own more than 50 per cent of the total net wealth in the covered Eurozone coun-
tries. This concentration is much lower for household incomes, where the 10 per
cent of households with the highest incomes earn about 31 per cent of the total
income (ECB, 2013, p. 96).
As mentioned earlier, since the HFCS has only been conducted once so far, it
is not possible to assess the development of concentration of wealth over time.
However, in his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the French economist
Thomas Piketty has presented data on the distribution of wealth in Europe. His
calculations are based on long time series for France, Great Britain, Germany, and
Sweden. Piketty shows that in Europe the share of wealth owned by the top 1 per
cent has been growing slowly but steadily since the 1970s; he also warns that the
concentration of wealth might further exacerbate in the future (Piketty, 2014). 
The HFCS wealth survey shows that, so far, only little was known about
wealth in the Eurozone. While the distribution of income from employment is well
researched in many countries, until recently, researchers were rather in the dark
when it came to wealth. The reason for this is that tax authorities record incomes,
but the only source of information about wealth are surveys on a voluntary basis –
with all their advantages and disadvantages. Given how willingness of rich house-
holds to participate in surveys as HFCS is lacking, one partial solution would be to
make participation mandatory in future HFCS waves.
7. The fight against inequality and poverty
The analysis above shows an overall picture of a Europe that is not converging
but diverging, and the main driver for income divergence is not divergence within
countries but between countries. And while income is unequally distributed, but
inequality in wealth is much larger. 
The European labour market still suffers, with high levels of long-term unem-
ployment and a large share of young people that are unable to find a job. There is
a risk that the development will become structural, creating scars for a long time.
Poverty and material deprivation is rising, but more in some countries than others.
The divergence is therefore not only seen on a macroeconomic scale, but also the
living standards of Europeans are diverging. Some might argue that the rising
poverty and material deprivation are just driven by the cycle, but our analysis has
shown that austerity and changes in social protection expenditure have a signifi-
cant effect on severe material deprivation.
Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 93In the chapter above our main focus has been on income and wealth inequali-
ties, inequalities on the labour marked, poverty and material deprivation. But there
are many other kinds of inequalities—such as inequality in education, health,
gender, race discrimination, crime exposure etc.—that are just as problematic.
Within a few years we could easily end up in a situation where large
inequality increases have occurred right in front of our noses, knowing that it
could have been prevented, if we had implemented decisive action. Knowledge
is power, ignorance is defeat. To reverse the trend in poverty, inequality and the
divergence between countries, we need to put the fight against poverty and
inequality firmly on the agenda. 
One of the main ideas behind the European Union was to enhance the
convergence among member states. The more divided the countries are, the
harder it is to create a common direction for the EU. Policy coordination, not least
in the fiscal area, becomes more difficult. Inequality should be fought not only
from a distributional perspective but also for the future of the European Union. A
union, particularly one that shares the same currency, has to serve equality and
cannot be maintained at the expense of rising inequality. The risk is a withdrawal
on national level, ending in breaking up the euro. 
Creating jobs through investment
European investment has fallen more than 400 billion euros since its 2007
peak, leaving Europe caught in an investment trap. Therefore, we urgently need
to stimulate investment for the purpose of job creation both in the short run as
well as in the long run. As shown above, poverty and material deprivation is
closely related to economic growth, unemployment and especially long-term
unemployment. It is therefore crucial that we manage to create more European
jobs in order to avoid a structural worsening of the labour market, though hyster-
esis effects, with continuing divergence and poverty increase as a consequence. 
The European commission has just presented an investment plan for Europe,
the so-called Juncker-plan. The plan is a step in the right direction, but is likely to
fail to deliver on its promises (see chapter 1 and 4). More still needs to be done
in order to prevent more people from being long term unemployed ending in
poverty and material deprivation. As outlined in chapters 1 and 4, there are still
several channels within the EU fiscal framework that can increase investment and
in this way boost growth and create jobs. Economic policy should address
austerity and deflation by the usual tools but the diverging underlying dynamic
requires much more. A coordinated wage policy would be an important counter-
weight (see chapter 5 of this report and iAGS 2014) and transition toward a low-
carbon economy could be a way to reignite prosperity in Europe (chapter 4 of
this report). Ultimately, public investment financed by money creation may be
resorted to (a scheme is proposed in chapter 3 of this report).
Active labour marked policies and increased education level
Increasing expenditures and effort on active labour market programs will also
reduce inequality and poverty. Passive labour market programs are traditionally
unemployment insurance schemes, whereas active labour market programs are
training activities and other reintegration policies targeted at the unemployed (as
opposed to a general training or education subsidy). Active programs may
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employment programs intended to prevent skill losses during the period of
unemployment. In other words, active labour market programs aim at securing
the employability of the unemployed in order to avoid scarring effects of long-
term unemployment. 
As already stated above child poverty is especially concerning. Ensuring that
parents are employed is therefore a crucial mechanism to reduce the risk of child
poverty. Policies that improve the conditions for low income families with children
will reduce child poverty. This could be seen in the form of higher labour partici-
pation among parents, including improved parental leave arrangements, which
makes it easier to return to work after maternity leave. Increasing the female
participation rate is also likely to reduce the risk of poverty for children. By
increasing the female participation we can increase employment and create more
equal opportunities for men and women. One way to make it more likely for
women to participate in the labour force is to develop the public childcare system.
By increasing the educational level for the weakest we can lift low-incomes
and in this way reduce inequality. The supply of unskilled labour is reduced rela-
tive to that of skilled labour. In this way it is possible to fight social inequality by
getting weaker groups employed and supporting their bargaining power on the
labour market. Increasing the education level will also benefit the large group of
unskilled or low skilled young people in Europe. More young people should have
at least an upper secondary education and more adults, especially those without
training, should have better opportunities to upgrade their skills through adult
and continuing education.
In chapter 1 we argued that the present European fiscal rules are putting pres-
sure on expenditure such as investments in education and active labour market
policies. These kind of social investments are investments that are changing the
long-term because they are investments in the future of Europe. Downgrading
social investments will therefore have long-lasting consequences for Europe (Palier
et al., 2011). One of the problems with the recently presented Junker-plan is that
it does not rely on such investment, despite the fact that such social investments
are clearly priorities in the Commission. Since the Junker-plan relies heavily on a
leverage effect (or multiplier effect) from private investments, by construction it
could not have included social investments. This underlines the limitation of these
hybrid (public-private) plans.   
Making Europe more equal by reforming the tax system
When it comes to poverty reduction and creating a more equal Europe,
looking at how we tax people is also important. Reforming the tax system in
Europe in order to make it fairer and more progressive, will not only have a direct
effect, it can also finance investments such as education or active labour market
policy, that will benefit lower-income groups. 
Kindermann et al. (2014) finds in a very recent study on US data that
increasing tax rates at the very top of the income distribution, for instance
among the top one percent earners, can both reduce tax burdens for the rest of
the population as well as increase social welfare, and reduce both income and
wealth inequality. Because tax burdens are increased for the top one percent
earners and decreased for the “bottom” 99 percent, the average consumption
Rising inequality in the EU: The elephant in the room 95will increase, and inequality will decrease compared to a situation with no tax
change. Wealth inequality will also decrease. By taxing extraordinary high
income at a high rate, the source of the wealth concentration is being taxed at a
high rate, which will result in a significant decline in wealth inequality over time
(Kindermann et al. 2014).
Reforming income taxation is not the only way to go; other tax sources
should also be considered. An increase in property taxes should be considered.
First of all property is immobile, meaning that it is not the target of tax evasion.
Secondly the value of real estate is highly correlated with wealth, meaning that
higher taxes on property, means higher taxes in the top of the distribution. In
light of the dramatic inequality of wealth in Europe, an obvious demand is also to
raise wealth-related taxes in coordination. Apart from fairness considerations,
other aspects necessitating such a move are tight public budgets and the rela-
tively high tax burden on labour. Wealth-related taxes are also considered a
source of income for the funding of public services that has little or adverse
impact on economic growth, especially if raised EU-wide at low rates. The EU
should implement a common Financial Transaction Tax. Ten European countries
have already agreed on implementing the tax from 2014, but other European
countries should join the initiative. 
Finally the effort to combat tax evasion and tax havens should be strength-
ened. The European Commission has estimated that European countries annually
lose in the area of 1 trillion euros because of tax evasion EU-COM (2012). But tax
avoidance is not only a problem related to money transferred out of the EU. This
stresses that there is an urgent need for greater coordination of the European tax
systems. A lot can be done in order to unify taxation rules, creating common
legislation, a common tax base and creating transparency in the tax system. An
important first step in this direction is an automatic exchange of information to
combat tax evasion which is supported by the OECD (2014) and being imple-
mented in the EU. The goal must now be the consistent implementation of the
OECD agreement, which was signed by 51 states in October 2014, together with
the abolition of banking secrecy, at least in the EU.
But unhealthy tax competition in the EU is already a reality, where corporate
tax cuts in one country makes other countries follow, making it a 'race to the
bottom'. The result is a negative spiral with no winners, as countries follow each
other down, in an attempt to lure investments and businesses from each other.
The OECD has denounced “harmful Tax Competition” since 1998. Tax practices
that were defined as harmful were: “no or low effective tax rates”; “ring fencing of
regimes” (preferential tax regimes are partly or fully insulated from the domestic
markets to protect own economy); “lack of transparency”; “lack of effective
exchange of information” (OECD, 1998). It is therefore important to build a polit-
ical consensus on a higher degree of policy coordination for corporate taxation.
This could for done by implementing an EU wide strong inventory of income,
wealth and tax regimes (including advance tax ruling), with shared information
among member states. Disseminating anonymized comprehensive information
(like it has been seen in ECB’s recent wealth survey) is useful in order to
strengthen the public and scientific debate. Based on that, a framework proposi-
tion could be developed, where residents are taxed according to national law
avoiding double taxation and double no taxation. Wealth in one country would
be known to fiscal administration in the country of residence and taxed according
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report96to prevailing fiscal rules. Multiple residency would not be allowed. Such a frame-
work would provide full transferability of social rights as these would be given as a
joint benefit of such common framework. Fiscal havens would be eradicated.
Minimum taxation levels could be secured, and the same could apply to firm taxa-
tion. Another approach could be only to engage willing countries, in the
enhanced cooperation procedure, in fiscal convergence. Residency would not be
an issue and common law would apply. Harmful fiscal competition could be dealt
between the core of common fiscal law countries and remaining countries.
One thing is for sure; the current challenges with the ongoing economic
crisis, the unhealthy corporate tax competition and tax evasion are best solved by
international cooperation, and the EU can play a central role in doing so. 
Chapter 3COPING WITH THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE EURO AREA 
BANKING SYSTEM AND THE REAL CRISIS
THE IMPOSSIBLE CHALLENGE OF THE ECB ALONE
The financial turmoil resulting from the subprime crisis and then the
European sovereign debt crisis have weakened the euro zone’s banks and the
state of public finances, creating a vicious circle in which the banking and debt
crises have been mutually reinforcing (Shambaugh, 2012). This was followed by
an unprecedented loss of confidence that caused a double liquidity crisis: first in
September 2008, following the fall of Lehman Brothers, and then at the end of
2011 due to the European debt crisis. Despite the many common rules1 applied
by the Member States on financial regulation and a common framework for
competition and freedom of establishment, the banking and financial system,
which seemed to be increasingly integrated2, has fragmented. 
Fragmentation of the European banking system has had strong
consequences. First, beyond the European deposit guarantee, one euro in a
Portuguese bank could not be substituted with one euro in a German bank, for
Portuguese and German banks did not support the same default risk. It led to a
reduction in the optimality of the euro zone. Second, fragmentation meant
increased spreads between European domestic interest rates, which paved the way
for a modification in the transmission of the European central bank (ECB) single
monetary policy. The pass-through of conventional monetary policies no longer
worked in distressed economies where monetary conditions were increasingly
influenced by the level of debts, public and private, or by the market perception of
unsustainability. The single monetary policy then aggravated the divergence
between the core and the periphery: low rates for main refinancing operations
reduced core countries rates, but not that of the periphery. Consequently the ECB
tried to counter this phenomenon by repeatedly proposing various
unconventional measures, prioritizing support for the banking system due to the
key role it plays in financing non-financial agents in the Eurozone. In addition, a
large-scale institutional change has started taking place with the on-going
establishment of a banking union designed to supervise the euro zone’s systemic
banks and to propose resolution mechanisms to cope with future bank failures.
This chapter provides an overview of the fragmentation of banking system in
the euro zone. It discusses the measures taken by the ECB to deal with this,
including the banking union. The chapter highlights the shortcomings of a
European strategy which would exclusively rely on the ECB to save the euro.
A stronger coordination, first between the ECB and national bank supervisors
and, second between the ECB and national governments, is called for in order
1. Rules resulting from the transposition of European directives, themselves usually inspired by the
recommendations of the Basel Committee.
2. The numerous reports written on European financial integration indeed showed that while the
interbank markets were highly integrated, this was not the case of retail banking (see for example
Jappelli and Pagano, 2008).Revue de l’OFCE — iAGS (2015) Third Report 
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report98not only to escape a new range of bank failures but also to resolve the current
economic crisis. Consequently, two proposals are made: first, a special
banking fund is discussed to address the too-important-to-fail (TITF) banks
which, under the on-going banking union, will draw on national backstops,
hence on bail-outs; second, the launch of a policy mix is advocated, with a
fiscal investment package financed by European Investment Bank (EIB) bond
issuance and ECB purchases.
1. The fragmentation of the Eurozone banking system
The banking system in the euro zone has been hit hard by the dual crisis that
has afflicted Europe since 2007: first, the subprime crisis and then the sovereign
debt crisis. The first caused heavy losses related to the holding of toxic assets. This
forced central banks to take exceptional measures (see below) and governments
to set up plans to bail out their banking systems in late 2008. Tensions on the
interbank markets significantly eased, as was seen in changes in the difference
between the Euribor and Eurepo3 interbank rates (Figure 1). However, the
interbank market never returned to the way it functioned before the crisis,
and tensions peaked anew in mid-2011 in conjunction with the sovereign debt
crisis in the euro zone. Indeed, the banks’ exposure to sovereign risk threatened
their solvency and plunged the euro zone into a vicious circle in which banking
and fiscal problems became mutually reinforcing in some countries. It remains
that since the sovereign debt crisis was mainly confined to Greece, spreads in the
interbank market remained well below the peak seen during the fall of Lehman
3. The Euribor rate represents the price of an interbank loan without collateral for a given term.
The Eurepo rate is the price of an interbank loan with collateral for the same term.
Figure 1. Difference between the Euribor rate and the Eurepo rate
  Difference in points
Source: Datastream.
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less increased the risk of a new systemic crisis, engendering further tensions on the
interbank markets from mid-2011. In order to ensure that these tensions did not
give rise to a major systemic crisis, the ECB decided to intervene again and
granted financing for an exceptional period of three years. The ECB thus covered
most of the financing needs of the Spanish and Italian banks, which were no
longer able to raise funds on the interbank market or the bond market.
While this meant that the banking crisis was contained, it was certainly
not resolved. Indeed, a dichotomy has emerged between the countries at the
heart of the European Union (Germany, France4, Netherlands, Belgium and
Finland) and those experiencing a crisis in their public finances (Greece, Portugal,
Ireland, Spain and Italy). In the bond markets, this has resulted in a reallocation of
investor portfolios to the detriment of the countries at risk. The purchase of
government bonds issued by countries considered safer has been favoured, which
has had the effect of causing significant losses for banks exposed to sovereign risk,
i.e. mainly those from the countries in crisis. Their increasingly fragile situation led
them to be deprived of liquidity in the interbank market. Banks in the core
countries possessed cash and preferred to leave it on deposit with the ECB.
Without market financing, the banks in the countries in crisis turned to the ECB
via its various monetary policy operations. Consequently the ECB has replaced
the market and has been implicitly taking on the risk that interbank market
players no longer wish to bear. This has resulted in a very significant increase in
TARGET balances (Figure 2), which measure the debtor or creditor positions of the
national central banks, and thus the commercial banks vis-à-vis the ECB.
4. France can be considered one of the Union’s core countries. Nevertheless, with regard to the
TARGET balances, French banks are slightly in debt, but not at all on the same scale as the Spanish
and Italian banks.
Figure 2. TARGET balances
       In bn euros
Source: Eurocrisis monitor, Osnabrück Universität.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report100The crisis has in fact severely disrupted the functioning of the interbank
market, which had previously appeared highly integrated. Credit flows and cross-
border deposits between monetary and financial institutions (MFIs) in the euro
zone have contracted sharply. As far as banks’ bilateral consolidated foreign claims
are concerned, Bouvatier and Delatte (2014) show that banking integration has
reversed in the euro zone, in contrast with what happened in non-euro zone
banks where banking integration has strengthened since the financial crisis.
The change in credit conditions as measured by the ECB’s Bank Lending
Survey (BLS) clearly reflects the tightening of credit conditions in Spain at the
beginning of the crisis, in line with the crash in the real estate market, as well as in
Italy, where restrictions on the supply of credit to households and businesses
peaked in late 2011 and early 2012 (Figures 3 and 4). These observations are in
line with the influential work of Jiménez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2012).
Using a microeconomic database on bank behaviour, these authors show that the
probability that a Spanish bank will refuse credit to non-financial corporations
increases in a deteriorating economic environment (tightening of monetary policy
or reduced growth) and that this effect is even stronger when the banks are
weakly capitalized or not very liquid.
Another dimension of fragmentation involves the sharp increase in the disper-
sion of bank rates in the euro zone since 2007. This can be seen in the changes in
interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations (Figure 5) in the euro zone
since the crisis, as well as in the interquartile differences calculated for the rates
charged on loans (to euro zone households or non-financials, see Figure 6) and
deposits (Figure 7).             
Figure 3. Credit conditions applied to enterprises
Note: The curves for each country represent the difference between establishments reporting that they
have tightened their credit conditions and those reporting that they have been eased. Therefore a rise
reflects tighter credit conditions.
Source: ECB (Bank Lending Survey).
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Coping with the fragmentation of the euro area banking system and the real crisis 101Figure 4. Credit conditions applied to households (for house purchase)
Note: The curves for each country represent the difference between establishments reporting that they
have tightened their credit conditions and those reporting that they have been eased. Therefore a rise
reflects tighter credit conditions.
Source: ECB (Bank Lending Survey).
Figure 5. Interest rates on new lending to non-financial corporations 
(1 to 5 year term)
In %
Source: ECB.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report102Figure 6. Dispersion of interest rates on bank credits
In percentage points                                                                                                                                  In %
Source: ECB. Interquartile difference.
Figure 7. Dispersion of interest rates on bank deposits
In percentage points
Source: ECB. Interquartile difference.
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Achieving uniformity in the transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy in
all the Member States is central to ensure the viability of the monetary
union. There were already significant differences in the transmission of monetary
policy prior to the crisis (Arnold & van Ewijk, 2014; Sorensen & Werner, 2006),
although a trend toward greater uniformity had been observed (Vajanne 2007;
Blot & Labondance, 2013). Note, however, that this conclusion depends heavily
on the markets surveyed and their level of legal integration and competition (de
Graeve, de Jonghe, & van der Vennet, 2007). Homogenization appears clearly in
the transmission of monetary policy on the rates charged to business. Transmis-
sion is more heterogeneous on other markets where national characteristics
associated with legal systems and popular customs are still essential to setting
bank rates (Mojon, 2000; Giuliodori, 2005), like markets for mortgage and
consumer loans. 
The trend towards uniformity in the transmission of monetary policy
throughout the euro zone came to a halt with the crisis, and the convergence
of bank interest rates has even reversed [(Arnold & van Ewijk, 2014),(Belke,
Beckmann, & Verbeyen, 2013),(Karagianis, Panagopoulos, and Vlamis, 2010),
(Rughoo & Sarantis, 2014)]. 
The fragmenting transmission of monetary policy is weakening the euro
zone because it reduces the effectiveness of the ECB's single monetary policy if it
leads to strengthening economic divergences, when, for instance, expansionary
monetary policy does not produce lower interest rates on the loans of the periph-
eral countries. In the following, we intend to show that fragmentation is not only
due to economic fundamentals but also to heterogeneous self-sustaining
dynamics. To explore this point, we propose estimating the following equation in
an effort to explain the nominal interest rates applied by the banks rbi,t in each
Member State i at time t. Here we present the results for interest rates on 1 to
5-year loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) and for two types of loans to
households: real estate loans and consumer loans.
rbi,t = αi + β.timei + γ.primei,t + δ.rmt + ρ.CISSt + εt
These interest rates are explained by the money market rates rmt which reflect
the ECB’s conventional monetary policy. Here we take the overnight rate (Eonia).
In addition, we include a variable reflecting the risk premium associated with each
Member State (primei,t), calculated as the difference between the long-term rates
on government bonds and the money market rates. To take account of the exac-
erbation of risk aversion since the crisis, we also include an indicator of financial
stress: the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) developed by the ECB
(Hollo et al., 2012).
Panel estimates are implemented on two sub-samples of the euro zone: one
for the core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, France and the
Netherlands) and the other for those in the periphery (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy
and Portugal). We include country fixed effects, and we include a time trend timei
that measures the temporal effect that is not related to the fundamentals included
in the model. Finally, we estimate these panels for two sub-periods: before and
after the crisis.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report104Results are reported in table 1. Looking at the rates for NFCs, we find that
before the crisis the determinants of these rates were relatively similar in the
countries of the core and the periphery. Monetary policy was a little more influen-
tial in the peripheral countries, but for the rest, the coefficients were very close.
Note in particular the downward trend in rates for both groups of countries iden-
tified by the timei variable. This result indicates that, independently of the model’s
fundamentals, there is a trend for bank rates to fall in the euro zone. Before the
crisis, there was a trend towards setting relatively homogeneous interest
rates for loans to NFCs in the euro zone.
The results since the crisis point towards a different dynamic, with
increasingly clear fragmentation. While the transmission of monetary policy
remains at an equivalent level in the core countries, it diminishes sharply for
countries in the periphery. Furthermore, while the variable that takes into
account the risk premium applied to each Member State is no longer significant
for the core countries, it still is for the periphery countries. However, this is a
period during which rate spreads were increasing for these countries, indicating
that tensions on the bond markets are affecting the rates charged by banks.
Likewise, the financial stress indicator still has a positive, significant effect, but the
coefficient is twice as high for the countries of the periphery. Finally, it is inter-
esting to note the results of the time variable. For the core countries, this variable
has not been significant since the crisis, indicating that the establishment of bank
rates does reflect the fundamentals included in the estimates. For the periphery,
this variable has become positive since the crisis: in addition to the other determi-
nants included in the equation, an upward trend in bank rates can be seen in the
peripheral countries. This result highlights the process of divergence between the
two groups of countries. The peripheral countries have suffered a hike in bank
rates independently of the fundamentals, a situation that is not seen in the core
countries. This post-crisis trend towards differentiation can also be seen when
looking at the establishment of bank rates for households, whether for real estate
loans or consumer loans. This observation is confirmed (Table 2) by taking into
account non-conventional measures where, rather than the EONIA we introduce
an implicit monetary policy rate5 (or “shadow rate”). Since the crisis, there has
been noticeable fragmentation between the core and the periphery.
The ECB is thus facing a dual challenge. First, it has to bring inflation back to
its target. The fight against the risk of deflation is thus becoming central to the
implementation of monetary policy. Second, the measures taken by the ECB also
has to aim at reducing the fragmentation of the European banking system so as to
restore homogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy within the euro zone
(Cour-Thimman & Winkler, 2013).
5. The calculation of an implicit monetary policy rate can be used to translate the unconventional
measures taken by the central banks. The implicit rate can thus be negative. See Wu and Xia (2014)
for an illustration. 
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Consumer
risis Pre-crisis Crisis
  Periph Core Periph Core Periph
Eonia 0.49*** 0.68*** 0.28*** 0.01 -0.50**
 [0.09] [0.06] [0.09] [0.17] [0.22]
Prime -0.03** 0.31*** 0.01 -0.13 0.04
 [0.01] [0.07] [0.13] [0.12] [0.03]
Ciss 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.19*** 0.43***
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08]
Time * -0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.02***
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Constan 2.88*** 4.58*** 8.36*** 5.44*** 6.64***
 [0.29] [0.33] [0.60] [1.07] [0.75]
N 268 459 288 335 201
r2 0.64 0.69 0.28 0.05 0.16
Data sourTable 1. Determinants of bank interest rates before
 NFC Property
 Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis C
Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph Core
0.74*** 0.88*** 0.72*** 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.87*** 0.15***
[0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.09] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05]
0.21*** 0.16*** 0.00 0.07*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.11***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.06] [0.04] [0.03]
0.33*** 0.35*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.35*** 0.15***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
-0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
t 3.30*** 2.51*** 2.61*** -0.13 5.04*** 3.07*** 4.39***
[0.14] [0.13] [0.24] [0.30] [0.27] [0.17] [0.30]
387 288 402 268 432 288 402
0.89 0.97 0.80 0.46 0.35 0.93 0.73
ce: ECB & Eurostat, authors' estimates.
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Consumer
Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
  Periph Core Periph Core Periph
Shadow 0.10** 0.52*** 0.19** -0.12 -0.47***
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]
Prime * -0.01 0.16** -0.08 -0.14 0.01
 [0.01] [0.07] [0.13] [0.12] [0.03]
Ciss * 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.16** 0.29***
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08]
Time ** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 0.01**
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Consta * 3.13*** 5.48*** 8.85*** 5.96*** 7.57***
 [0.32] [0.30] [0.54] [1.06] [0.75]
N 268 459 288 335 201
r2 0.61 0.67 0.27 0.06 0.23
Data souTable 2. Determinants of bank interest rates before
 NFC Property
 Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis
Core Periph Core Periph Core Periph Core
0.52*** 0.62*** 0.24*** 0.11*** 0.29*** 0.60*** 0.02
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.02]
0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.08*** 0.12 -0.03 0.09**
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.01] [0.06] [0.05] [0.03]
0.42*** 0.47*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.47*** 0.17**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02]
-0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
nt 4.04*** 3.35*** 3.13*** -0.05 5.48*** 3.92*** 4.61**
[0.17] [0.18] [0.30] [0.32] [0.26] [0.21] [0.31]
387 288 402 268 432 288 402
0.83 0.93 0.70 0.44 0.31 0.87 0.72
rce: ECB & Eurostat, authors' estimates.
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as a last resort?
The results reported in the previous section have shown that monetary
policy does not share the same degree of effectiveness in the core and the
peripheral countries: it may still be effective in the first but not in the latter.
It thus questions the ability of the ECB to manage the euro area crisis on
its own.
The gloomy economic situation in the euro zone, with its deflationary risks,
brought the European Central Bank (ECB) to undertake a round of quantitative
easing. These measures, some of which may demand that the ECB take on risk –
via the acquisition of securitization products, i.e. Asset Backed Securities (ABS) –
are controversial. Some economists, such as Hans-Werner Sinn, criticize the
ECB: in their view, it is exceeding its mandate for price stability by subjecting
the European economies to a risk of inflation due to excess liquidity that it has
put into circulation. Other economists, such as Michel Aglietta, believe instead
that the ECB is providing an appropriate response to Europe’s economic
situation within the given institutional framework. They even regret the
slowness of its response and are pushing for an institutional change to give the
ECB a plurality of objectives, including price stability, growth and financial
stability (Blot et al., 2014) or price stability, financial stability and a sustainable
public debt (Aglietta, 2014).
After having reviewed the recent unconventional measures implemented by
the ECB, we review the effectiveness of these measures. We conclude on the chal-
lenges of ECB policies in the longer run and discuss the usefulness of a change in
the statutes of the ECB.
Comparison of the monetary policy measures taken by the ECB, 
the Bank of England and the Fed
The major central banks have resorted to various measures, both conven-
tional and unconventional, that have resulted in increasing and / or changing the
size and composition of their balance sheets. There are nevertheless important
differences in the nature of the measures preferred by the ECB, the Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England. These differences result in large part from the
financial structure of the economies in question. The ECB has for instance
focused on supporting the banking system because of its major role in financing
non-financial agents. In the United States, where market financing is predomi-
nant, the Federal Reserve has instead sought to influence market prices through
the purchase of securities. The fact remains that increasing the size of the balance
sheet is still an imperfect way to take account of the additional monetary
stimulus resulting from the unconventional measures implemented. There have
been recent efforts to determine an equivalent of these actions in terms of key
interest rates, called an implicit rate or shadow rate. Wu and Xia (2014) propose
an approach that is based on the rate curve and thus calculate the implicit rate of
the monetary policy of the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England.
Doing this shows that the ECB has indeed conducted a more expansionary
monetary policy (Figure 8) through unconventional measures than what the
main refinancing operations rate shows, as the implicit rate is negative. However,
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report108the ECB’s policy has been relatively less expansionary than that of the Bank
of England and the US Federal Reserve.
The monetary policies of the major central banks have consisted in lending
directly to the banks (against high-quality collateral) and intervening in the
financial markets (mainly government securities but also securities backed by real
estate assets, and non-financial commercial paper). Several types of interventions
have been endorsed:
• On the one hand, the Fed and the Bank of England decided to intervene,
as a first step, mainly through (conventional) loans to banks facing liquidity
problems. In a second step, these central banks engaged in purchases of securities
on the markets to lower long-term interest rates and stimulate the economy. For
example, the Federal Reserve established programmes for purchasing US govern-
ment debt (the first was launched in March 2009) and mortgage-backed
securities. In June 2014, the securities portfolio of the Federal Reserve came to
about 4000 billion dollars, or about 90% of its balance sheet (Figure 9). Likewise,
in January 2009 the Bank of England set up the Asset Purchase Facility, a very
large-scale programme to purchase British government securities and to a lesser
extent Treasury bills and corporate bonds. In July 2012, this had reached a level of
GBP 375 billion, or 90% of the BoE’s assets (Figure 10).
• On the other hand, most of the ECB’s efforts have relied on collateralized
loans (i.e. against guarantees) to the banking sector. Since October 2008,
auctions for monetary policy transactions have been conducted at fixed rates with
full allocation for demands for bank refinancing. In other words, so long as suffi-
cient collateral is provided, any demand for bank liquidity is met. This policy is
thus entirely dependent on the demand for liquidity coming from commercial
banks, and thereby breaks with the previous policy of a limited supply of liquidity
to banks. Though new, this policy is not quite unconventional, insofar as it does
Figure 8. Shadow rates of monetary policy 
In %
Source: Wu & Xia (2014), http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/jing.wu/research/data/WX.html.
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Coping with the fragmentation of the euro area banking system and the real crisis 109not increase the size of the commercial banks’ excess reserves, or the risk borne by
the ECB.6 Furthermore, the ECB implemented unconventional measures when it
decided to increase the maximum maturity of its loans (initially 3 months), with
one-year operations carried out in June, September and December 2009 (LTRO)
and three-year operations in December 2011 and February 2012 (VLTRO). The
ECB has also created programmes to purchase securities: (i) secured bank bond
purchases (called “covered bond purchase programmes”, CBPP) in June 2009 and
CBPP2 in November 2011 were designed as a further way of dealing with banks’
financing costs, which were considered too high and thus incompatible with the
orientation of monetary policy; (ii) the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) was
launched in May 2010 to engage in the limited purchase of government debt on
secondary markets, sums that were supposedly sterilized by the ECB; the SMP was
designed as a response to the pressure on sovereign debt markets, which called
into question the smooth transmission of monetary policy in the euro zone; (iii)
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), a new programme of buying sovereign
bonds, starting in August and September 2012, which is intended to limit what
are considered excessive risk premiums on certain sovereign debt bonds; (iv)
finally, facing a growing risk of deflation in the euro zone, the ECB decided on 4
September 2014 to implement a new programme to purchase the debt securities
of European companies and residential real estate loans (Asset-Backed Securities
Purchase Programme, ABSPP) and a new programme for purchasing secured bank
bonds (CBPP3), with the aim of freeing commercial bank balance sheets of these
debts and thereby encouraging them to lend to businesses, in particular SMEs.  
6. It must be acknowledged that risk has somewhat increased to the extent that collateral
eligibility requirements are reduced.
Figure 9. Composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet assets
In billion dollars
Source: Federal Reserve (Flow of Funds).
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report110The multiplicity of the ECB's purchasing interventions should not mask
the fact that its programmes remained limited in scale: 50 billion euros for the
CBPP and CBPP2,  162,5 billion euros for the SMP (as stated in the initial
announcement)7, an unlimited but unused amount for OMTs and unspecified
amounts for ABSPP and CBPP3, compared with about 1 trillion euros for the two
long-term lending operations (LTRO), which contributed greatly to increasing the
size of the ECB’s balance sheet (Figure 11). It follows that the ECB has done more
to relieve commercial banks than to directly support or revive financial market
activities.
The differences in technique between the central bank interventions reflect
particular legal and economic factors – legal, because EU treaties prohibit the ECB
from buying sovereign bonds on the primary market, and economic, as central
banks seek to affect financing conditions as efficiently as possible. In the euro
zone, banks provide the bulk of financing for private sector activity, which is why
the ECB intervenes mainly by lending to the banking sector. Conversely, finance
for the US economy is more disintermediated, which explains the scale of the
Fed’s securities purchases.
A much-discussed unconventional monetary policy involves influencing
expectations through the announcement of policy in advance (conventional or
unconventional). This policy of “forward guidance” (formerly called “open-mouth
operations”) consists of announcing that the central bank benchmark rate will not
be cut until the unemployment rate falls below 7% of the working population (as
did the Bank of England from the summer of 2013) or of announcing an
unlimited conditional buyback of sovereign debt (up to a maturity of 3 years) to
contain the upward pressure on the yields on government bonds (this was the
Figure 10. Composition of the Bank of England’s balance sheet assets
   In billion British pounds sterling
Source: Bank of England.
7. The maximum amount allocated to SMP was 219 billion euros in January-February 2012.
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summer of 2012, and up to now never used).
On the effectiveness of ECB unconventional monetary policy
The ECB objectives are easily circumscribed within the European framework.
The Treaty on the European Union requires that the ECB prioritize the pursuit of
price stability. In addition, without detriment to this objective, the ECB shall
pursue policies that are consistent with the objectives of the European Union,
which include in particular the search for high growth that does not generate
inflationary pressures. The effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy can thus be
judged by these two objectives: price stability and, once that is achieved,
economic growth. To achieve these objectives, the ECB must ensure that the
channels for transmitting its policy towards the banks and financial markets
function properly.
Hitherto, unconventional measures were introduced officially in order to
restore the channels for transmitting the ECB’s monetary policy to the real
economy – the very channels that in some euro zone countries had been
damaged by the financial crisis and the euro crisis. 
Numerous articles have dealt with the ECB’s monetary policy since the start
of the crisis. Creel, Hubert and Viennot (2013) offer a summary (see the Table on
p. 26 of their paper), which concludes that in general the interest rate channel
worked, whereas the credit channel did not have the expected effects of trans-
mission. The recent results of Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza (2014) nuance these
findings to some extent, by showing that the announcement of the OMT
programme led to lowering the two-year sovereign rates of Italy and Spain,
without any effect on German and French sovereign yields. Using a multi-
country VAR model linking the macroeconomic and financial variables, they
Figure 11. Composition of the ECB’s balance sheet assets
In billion euros
Source: ECB.
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level of economic activity, lending and prices in Spain and Italy: for instance, the
simple announcement of the unconventional policy could have improved the
transmission of conventional monetary policy to the macroeconomic and
financial variables.
Following this work, Creel, Hubert and Viennot (2013) examined the effec-
tiveness of the ECB’s conventional and unconventional policies during the
financial crisis in four countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). They
estimated the impact of the conventional instrument and the purchases of securi-
ties under the ECB’s unconventional policies (those classified as “Securities held
for monetary policy purposes”) on interest rates and on the volume of new loans
made in different markets: loans to non-financial corporations, to households, the
sovereign debt market, and the money market. They show (see table 3) that
unconventional policies have led to lowering interest rates on the money market,
on government securities and on loans to non-financial corporations. These
policies, however, have had no effect on the volume of lending. At the same time,
it turns out that the conventional instrument, whose lack of effectiveness was one
of the justifications for the use of unconventional measures, had the expected
effect on virtually all the markets surveyed – more so in the South of the euro zone
than in the North on the market for six-month sovereign bonds.
It seems therefore that unconventional policies have had a direct impact
on the sovereign bond market as well as indirect effects, by helping to
restore the effectiveness of the conventional instrument on other markets.
One of the reasons explaining the weak impact of both conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary instruments , on the volume of loans granted is the need for
commercial banks to deleverage and reduce the size of their balance sheet by
adjusting their portfolio of risk-weighted assets. This has pushed them to increase
their reserves rather than to play their intermediation role and to demand a rela-
tively higher return for exposure. Bank practices, though legitimate, hurt the
transmission of monetary policy: rates fall, but credit fails to take off. It is thus
important for monetary policy not to be based exclusively on the banking sector. 
In view of these results, it is interesting to note that the new wave of
unconventional operations discussed by the ECB since June 2014 has focused
more directly on the possible acquisition of sovereign bonds and the acquisi-
tion of corporate securities, which means bypassing the banking sector. This
workaround should hopefully strengthen the transmission of monetary policy to
the real economy, a result that would obviously be welcome to avoid the risk of
deflation in the euro zone.
As a matter of fact, on 5 June 2014, the ECB announced a series of measures,
including rate cuts and measures to boost the supply of loans. It is difficult to
estimate the direct impact on economic activity in the euro zone. It is also possible
that the (indirect) signalling effect of these measures can generate an improve-
ment in market conditions and confidence.
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Table 3. Panel data estimation of ECB monetary policies on interest rates and volumes
Sovereign bond mkts, Sovereign bond mkts, Sovereign bond mkts, NFC loans, 
inf to 1 m€
NFC loans, 
sup to 1 m€
rate volume rate volume
(9) (10) (11)  (12) 
0.23*** -0,03 0.27*** -0.37*
[0.06] [0.07] [0.10] [0.21]
-0.01** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
0.13**  -0.30***  
[0.06]  [0.06]  
*  0.40***  0.42***
 [0.05]  [0.06]
0,04  0.06**  
[0.04]  [0.03]  
*  0,04  0.35***
 [0.07]  [0.12]
0,01 0.04*** 0,02 0.09***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04]
0,00 0,00 0.01*** -0.01**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
-0.20** 0.33*** -0.46*** 0.99***
[0.09] [0.11] [0.16] [0.32]
-0.00* 0.00* 0,00 0,00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
* -0,01 0.24*** -0,04 0.66***
[0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.13]
256 260 256 260
ust to an AR(1) disturbance term. Money market maturity 6 mth maturity 5 yr maturity 10 yr
 rate volume rate volume rate volume rate volume
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Conventional MP 0.33*** 2,16 0,02 -0.05* 0,21 0,06 -0,14 0,02
 [0.06] [3.41] [0.29] [0.03] [0.47] [0.04] [0.42] [0.04]
Unconventional -0.01*** 0,15 -0,02 0,00 -0.03* 0,00 0,01 0,00
MP [0.00] [0.13] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
Lag rate -0,04  -0.51***  -0.48***  -0.50***  
 [0.06]  [0.04]  [0.04]  [0.03]  
Lag volume  0.88***  0.31***  -0.19***  0.24**
  [0.03]  [0.06]  [0.05]  [0.06]
Volume 0,00  -0,66  0,06  1.13*  
 [0.00]  [0.66]  [0.70]  [0.63]  
Rate  -1,20  0,01  -0,01  0.01**
  [3.42]  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.00]
CPI 0,02 0,87 0,00 -0.01** 0,05 -0.03*** 0,07 -0.02**
 [0.01] [0.56] [0.05] [0.00] [0.07] [0.01] [0.07] [0.01]
IP 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00
 [0.00] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
CISS -0.50*** 4,46 -0,64 0,00 1.19** 0,02 0,24 -0.11*
 [0.09] [4.78] [0.41] [0.04] [0.60] [0.07] [0.59] [0.06]
Oil Price 0.00* 0,05 0,00 0,00 0.01** 0,00 0,01 0,00
 [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
STOXX 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Const. 0.06** -1,94 0.41** 0.13*** -0,15 0.31*** -0,07 0.14**
 [0.03] [1.48] [0.17] [0.02] [0.28] [0.02] [0.22] [0.02]
N 256 260 256 260 256 260 256 260
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The model is estimated with time and country fixed-effects rob
Source: Creel, Hubert and Viennot (2013).
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report114• The ECB lowered the rates on its main refinancing operations (MRO) and
the deposit rate to 0.15% and -0.10% respectively. The marginal lending
rate was reduced to 0.40%. 
• A certain number of measures to strengthen liquidity have been announced:
the sterilization of the Securities Market Programme (SMP), which currently
takes up to 165 billion euros, will end; the fixed-rate financing operations
with full allotment8 (“fixed rate full allotment”) will be extended for at least
18 months, until the end of 2016; and the ECB will carry out a series of
targeted LTROs (TLTROs) on a horizon of over 2 years starting September
2014.
• The TLTROs will have a maturity of less than 4 years, and the initial alloca-
tion will be 7% of outstanding private sector loans, with access to additional
funds based on improvement in actual lending. This could increase access to
the liquidity of banks in the peripheral countries that are currently
deleveraging.
• The cost of these loans will be set at the rate of the MRO at the time of
purchase plus 0.10 points. By making available financing over 4 years at the
MRO + 0.10 point rate, the ECB is strengthening its forward guidance policy
by ensuring that rates will remain low for an extended period.
• In addition, Mr. Draghi has reported “an intensification of preparatory work
related to ABS purchases” to encourage the development of the market.
On 4 September 2014, slowing growth and the increasing risk of de-
anchoring inflationary expectations and drifting into deflation prompted the ECB
to lower its benchmark interest rate by 10 basis points and to announce the
purchase of private sector assets starting in October. The announcement rein-
forced the package of measures announced in June.
• The ECB cut its key interest rate by 0.10 point. The rate on the main refi-
nancing operations (MRO) is now 0.05% and the rate on deposit facilities -
0.20%. Mario Draghi noted that this reduction would make the upcoming
TLTRO operations more attractive.
• The ECB also announced a programme to purchase ABS (ABSPP) to
stimulate new credit flows to the real economy. The ABS programme will
include “simple and transparent” ABS purchases backed by underlying
assets consisting of claims on the non-financial private sector in the euro
zone. The programme will include residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS).
• In parallel, a covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3) was announced
that will target purchases of covered bonds issued by euro zone monetary
financial institutions.
• Mario Draghi also stated that a quantitative easing programme (referring to
purchases of sovereign bonds) was discussed.
These measures can be broken down into three groups based on their respec-
tive objectives: 
1.  Implicit tightening9 of the monetary policy stance, inducing as a reaction:
8. The ECB meets all the demands for liquidity made by the banking system.
9. Linked firstly to the reduction in the inflation rate, which is pushing up the real interest rate,
and secondly to the reduction in the size of bank balance sheets.
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ii. Injections of liquidity (end of SMP sterilization, LTRO, FRFA extension). 
2. Deterioration of the mechanisms for the transmission of monetary policy
(“via the channel of bank credit”), inducing as a reaction:
i. Targeted LTROs,
ii. Purchases of ABS and CBPP3. 
3. Increasing gap between inflation and the ECB target and the medium-term
economic outlook, inducing as a reaction:
i. Broad-based asset purchases.
What impact these measures are likely to have?
Rate reductions 
These measures operate through various channels, and their impact will
depend, in part, on the demand for credit. We believe that the direct impact of
these rate cuts will be relatively weak. The standard multipliers suggest an
impact of less than 0.1% on the euro zone’s GDP, although the signalling effect of
a negative deposit rate could have a slightly higher impact.
Injections of liquidity
The impact of the end of the SMP sterilization operation (which increases the
reserves of the central bank) will increase liquidity and thus could push the EONIA
rate towards the bottom of the interest rate corridor. But the effect is likely to be
limited, because the excess liquidity will decline if the banks continue to repay the
450 billion euros from the existing very long-term refinancing operations
(VLTROs). As the banks already have access to virtually unlimited ECB financing
and reimbursement, it is not very likely that new liquidity injections will have a
significant impact on the economy, in the context of the current corridor.
Targeted LTROs
The TLTROs could potentially have a significant effect. The TLTROs are
supposed to reduce banks’ financing costs significantly. Indeed, on average, 4-
year financing on the markets currently costs euro zone banks around 150 basis
points. It can be expected that the TLTROs will reduce this cost. However, even if
the banks use the TLTRO programme, it may not have the desired effect on
the mechanism for transmitting monetary policy, as the banks may use this
financing to buy government bonds or other assets rather than stimulating
the supply of loans to households and businesses. The fact that banks in the
euro zone are currently reimbursing the 2011 and 2012 VLTROs suggests that
there are barriers to lending today (mainly low demand for loans), even when
financing costs are low. The main difference between the VLTRO and TLTRO
though involves conditioning the provision of liquidity in the latter on an amount
of outstanding loans to the non-financial private sector (excluding mortgages),
based on what the Bank of England did with its Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS)
set up in summer 2012.
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These new measures supplement the TLTRO programme, as these purchases
should allow substitution in the banks’ balance sheets in favour of lending to the
real economy. However, it is impossible at this stage to quantify the impact of
these announcements. The purchases of covered bonds began in October 2014,
while the ABS purchases will begin before the end of the year. The covered bond
spreads have narrowed in response to these announcements. The purchases will
continue for at least two years, but no details on their size have been given.
Estimates of the current size of the ABS market vary, but are around the 1,000
billion euro mark, about half of which is traded on the financial markets. A note by
Bruegel10 suggests that about 60% of the market is made up of RMBS. The quality
of outstanding ABS securities varies, and not all will be eligible for ECB purchases.
In addition, a large part of the existing shares are already used as collateral with
the ECB.
More specifically, Mario Draghi announced on 4 September 2014 that the
objective could be to raise the ECB’s balance sheet to its level of early 2012. To do
this would require increasing it from its current level by 1,000 billion euros. He did
not provide an estimate of the size of the two purchasing programmes. A recent
survey by Bloomberg estimated the TLTRO programme at 500 billion euros. But
an important part of the TLTRO could simply replace the financing for the refi-
nancing operations conducted in 2011-2012. This suggests that an asset
purchase programme of an additional 500 billion euros would be needed to
reach the target announced for the size of the ECB balance sheet.
“Broad-based asset purchases” (in the ECB’s language: QE and 
the purchase of sovereign bonds) 
It seems doubtful that the combination of TLTRO programmes and purchases
of ABS and covered bonds would enable the ECB to achieve half or more of the
1,000 billion euros of net expansion in the size of its balance sheet. The first
tranche of the TLTRO programme has been disappointing (the ECB allotted
82.6 billion euros on 18 September 2014, and the second tranche will be
announced on 9 December 2014 and allocated on 11 December). The continuing
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment will give investors reason to
hold their assets until the ECB’s policy goes even further. To achieve a trillion euro
expansion of its balance sheet, the ECB needs to move to the next step of the plan
set out by Mario Draghi in the Spring, i.e. “Broad-based asset purchases” (BBAP),
and to reach the target size, they should include purchases of sovereign bonds in
the euro zone.
In December 2014, the ECB has published its new economic forecasts,
including the first for up to 2017. It seems that early 2015 will be the earliest
occasion at which new monetary stimulus measures could be announced if the
economic outlook for the euro zone still shows no sign of improvement, or if fears
of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations gain more ground. In this case, there is
a good chance that the ECB will use unconventional monetary policy, as it sees fit,
10. Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets?, by Carlo Altomonte and
Patrizia Bussoli, 24 July 2014.
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ration in the economic outlook, which could lead to the break-up of the euro zone.
All in all, two main conclusions emerge from the study of ECB monetary
policies: First, the monetary programmes implemented by the ECB have
remained limited in scale, in contrast with other central banks like the Fed
and the Bank of England; second, monetary policy measures have not
produced an increase in bank loans, despite an improvement in the interest
rate channel; consequently, monetary policy measures have neither been
sufficient to produce a recovery in the euro zone nor to achieve the inflation
target at 2%. Fragmentation remains.
3. Banking Europe: In unity strength?
The banking union, which has been phased in from November 2014, is
part of a slow process of European financial integration. The premises of a
banking and financial Europe already figure in the Treaty of Rome (1957). In
addition to the free movement of goods, the Treaty provided for the freedoms of
establishment, of the provision of services and of the movement of people and
capital (Article 67). These fundamental freedoms provided fertile ground for the
emergence of a European banking and financial market. It was nevertheless not
until the Single European Act in 1986, followed by the 1988 Directive, that
Article 67 came into force, on 1 July 1990. Meanwhile, in 1974, the Basel
Committee defined the basis for international prudential banking regulations,
which were gradually adopted at the European level with the Basel I standards in
1988 (some countries), Basel II in 2004 (standard adopted in the form of an EU
directive) and then Basel III in 2010 (adoption of a European directive and a
European regulation with implementation starting on 1 January 2014).
A fruit of the crisis, the banking union is organized around three pillars. It
harmonizes supervision (and thereby abolishes unnecessary opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage), creates bank resolution mechanisms in the euro zone and
adopts the logic of a “bail-in” of the banks. In this sense, it offers new solutions.
However, it leaves grey areas, and the European solidarity created by the
banking union could be insufficient to deal with major shocks. A specific
banking fund may thus be needed.
The banking union: A solution with three pillars
At the EU summit in June 2012, the heads of State announced plans to create
a European banking union. The idea of the banking union was born from a
threefold need: to break the link between the sovereign debt crisis and the
banking crisis by creating a Single Resolution Fund and at an ultimate stage by
allowing the direct recapitalization of troubled banks by the European Stability
Mechanism;11 to prevent runs on banks; and to avoid the fragmentation of the
euro zone’s banking markets.
11. In this ultimate case, the approval of national parliaments may be necessary. For instance,
according to the decision of the German parliament on 6 November 2014, the approval to ESM
funds for direct recapitalization are currently limited up to an amount of 60 bn. euros, while the
Single Resolution Fund shall have a total volume of 55 bn. euros in 2023.
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The first pillar is the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): its implementation
is based on three texts.12 The Regulation of 3 November 2013 entrusts prudential
supervision of the banking system to the European Central Bank as of 4 November
2014. Article 6 of the Regulation states that the nature of this supervision depends
on the size of the bank, its importance to the economy of the participating State,
and the scale of its cross-border activities. The following are therefore
distinguished:
• “Important” banks, directly supervised by the ECB
Institutions considered “important” are those that comply with at least one of
these four conditions: 1) hold total assets exceeding 30 billion euros; 2) hold total
assets of over 20% of the Member State's GDP; 3) are considered significant by
the competent national authority; or 4) are considered significant by cross-border
activity.13
Regardless of these criteria, the SSM will cover at least three banks per country
and those that have claimed or received direct financial assistance through the
EFSF or the ESM. 130 banking groups throughout the euro zone will be affected,
i.e. almost 85% of all banking assets in the euro zone, but in different proportions
in different countries.
• The “less important” banks are those whose supervision continues to be
ensured by the national authorities, but under the control and within the
framework defined by the ECB.
Banks that do not meet the above criteria will still come under the supervision
of their respective national supervisors; they may be subjected to the direct
responsibility of the ECB if their situation deteriorates and if warranted by the risks
that they could pose to financial stability.
In order to have a good estimate of the state of health of Europe’s banking
system, in late 2013 the ECB joined with the European Banking Authority (EBA) to
initiate stress tests and an asset quality review (AQR). The results were published
on 26 October 2014. The stress tests are designed to assess the resilience of banks
in the event of a major crisis (recession with a 1.7% fall in Europe’s GDP, rising
interest rates, falling property prices, etc.). The AQR aims to verify the quality of
internal valuations of risky assets. These internal valuations play a key role since
they are used to calculate risk-weighted assets (RWA). The equity ratio (as defined
in Common Equity Tier 1, called CET114) divided by the RWA then defines the
Basel risk-based capital ratio, one of the solvency ratios used in the new Basel 3
prudential regulations. As of 2015, this must be greater than 4.5%. Basel 3 also
provides for adding a capital conservation buffer.15 By 2019 this capital must
represent at least 2.5% of the RWA, and the sum of Common Tier 1 and conserva-
12. The Agreement of 6 November 2013; Regulation No 1022/2013 establishing a European
supervisory authority (European Banking Authority); and Regulation No 1024/2013 of 15 October
2013 giving the ECB specific tasks on policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions.
13. At least, this includes banks whose cross-border assets or liabilities make up a significant part
(>10%) of its total assets or liabilities.
14. Equity capital according to CET1 criteria consist of common shares, retained earnings, and a
portion of the minority interests of bank subsidiaries.
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ECB has retained a minimum threshold of 5.5% in the stress scenario and 8% in
the baseline scenario. On this basis, only 25 of the 130 banks evaluated had a lack
of equity capital. A total recapitalization on the order of 25 billion euros is thus
necessary. This mainly concerned banks from the peripheral countries: Cyprus
(Bank of Cyprus), Greece (Hellenic Bank, National Bank of Greece, Eurobank), Italy
(Banco Popolare, Banca Popolare di Milano, Banca Popolare di Vicenza, Monte dei
Paschi di Siena, Banca Carrige, etc.) and Portugal (Banco Comercial Portugues).
Twelve banks have in fact already carried out capital increases since 1 January
2014, so only thirteen banks need to increase their capital. These seemingly
good results for the health check on Europe’s banks mean that the ECB can
begin its new single supervisor mission in serenity. There have nevertheless
been a number of criticisms of its method of assessing bank fragility, through
stress tests, so Europe’s optimism should be taken with caution.
Indeed, there are pros and cons to bank stress tests. Among the pros, Petrella
and Resti (2013) show that empirically the stress tests, corrected for the economic
environment in which they were made public, had the expected market effects.
They support the argument that the publication of these results constitutes infor-
mation that is likely to influence the price of bank stocks. Schuermann (2014) also
justifies the bank stress tests based on their ability to generate a return of confi-
dence in the banks. Among the cons, Borio et al. (2014) point out the several
shortcomings of these tests. First, they are based on a partial equilibrium
approach that does not take into account the feedback effects of bank fragility on
macroeconomic risks (also see Galati and Moessner, 2013). The risks estimated are
only due to the first round effects of strictly exogenous shocks. Second, the under-
lying econometric model is linear, which is contradictory to the goal of the stress
tests, which is precisely to detect a breakdown in banks’ balance sheets following
a macroeconomic shock. Third, the stress test models are “the antithesis of what
financial instability corresponds to” (Borio et al., 2014). Financial instability is not
set off after a major macroeconomic shock (a 1.7% fall in euro zone GDP!), but
after a “normal” shock, that is to say, a small-scale shock. If GDP tumbles 1.7%,
and the financial system is swept away in the storm, it cannot be concluded that
the financial system was already fragile. Conversely, if there is only a small shake
then it is easier to blame the fragility of the financial system if it fails to withstand
this. Fourth, financial and banking crises are not normally triggered after GDP
falls, but before it has substantially declined. 
Pillar 2
The second pillar provides a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which is to
handle the resolution of bank failures. It is based on two Community texts17 and
an Inter-Governmental Agreement of the Council of the European Union (21 May
2014) covering certain specific aspects of the establishment of a Resolution Fund.
15. This capital could consist of a compulsory retention from earnings when the solvency ratio is
insufficient. 
16. The total Basel risk-based capital ratio can significantly exceed that number, if, depending on
the institute and economic activity, systemic or countercyclical buffers are activated by the
regulatory authorities. However, postponing the introduction of an obligatory absolute leverage-
ratio in addition to the risk-weighted approach until 2016 has been criticized.  
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an institution or to liquidate it. The regulation establishing the SRM (No. 806/
2014) governs the creation of the Single Resolution Fund and its compartments,
as well as the conditions for deciding on its use, while the Inter-Governmental
Agreement deals with the transfer of national funds into the Single Resolution
Fund and on proceeding with the mutualization of its compartments. The SRM
will apply only to banks participating in the SSM.
First, the principle of “bail-in” is enacted as follows: starting in January 2015,
the EU Recovery and resolution of banks Directive is to come into effect, which
provides, when a bank is in difficulty, a “bail-in” of the bank, rather than an
external “bail-out” by the government. The first to pay would be the shareholders
and creditors in order of seniority – bondholders, then depositors whose deposits
exceed 100.000 euros. The bail-in will apply to at least 8% of the bank's liabilities
before the Single Resolution Fund can be used. As a rule, the Fund may not recap-
italize more than 5% of the bank’s liabilities.
Second, unlike the rest of the resolution mechanism, which is Community
level, the establishment of the resolution fund will be based on the Inter-Govern-
mental Agreement. After a period of eight years (2016-2023), the Fund, which
will be funded by the banks, will have 55 billion euros and be mutualized.18 The
pooling of these funds will take place gradually, with 40% of funds to be shared
during the first year, 60% the second year, and the rest being included progres-
sively over the following six years.
Pillar 3
The third pillar is to harmonize the already existing national deposit guarantee
schemes. Directive 2014/59/EU19 on the strengthening of deposit guarantee
mechanisms reaffirms the protection of guarantees on deposits of up to 100,000
euros. It provides, after a transition period of 10 years, quicker reimbursement
(7 days) in the event of a bank failure and more solid financing for national
guarantee mechanisms (0.8% of deposits covered against about 0.1% in France
in 2014) via a tax levy on banks.
Numerous grey areas
While many experts agree that the banking union is a big step in “deepening”
European integration, a number of grey areas undoubtedly remain. First, the
process of unifying the banking systems will be slow. The mutualization estab-
lished in the second and third pillars will take place later. If a State’s banks need to
be bailed out during the transition period, then it is the State in question that
would continue to borrow in its own name from the ESM. Furthermore, the
17. Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the resolution and recovery
of credit institutions and investment firms, and Regulation 806/2014 of 15 July 2014 on the Single
Resolution Mechanism, which essentially governs how the mechanism functions.
18. The agreement provides that, upon a plenary decision of the Resolution Board, the Fund may
borrow on the financial markets to strengthen its capacity for intervention. The target amount is also
raised to at least 1% of all covered bank deposits at the end of the transition period (2016-2013).
19. Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes was published in the OJEU on 12 June
2014; it must be transposed by the Member States before 31 May 2016.
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tion Fund (second pillar) are based on an intergovernmental treaty, potentially
giving countries a veto.
The fragmentation of banking between countries is likely to increase, for
three reasons. First, because, as Basel 3 comes on line, banks, especially in
troubled countries, will be subject to more stringent requirements and so will
have to rein in their credit distribution and strengthen their liquidity with the ECB
(Couppey-Soubeyran et al., 2012). Second, while other countries, including
France, wanted all 6.000 banks in the euro zone to be subject to the ECB’s new
supervisory regulations, Germany managed for its regional banks (Sparkassen) to
avoid the ECB’s single supervision by making a distinction between major banks
and smaller banks. The argument put forward is that in the case of small regional
banks a central supervisor does not have any informational advantage over a local
supervisor (Quignon, 2013). Between 25% and 35% of the German banking
system is thus still directly supervised by the national authorities (against only 5%
for France, where the banking system is highly concentrated). Yet the small
regional banks may also pose a systemic risk (Speyer, 2012; Quignon, 2013), as is
evidenced by the difficulties Spain’s savings banks have encountered and the
resulting impact on the country’s banking system. There is a risk of fragmentation
between a well-capitalized conglomerate of big banks and a weakened periphery
of small undercapitalized banks. Third, the fragmentation will increase most, if
ever one of the Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) has to go through
resolution at public expense of the member state, in which it is seated. These
interconnected institutes incorporate the largest part of the systemic risk. So far,
the too-important-to-fail (TITF) problem has not been addressed sufficiently
within the Banking Union. In particular, European megabanks still take benefits
from the implicit subsidy based on the fact that in case of difficulties a govern-
ment bail-out will be necessary to guarantee the stability of the financial system
(IMF 2014). If one of these banks has to be resoluted, the Single Resolution Fund
will not yet be large enough to provide 5% of the bank’s total liabilities (Lindner
et al., 2013). Indeed, this makes the TITF problem one of the central challenges
beyond the current state of the European Banking Union.
The shift from a bail-out to a bail-in logic is similar to a return to market disci-
pline where investors, being aware of a reduction in the State’s implicit support,
will demand higher returns based on the risk profile of the issuing bank. This
revaluation of bank risk may weigh on the banks' refinancing costs and the
allocation of credit to business.
The new financial products being purchased and issued by financial institu-
tions are spurring the emergence of a system of credit that parallels the traditional
banking system and avoids prudential regulation. This parallel system of “shadow
banking” facilitates access to liquidity, which could be beneficial to the financing
of the real economy, but it is also conducive to the development of leverage
effects that can in turn encourage speculative abuse. This parallel system is
ignored by the proposed banking union. In an ACPR note, D. Nouy (2013)
mentions several possibilities, including expanding the supervisor’s role, or sepa-
ration. However, the article warns against the risk of regulations that would lead
to reducing access to liquidity.
More specifically, on the issue of separation, the banking union will require
a broader harmonization of national regulations. Indeed, following the recom-
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countries have adopted national measures on the separation of banking activities
aimed at securing deposits: the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Belgium.
These uncoordinated national choices are questionable and constitute a new
source of divergence. The adoption of common regulations for banks' financial
activities could be a fourth major pillar of the banking union (Antonin et al.,
2014). The separation advocated by the Barnier proposal lends credibility to the
banking union and its three pillars (SSM, SRM and deposit insurance). The estab-
lishment of a consistent framework simplifies the control of the European
supervisor within the SSM process (the ECB will check banks’ normal activities and
ensure that they are not disturbed by speculative activity) and reduces distortions
in competition. The separation advocated by the Barnier project also lends credi-
bility to the SRM, as it becomes more difficult for banks to attain systemic size
(too-big-to-fail), and losses by market banks will not be reflected (at least not
directly) in the lending activities of deposit banks. By reducing the risk that
commercial banks will fail, it reduces the risk that a costly bailout for savers (bail-
in) will be needed, such as activating the deposit guarantee.
There has been criticism of the attribution to the ECB of the single supervisor
mission. One argument holds that the process of supervision at the European level
should be as broad as possible, and ideally include all the economies of the
European Union (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2012; Barbu and Boitan, 2013). However, as
things exist today, single supervision via the ECB is required only for the euro
zone. It would have been more appropriate to expand the powers of the EBA.
However, the EBA’s credibility might have been tainted insofar as the stress tests it
published in July 2011 were imperfect predictors of banks’ real ability to withstand
the sovereign debt crisis in late 2011.
Speyer (2012) sets out six other factors that argue against attributing the
whole supervision mission to the ECB:
— A conflict in objectives: the ECB would combine the powers of monetary
policy and financial supervision. There may be conflicting objectives in
these mandates, such as a trade-off between price stability and the
strength of the banking system.
— The risk of credibility: if the ECB fails in its role as the single supervisor, this
could harm its reputation.
— The ECB is independent, and its mandate should be clear so that Parlia-
ment can easily hold it accountable for its actions. This new role of
supervisor could cloud the clarity of its mission.
— A broader and more political mandate increases the risk of political inter-
ference, weakening its independence. 
— The authority delegated to the EBA was more readily accepted because it
was subject to parliamentary control. The independence of the central
bank could be an obstacle to the exercise of the new powers.
— From a legal point of view, the decisions taken by a supervisor should be
disputable before another legal entity. The notion of the ECB's independ-
ence does not fit well with the possibility of appealing to another authority.
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stage of European integration, the ECB seems the only institution that can
effectively enforce an improvement in financial market stability. 
Towards a better mutualization of risk
The banking union represents an undeniable advance, as it should make
it possible to break the vicious circle between the banking crisis and the
sovereign debt crisis. Banks should be notably less exposed to public finances
weaknesses as was the case during the recent crisis. Cost of funding for banks
would then be reduced and become more homogeneous. Consequently, the
transmission of monetary policy could also become more homogeneous: if banks
are better integrated, their characteristics should converge, which will allow them
to apply more uniform rates on new loans and therefore better pass through the
key rate policy to market rates.
The success of the banking union depends on developing the activity of each
bank beyond its national market. The successful completion of the banking union
should be characterized by banks with a territorial coverage that is broad enough
to absorb asymmetric economic shocks. In this sense, the geographical diversifica-
tion of banks’ balance sheets could contribute to mutualizing asymmetric cyclical
shocks. By simplifying the bank-regulator relationship, the single supervisor
should help banks to expand beyond their domestic markets, which would
also contribute to better integration. Besides, by reducing the potential political
capture of the decision to save some banks, it would avoid to let non-performing
banks (or even Zombies banks) pursue activity, hence deteriorating the quality of
intermediate finance. The ensuing strength of the European banking system
would improve its stability. The harmonization in the procedure would also
reduce national heterogeneities across countries. It would then reduce costs of
funding and fragmentation across countries. It must yet be stressed that the reso-
lution procedure may still be complex, long and open to political dispute.
The crisis resolution fund and the deposit guarantee fund provide two addi-
tional ways to protect the banking system. To some extent, these two funds
constitute a mechanism for mutualizing asymmetric shocks in the euro zone,
which could contribute to further optimizing the currency area, in the sense of
Mundell (Quignon, 2013). In 2009, at the height of the banking crisis, govern-
ments had to commit significant public funds, up to a level of 9.1% of GDP. But
what would happen if ever these two funds proved insufficient in the future?
Would each State once again take responsibility for supporting its banking
sector? If some States proved unable to do this, then in order to prevent the
breakup of the euro zone, such a failure could require either greater fiscal union
via the ESM or that the ECB goes beyond its implicit role as lender of last resort,
which is theoretically limited to liquidity crises, and becomes the true saviour of
the euro by monetizing the losses. Large safety nets and appropriate backstop
(through the resolution fund) may help to prevent liquidity squeezes, increase
stability and reduce fragmentation across countries. Given the limited scope of
the single resolution fund and very progressive funding though, uncertainties will
remain strong on the ability of the banking union to be able to resolve timely a
systemic institution.
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The success of the European Banking Union depends on two issues not
adequately addressed at the current stage. First, the implementation of an
effective backstop in addition to the existing resolution and deposit guarantee
funds, which could easily become overloaded in the case of the next systemic
turbulences. Under the status quo, national backstops which have not been set up
effectively in all member states are still favoured and which carry the risk of once
again setting off the vicious circle between banks and states. Second, the problem
of too-important-to-fail (TITF) banks, which should be discussed in the light of a
comparison between Europe and the United States, as in both markets bank
concentration has increased due to the financial crisis. The amount of total assets
held by European megabanks even exceeds the one held by US megabanks, while
at the same time the absolute leverage ratio (see Footnote 15) of European GSIBs
is on average almost one percentage point lower than the one of American GSIBs
(Hoenig, 2014). In order not to place the budgets of the member states under
undue pressure and in order to address the TITF problem, Lindner et al. (2014)
propose a special sectorial fund instead of national backstop solutions. In the long
term, the biggest market participants’ contributions to this fund are expected to
be substantial such that it gives an incentive to reduce the size.20 
The fund would have to be financed by pan-European levy instead of national
ones. As the euro zone is an integrated financial market, solvent financial market
participants from other member states than the domestic, including non-banks
such as hedge funds and other shadow banks, should ultimately contribute to
pan-European financial market stability. While in principle constructed for cases in
which the Single Resolution Fund is undercapitalized, if necessary, the special
sectorial fund could also be used for the coordinated process in dealing with
banks for which the asset quality review and the stress test on 26 October 2014
have evaluated a lack of equity capital. As the results mainly concerned banks
from the peripheral countries, this could prevent a further fragmentation of the
banking system without creating budgetary consequences in the corresponding
member states. In order to be immediately operational a comprehensive direct
recapitalization by the ESM is needed, while the ESM receives claims against the
pan-European banking sector which must be repaid in a more long-term manner.
4. The ECB and the future
The activism of the ECB has raised at least four concerns about the risks it
may pose to the Euro zone in the long run. The first risk is inflation. The mone-
tarist view acknowledges that the growth of monetary aggregates will fuel
inflation. At the moment, such a risk is negligible: as discussed in chapter 1, the
euro zone is facing the risk of deflation, not inflation. The second risk induced by
the ECB is political: does quantitative easing bypass the mandate of the ECB,
notably when the latter is involved in buying public bonds? The answer to this
question will be given by the European Court of Justice in January 2015. Mean-
20. Both scenarios, asset sales or breaking apart into legally independent entities, are conceivable.
The contribution period has to be stretched in order not to place a strain on lending or on financial
market stability as a result of direct and high contribution payments. 
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stability. Drawing on this mandate, one might argue that quantitative easing is
aimed at increasing inflation expectations and inflation rates up to the level where
the inflation target will be reached. In this sense, QE would help the ECB to
achieve its objective. The third risk is one of excessive volatility in the euro/USD
exchange rate (ER) in an era of secular stagnation. The reasoning borrows from
the “overshooting” argument: the US tapering produces a differential in
monetary stances between the US and the euro zone. A long lasting expansionary
monetary policy in the euro zone, coupled with a restrictive policy in the US, may
generate a positive interest rate spread between the US and the euro zone, hence
an expected appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the USD. Such an expectation
would require a sharp and sudden euro depreciation, hence volatility in the ER,
without a surge in long run growth. This argument can be used, nevertheless, to
argue that a sharp depreciation of the euro will foster economic growth in the
short run: the risk thus becomes an opportunity. Finally, there are concerns
whether the massive purchases of assets including sovereign bonds, by driving
down the returns on these comparatively safe assets, will inflate the prices of
other, riskier assets. This might even create bubbles whose subsequent bursting
might be difficult to control. Raising the prices of existing assets also has distribu-
tional implications that many will be uncomfortable with in the wake of the crisis
and given an already pronounced trend to greater inequality in many countries.
Of course measures could be taken to counter possible side effects such as these.
They do not invalidate quantitative easing. But they imply that careful policy
choices need to be made.
So far, the relative ineffectiveness of the ECB to foster growth and inflation
must be acknowledged: the ECB will not be able to reflate the euro zone on its
own. In the light of the previous analysis it should be considered to initiate a
time-limited policy of quantitative easing in Europe via, e.g. a pre-announced
and substantial volume of purchases by the European Central Bank of newly
created European Investment Bank bonds on the secondary market. The
funds are made available to euro zone member state governments for public
investment projects that meet certain minimal European guidelines and without a
co-financing requirement. A number of variations of the scheme can be envis-
aged, each with specific economic or political advantages and drawbacks. These
are discussed below; first we set out the basic mechanisms: 
• The scheme is established based on a decision by the European Council and
initially given a timescale of, say, five years that clearly establishes this form
of central bank support for public investment as reflecting a temporary
phenomenon necessitated by the risk of deflation and or stagnation and
the break-up of the currency union. Within this framework, the EIB emits
bonds on a degressive scale. Starting from an initial level – as a point of
departure we propose €250 bn in the first year, but the scheme is flexibly
scalable – the volume of bonds issued is progressively reduced (e.g. by €50
bn a year).  
• The ECB commits to purchasing these bonds on the secondary market and
holding them on its books for a holding period (for instance ten years). The
EIB triple A rating coupled with the preannounced central bank purchases
will ensure extremely low interest rates. In order to ensure conformity with
the ECB's Treaty obligation to ensure price stability – currently being
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economic recovery is sufficiently strong that inflation rises above a certain
threshold, the ECB can progressively withdraw from the purchases (taper). 
• The EIB makes the funds generated by its bond placements available to
Member States for public investment purposes. The precise way resources
are allocated between Member States can be varied to meet different policy
aims and considerations of political feasibility (see below). The EIB is not
responsible for detailed vetting of proposals, as is the case with its normal
lending, (It normally performs extensive due diligence to secure its triple A
rating, but this is not required here since the bonds are held by the ECB).
Equally the usual requirement for 50% Member State co-financing is
waived. 
• Member States submit projects for funding that meet a small number of
European guidelines (e.g. conformity to the goals of the Europe 2020
strategy, climate-change commitments etc.). A starting point could be the
list in any case being drawn up for the Juncker Investment Plan. Some
funding could also be reserved for pan-European projects, although the
likely more extensive coordination demands involved risk implementation
delays.
• Member States conduct the projects with money being disbursed following
agreed milestones. Ultimately member State governments are responsible
to their electorates regarding the use of the money made available to them.
• After the agreed ECB holding period has expired the debt held by the ECB
is to be serviced. Here, too, different options are conceivable. It can, but it
needs not, be a feature of the scheme to extend the holding period indefi-
nitely; see the discussion below. 
Before looking at various specifications and options, it is worth noting some
important advantages of this approach in the current economic and political
context:
• A predetermined volume of additional real spending on goods and services
is reliably and predictably injected into the sluggish European economy,
raising real incomes and setting off multiplier and also anti-disinflationary
effects (cf. IMF 2014: 75ff.). This is in marked contrast to QE on purchasing
existing private or public sector assets: these do not of themselves create
additional real spending, but rather rely on indirect and uncertain channels
to increase spending, involve the vagaries of the financial sector and the
risks of inflating asset bubbles etc. 
• Government budgets are not burdened with additional debt for many years
by which time real and nominal incomes and thus debt servicing capacity
will be substantially higher. On the contrary, deficit and debt ratios will
decline due to the faster nominal GDP growth. This is in contrast to strate-
gies involving giving greater fiscal leeway to struggling economies: this
adds to their deficit and debt (although, depending on the multiplier, not
necessarily to the respective GDP ratios) and increases consolidation needs.
• Investment in areas crucial for Europe's future can be achieved, raising
productive capacity and productivity and crowding in private investment.
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rates. There may be some upward pressure on inflation for a limited period
particularly if investment is also financed in low-unemployment countries
like Germany. However, higher inflation, especially in Germany, is a boon
not a bug of the scheme.  
• As an additional advantage shared with other QE schemes, the monetary
expansion will tend to cause depreciation of the euro, raising external
competitiveness.
• The scheme can be tailored in the light of political requirements.
Depending on program design, and if political obstacles can be overcome,
public investment spending can be concentrated in countries or regions
with the highest unemployment and largest negative output gaps. But if
there is no political support for such European-redistribution, the scheme
can go ahead on a “juste retour” basis, albeit with substantially reduced
effectiveness. 
• The scheme relies on already existent institutions and can be implemented
quickly. 
• The program is in principle infinitely scalable, as the ECB can “finance”
bond purchases with central bank money it creates at will, and it can be
progressively wound down as necessary and contingent on incoming infor-
mation about the state of the European economy. It is not mutually
exclusive to other measures on the monetary or fiscal side (and could be
rescaled accordingly).
• The scheme solves the problem of which assets the ECB should buy,
offering a market of unlimited size in principle and a security on which the
ECB faces no risk of capital losses (even if this is not economically, only
politically, important – see below). 
• The political effects for the process of European integration cannot be
quantified, but are likely to be substantial. The projects and their joint
funding would create a visible expression of a common European resolve to
exit the crisis and embark on a path of shared prosperity and ecological
modernisation. The Europe2020 Strategy would be given a substantial
boost, rather than, as now, a constant remainder of failure. The current risks
of political crisis (and secession) in some member states buckling under the
huge economic and social pressures would be reduced.
A number of alternatives and variations exist within this overall approach,
each with specific advantages and drawbacks. They relate, alongside the size and
duration of the scheme, to the role of the ECB in purchasing EIB bonds, the alloca-
tion of funds between member states, and to the debt servicing and repayment
options.
• Size and duration: As a point of departure a five year programme is
proposed with a degressive bond issue of €250 bn in the first year (2015),
falling by €50 bn each year. This represents roughly 2.5% of Euro Area GDP
in the first year falling by 0.5 p.p. each year. The aim is to boost spending
as fast as possible, but also to allow for the time needed to deploy resources
efficiently. It would take the programme to the end of the Europe 2020
strategy period. The total volume (€750 bn) represents some three-quarters
of the balance-sheet expansion apparently envisaged by the ECB. In the
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were identified. In the Commission's AGS 2015 an investment gap of
between €230 and €370 bn is estimated. This is a serious understatement,
however, presumably designed to show the appropriateness of the Juncker
Investment Package: it is based on bringing the investment share back to
between 21 and 22% of GDP but “accepts” the heavily depressed level of
GDP as the benchmark for that calculation, and in any case ignores the
need for additional investment to meet agreed policy objectives. In the
light of these comparators the proposals seems appropriately dimensioned,
but it can be rescaled (and clearly would need to be smaller if it were
targeted on the countries which suffered the most from the crisis, rather
than being spread across the whole currency area). 
• Inflation target: In order to safeguard the independence of the ECB to
pursue its mandate there should be a provision for the ECB to gradually
wind down (taper) its purchases if economic conditions, and specifically the
inflation rate, warrant this. Here it is proposed that central bank purchases
would be wound down to zero over a six month period if the core inflation
rate in the euro area exceeds 2.5% for three consecutive months. The 2.5%
rate implies some limited overshooting, but this is more than justified given
the prolonged and substantial undershooting of the inflation target. In
order to avoid shocks to the financing process the EIB would continue to
issue bonds. This would be non-inflationary as private-sector liquidity
would be absorbed.
• Both fund disbursement and repayment can be designed in a number of
ways, whereby an underlying trade-off between political feasibility and
economic effectiveness needs to be borne in mind, reflecting the above-
mentioned heterogeneity within the Euro Area. At one extreme would be a
scheme in accordance with the principle “to each according to need, from
each according to means”. Funds would be made available primarily to the
countries in crisis on the basis of a combination of indicators such as the
unemployment rate, the output gap or per capita income. Debt servicing
and redemption (after the ECB holding period) would be “socialised”, e.g.
based on GDP weighting. The other extreme would be a voluntary scheme
based on a “juste retour” principle. Countries may claim the ECB-backed
EIB finance as they perceive their needs, and each country subsequently
services its nationally-specific debt to the ECB. The first extreme is clearly
politically infeasible, as the Eurobond/redemption fund debates have
shown. The latter would be ineffective as uptake is likely to be very limited.
Some middle way needs to be found that maximises the economic impact
while meeting political exigencies. One solution would be to distribute
investment funding on the basis of population. This would likely be
perceived as fair, although Germany would receive the largest absolute
disbursement. Even so, countries with higher financing costs and lower
incomes and prices – i.e. the “crisis countries” – would actually benefit most
in per capita terms. Repayment obligations could be entirely proportionate
to funds received, or various European solidarity components could, given
the political will to do so, be incorporated.
• A more radical proposal – although in fact it is much less so than it might
appear – would be to extend the central bank holding period to “for ever”,
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bank. In other words the public investment is financed by pure money crea-
tion (helicopter money). This may well be politically difficult to “sell”: it is
counterintuitive, but economically there is no reason not to adopt this
approach. The debt servicing payments constitute income for the ECB; at
the end of the year it transfers its profits back to its owners – ultimately the
taxpayers. As both the government and the central bank are public bodies
the monies paid essentially wander from the left to the right pocket of the
public-finance trousers. The debt might just as well be extinguished. There
is no real “loss” to the central bank in doing so. The only loss is higher infla-
tion; normally this is a serious concern, but not in the current context (see
Whelan 2014).
5. Conclusion
The euro area remains in a perilous situation, economically and politically. The
threat of break-up has not been averted. In a number of countries opposition
parties that are openly calling for exit and/or default are gaining in strength. 
It is conceivable that a mix of less restrictive national fiscal policy, the
European Investment Plan and aggressive quantitative easing by the ECB
might jolt the euro area economy out of stagnation. This is highly uncertain
however. First, this chapter has showed that monetary policies by the ECB
have not had a strong impact on growth, inflation and credit. Second, the
Juncker Plan (Investment Plan for Europe) which is supposed to mobilise at
least €315 bn in additional investment has important limitations. The Plan runs
for three years, so if fully realised the investment boost would amount to just over
1% of GDP each year. This would be welcome. However, the proposal is explicit
that very little additional public finance is being made available. Rather the
existing Structural and Investment Funds will be “fully exploited”. Member States
will be invited to commit funds, the incentive being that any such expenses will
not count against the fiscal deficit. The key issue is that the bulk of the funding is
supposed to come from private investors; the fund is highly leveraged. Given their
apparent reluctance to invest in the current economic environment, it has not
been made clear what the proposed scheme really changes in investors’ calcula-
tions to justify expectations of a substantial increase. Even if private investment
under the programme does take off, to what extent will it merely replace invest-
ment that was planned anyway (deadweight effect)? A previous and somewhat
similar scheme largely failed to generate a significant investment boost. All in all,
the scheme itself is unlikely to do harm – except for the risk that it might convince
policymakers that anywhere near enough has been done. It would be foolhardy to
expect the Plan to deliver a major boost to investment and output, however. 
In order to underpin recovery, public investment and progress towards
the Europe2020 goals, some form of public-investment-based QE financed by
ECB purchases, for a limited period, can be considered, of which one type has
been discussed in this chapter. As the literature cited above shows the view that
such policies are necessary is increasingly gaining ground in the policy debate.
The authorities should not leave it until it is too late. Another form of public policy
may also be considered, like a package that combines a pan-European carbon tax
with fiscal stimulus (see chapter 4).
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union and proposed a sectorial fund to escape a possible new wave of bail-
outs in the future.
Chapter 4GREEN THE UNION: AN INVESTMENT STRATEGY TOWARDS 
A SUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN UNION
Restoring economic growth in Europe using only monetary policy, even of
the unconventional variety, appears more and more insufficient and in desperate
need of a second or third leg. In a much debated speech at Jackson’s Hole this
summer, Mario Draghi recalled this difficult context in the fight against the risk
of stagnation.
Structural reforms are often presented as a suitable complementary policy
tool. However, aside from the vagueness of their content, they could prove reces-
sionary, deflationary, and costly in the short term, procuring benefits in terms of
potential growth in the long or medium term only. Even though some structural
reforms may have positive impacts on activity or prices in the short term, recent
experiences, conducted in periods of large negative output gaps, tend to confirm
the general intuition that positive impacts may be long to manifest (see
Chapter 1). 
Fiscal policy could also be used as a complement. However, the governance
of the euro area, notably the reinforced framework of the growth and stability
pact (TSCG, 6-pack and 2-pack), combined with the continued weakness of Euro
area economies burdened by high cyclical deficits, have maintained restrictive
fiscal policies across the Euro area. The euro area as a whole has now suffered
from a cumulated fiscal impulse of more than negative 5 GDP points since 2010,
explaining in part the double dip recession of the euro area starting in 2011. It
remains important to salvage the heritage from the painful process of fiscal
governance building in Europe, even if the current governance presents many
flaws. In particular, when faced with a need for investment known to have a high
social return because of climate change, the Euro area’s fiscal governance still calls
for consolidation despite enjoying very low sovereign rates.
Characteristically, one of the key aspects of the European economic malaise is
the dramatic drop in physical investment since the onset of the crisis. Unlike other
countries such as the US, investments in the euro area have not yet begun to
recover (see Figure 1).
This situation is both a reflection of the current European macroeconomic
context, and a cause for the continued sluggishness of economic activity in the
Euro area. Worse, low investment threatens the long-term ability of the European
economy to develop and service individual and social needs.
In reaction to this deadlock, dissenting voices are now defending that the
European Union needs an immediate yet sustained boost in investment, to avoid
deflation in the short-term, and to prepare for the future and improve its sustaina-
bility in the long term. This is the proclaimed goal of the “€300 billion investment
plan” recently announced by the European Commission’s newly elected presi-
dent, Jean-Claude Juncker. The current proposal does not go nearly far enough
though—the expected multiplier of 15:1 between private and public investments
underlines the utter lack of fresh public funding committed to the plan. The ability
of the new European Fund for Strategic Investments to mobilise hundreds ofRevue de l’OFCE — iAGS (2015) Third Report 
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public money can be questioned. Worse still, the Juncker plan has not clearly
determined its target sectors and the projects it could potentially fund. It has not
identified either the channels through which the projected increase in investments
will be financed, or the ways in which it could be sustained in the medium to long
term (see Chapter 1).
A European investment plan should strive to maximize both its short-term
impact on activity and its long-term effects on the sustainability of future Euro-
pean growth—particularly regarding official EU policy goals such as the 20-20-20
objective.1 This entails that investment in business-as-usual, unsustainable
“brown” infrastructure should be avoided, as it maintains the European economy
on a development pathway that grows harder to reverse the later the transition
towards sustainability begins. This irreversibility of infrastructure investment
makes energy a high priority sector.
This paper identifies three sectors that fulfil the double criteria of short-term
boost to growth and long-term sustainability: energy production and distribution,
energy retrofit in the building sector, and sustainable mobility. For each of them,
we will discuss the macroeconomic interest of investing in their transformation, as
well as the capacity of the EU to stimulate and maintain an increase in invest-
ments: does the EU has the financial institutions and instruments to stimulate tens
or even hundreds of billions of investments in these sectors in the short term, for
example in the coming three years, and at the same time how could the EU
ensure the stimulus in investments will continue over decades?
It is worth noting here that, when studying the financial capacity of the EU to
increase investments, the public-private debate pops up: how much of the invest-
ments should be public, how much should be private, what is the leverage effect
Figure 1. Investment in the USA and the Eurozone
In % of GDP
Source: OECD, EO96, December 2014.
1. European 2020 Climate and Energy Package, setting a target of a 20% reduction in EU
greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels, an increase in the share of EU energy consumption from
renewable sources to 20% and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency.
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Green the Union: An investment strategy towards a sustainable European Union 133expected? We consider this discussion important, but think it is more relevant to
base the analysis on sector specific studies and determine—from the ground up—
what needs to be public money and what can be private money. More generally,
we think that analysing the sectorial needs for investment is a better starting point
to design an investment strategy than the source of financing or the relevant insti-
tutions and instruments to be used by the plan.
Beyond sector-specific analysis, it should be noted that in order to stimulate
investments in the short and in the long run, it is not enough to inject public
money and attempt to achieve the strongest leverage possible on private invest-
ments. In addition to the push strategy (introducing fresh money into an adapted
financial pipeline), any European investment strategy should adopt a complemen-
tary pull strategy (attracting financing out of the pipeline). 
By modifying the relative prices of different sources of energy, putting in place
a carbon price can spur an increase in investment through the depreciation of
existing energy- and carbon-intensive capital and an improvement in the profita-
bility of, and therefore the demand for, the projects analysed in Section 1. This
paper supports the idea of a “Carbon fiscal shock”, whereby this effect on invest-
ment would be maximised by setting the carbon price at a relatively high level
instantly, instead of following a more traditional progressive increase over time.
Section 2 presents this proposal, which could secure increased investments in
the long run and strongly reduce the current European output gap. It discusses
the conditions under which such a scheme could be implemented in Europe,
notably in terms of compensation and border tax adjustments. The macroeco-
nomic impacts of an EU-wide “Carbon fiscal shock” are then analysed through the
results of simulation exercises using the ThreeME and E3ME models.
1. Where to invest and how to invest?
Given the double criteria of a short-term boost to economic activity and a
long-term improvement of the sustainability of European economic growth, an EU
investment strategy should:
— Put energy supply and energy efficiency in buildings and transport at its
core, as these sectors are key for a sustainable economy and tend to have
strong macroeconomic benefits (growth, jobs, trade and economic
resilience);
— Build on the existing EU financial institutions and instruments to effectively
deliver a short term boost in investment, and progressively adapt them to
ensure this boost is sustained in the longer term.
This section investigates three sectors: energy supply, energy efficient build-
ings and energy efficient mobility. For each of them we identify the current
investment gap and then discuss the short and long-term macroeconomic bene-
fits of closing this gap for the European economy, distinguishing between:
— The growth impact
— The employment impact
— The trade impact 
— The resilience impact. 
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disposal to boost investment in these sectors. We also discuss whether there is a
need for complementary instruments for the EU to effectively support higher
investments in the short and in the long term.
From a general perspective, investing in mobility, housing and energy sectors
is key to build an Energy Union that is much less dependent on costly energy
imports, more resilient to energy price shocks and at the forefront of the fight
against climate change on the road to the Paris Climate Summit in December
2015. Moreover, these sectors are labour-intensive and support the activity mostly
in the construction sector—building construction and civil engineering—where
the output gap remains wide: the activity in 2013 was still below the 1996 level.2
With a longer term perspective, it turns that the energy and climate transition
entails costs that are outweighed by savings: according to the European Commis-
sion Energy Roadmap 2050, the additional capital cost of a decarbonisation
pathway for the EU energy system is below €260 billion annually, whereas savings
are above €310 billion.
Energy production and distribution
Why investing? 
Investment gap. Improving European energy security, particularly in the face
of heightened tensions with Russia, and fulfilling the EU energy and climate objec-
tives for 2020 and beyond require large scale investments in the European energy
production and distribution infrastructure. 
Concerning the energy grid, the European Commission has been identifying
since 2006 a number of Projects of Common Interests grouped under the TEN-E
(Trans-European Networks – Energy) umbrella. These projects entail3 extending
the European gas pipeline network—notably the strengthening of reverse flow
natural gas transmission capacities, thereby improving Eastern Europe’s
resilience; interconnecting Member States’ electric grids, which will improve the
effectiveness of the internal energy market and allow long-distance
transportation of electricity, in particular when produced from renewable energy
sources; developing “smart grids”, to facilitate the integration of renewable
electricity supply and improve load balancing. The European Commission has
estimated that until over the decade leading to 2020, €70 billion will be needed
for gas pipelines, storage, LNG and reverse flow infrastructure, and €140 billion
for high-voltage electricity transmission systems.4 Compared with the
investments delivered during the past decade, the current decade needs a rise of
investments by respectively 30% and 100% for gas and electricity networks. 
In addition, more than €120 billion have to be invested in additional renew-
able energy supply capacity5 if Europe is to achieve its 2020 target. After
weathering the beginning of the economic crisis fairly well, investments in new
renewable energy production capacity have declined for the second year in a
2. Source: Eurostat.
3. Decision No 1364/2006/EC on Trans-European energy networks, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/energy/internal_energy_market/l27066_en.htm
4. MEMO/11/710, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-710_en.pdf
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quick rebound in the deployment of new renewable energy production capacity
in Europe.
Growth impact. Fulfilling the TEN-E and renewable agenda entails the
completion of large scale infrastructure projects that would provide a Keynesian
boost to the European economy in the short-term. Indeed, such investments
would trigger activity in the civil engineering sector, a sector that has experienced
a steep decline since 2008 and has not recovered yet (Figure 2).
In the longer term, the new gas and electricity infrastructure will improve the
effectiveness of the European energy markets, with a beneficial effect on the level
and stability of energy prices. If investments in renewable energy sources reduce
the European energy trade deficit and protect the European economy from
energy crisis (see below), their impact on long term growth remains uncertain
however as it crucially depends on future fossil fuel prices.
Employment impact. The construction of new energy networks, whether it
be pipelines or high-voltage power lines, would be accomplished by the civil engi-
neering sector, with a relatively high average European labour intensity of 7.7 jobs
5. Estimation made using the Green-X model, developed by the Energy Economics Group (EEG)
at the Vienna University of Technology under the EU research project “Green-X–Deriving optimal
promotion strategies for increasing the share of RES-E in a dynamic European electricity market”.
Initially focused on the electricity sector, this modelling tool, and its database on renewable energy
(RES) potentials and costs, has been extended to incorporate renewable energy technologies within
all energy sectors.
6. This evolution needs to be nuanced by the falling cost of solar components: worldwide, 26%
more solar capacity was installed in 2013 than in 2012 for an investment cost 20% lower. However,
this can only account for part of the steep European decline in renewables investment: from 2011 to
2013, total investment fell from €92 billion to €38 billion. 
Figure 2. Civil engineering activity in the EU27
  Construction activity in the EU27, 2010 = 100
Source: Eurostat.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report136per million euro of activity (vs 4 for the manufacturing sector).7 Further, these
infrastructure jobs would be purely European, and could not be off-shored. While
some of the equipment used in the production of renewable energy is manufac-
tured outside the EU, Table 1 shows that most renewable energy sources present
a relatively high labour intensity.
Trade impact. Most of the infrastructure planned in the TEN-E projects, such
as pipelines and high-voltage power lines can be produced within the EU. This is
not the case, however, for all renewable energy supply equipment. Whereas the
EU-27 has a considerable trade deficit with the rest of the world in solar compo-
nents (European Commission, 2014),8 the situation is reversed for the other main
renewable energy source offering a large investment potential, wind power: in
2012, the EU had a trade surplus of more than €2.45 billion with the rest of the
world.9
The risk for an increase in the trade deficit on solar components is dwarfed by
the potential improvement that renewable energy sources promise to bring to the
energy trade deficit. In 2012, EU trade deficit in energy products with the rest of
the world reached €421 billion, or 3.3% of EU GDP10—almost three times as high
as in 2004. The European Commission estimated that in 2010, renewables had
already allowed to avoid €10.2 billion in imported fuel costs for electricity genera-
tion, €12.2 billion for heating and €7.6 billion for transport (Eurobserv’er, 2013). 
Resilience impact. The proposed improvements to the European energy grid,
along with the increased deployment of renewable energy sources, would help
insulate the EU from future energy price or supply shocks. Investing in these
projects would help avoid a repeat of the January 2009 gas crisis, when from 6 to
20 January, the 28.6% of European natural gas consumption that transit through
Ukraine were cut off (European Commission, 2009).
Besides, the expansion of renewable energy generation in Europe is central to
the achievement of Europe’s objectives of greenhouse gas emissions reduction.
Reaching a milestone of 20% renewable energy supply by 2020 is, along with a
7. Source: Eurostat.
Table 1. Direct and indirect jobs supported in the EU in 2012 per million euro 
of turnover, by energy source
Full time equivalents, FTEs
Wind power 8.9 Heat pumps 11.1
Solar power 8.2 Biogas 12.1
Solar thermal 11.5 Biofuels 7.9
Small hydropower 8.1 Geothermal 9.2
Source: The State of Renewable Energies in Europe, Eurobserv’er (2013), iAGS calculations.
8. As noted by the European Commission in a recent report, “the EU-27 has a considerable trade
deficit with the rest of the world in solar components and equipment”, which amounts to €9 billion
in 2012—mostly with China. While still very large, this deficit has been halved since 2010, when it
stood at €21 billion. 
9. Source: Eurostat.
10. Source: Eurostat.
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in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in 2020 from its 1990 level.
How to boost the investment?
State of the art
In order to finance the upgrade of projects targeted by the Transport Euro-
pean Networks in Energy, Transport, and Communications, the European
Commission has set up the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in 2013 by a new
European Regulation.11
In the energy sector, the CEF aims at closing the estimated investment gap of
€60 to €70 billion (European Commission, 2011) in the development of Euro-
pean energy infrastructure. By providing technical assistance, coordination
among member states and co-financing from 10% to a maximum of 50% of a
project’s total costs, the CEF intends to unlock investments that could not have
been made in its absence. In particular, it targets an increase in private funding
by bringing in new classes of investors such as pension and insurance funds
through new innovative instruments such as project bonds initiative. Importantly,
it will also provide grants to enable the funding of projects which, while
providing very strong positive externalities, are not commercially viable in the
current economic environment.
The Connecting Europe Facility complements the existing funding from the
EIB, along with other existing European programs which also participate in cross-
border energy infrastructure, most notably the Cohesion and the Structural
Funds. More generally the CEF seeks to avoid duplicating existing European
instruments, and to integrate and coordinate with existing programs, such as the
Common Strategic Framework or the Partnership Contracts.
On the renewables front, while the bulk of investments are largely carried out
by private banks, public finance institutions are essential in catalysing renewable
energy investments. These institutions mostly offer loans on favourable terms,
guarantees, but also provide equity or grants (Eurobserv’er, 2013). After a
decrease from 2011 to 2012, the EIB stepped up its support for renewables in
Europe to €6.4 billion in 2013, a doubling from the year before. It represents a
major actor in this space, providing a channel through which future renewables
investments can be disbursed.
Issues for today and for the future
To increase investments in energy grid, the EU already has at its disposal the
newly established CEF. This Facility however is under-funded. Indeed, €5.85
billion have been made available for energy infrastructure over the period 2014-
2020 whereas, during its design phase in 2011, the European Commission esti-
mated that “nothing less than €9.1 billion will suffice to make sure that the
infrastructure Europe needs is built in time”. 
Similarly, provided that the EIB financial support is stepped up, existing finan-
cial instruments appear adequate to bring European investments in renewables
11. Regulation of the EP and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting
Europe Facility. Official Journal of the European Union.
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projects remains an ongoing concern: perceived risks on the evolution of support
policies, volatility on the energy markets, difficulties in obtaining licenses and
other administrative roadblocks all contribute to increase the cost of financing.
This increased financing cost can have a large impact on the ultimate cost of the
electricity delivered by the renewable energy installation over its lifecycle,
impacting its profitability and competitiveness negatively.12 There clearly is a need
to enhance the link between local projects (generally financed by retail banks) and
the financial market. This intermediation could be facilitated in several ways,
through concessional loans,13 securitization vehicles to improve the refinancing
options for retail banks and potentially guarantee funds to reduce the cost of
capital and facilitate the implication of institutional investors through harmonized
and large-scale products (Ecofys, 2011). 
Energy efficient buildings
Why investing? 
Investment gap. Capturing the full potential of energy efficiency in European
buildings requires financing a large-scale deep renovation of the existing building
stock. Indeed, with a construction rate of around 1% per annum14 and a demoli-
tion rate an order of magnitude lower (Thomsen & Flier, 2009), renewing the
building stock with new, energy efficient constructions cannot be enough. 
The European Commission (2012) estimated that €60 billion would be
needed annually from 2012 to 2020 to conduct a moderately ambitious energy
renovation of the European building stock. Copenhagen Economics (2012) esti-
mated that conducting a deep retrofit of the whole existing stock would require
€78 billion per annum over the same period. It should be noted that only a deep
renovation can capture the full energy efficiency potential without risking
“freezing” part of the savings in place through a partial retrofit15 (IEA, 2013c). 
Growth impact. The buildings construction sector accounted for 5.4% of
EU’s GDP in 2013 (compared with 6.4% in 2008), and has been one of the
hardest hit since the beginning of the economic crisis. European construction
output in 2013 was more than 22% below its level of 2007 and had been falling
for 6 years straight. The construction sector is thus primed for a rapid rebound
given an increase in energy renovation investments. Moreover, it is largely
composed of SMEs, with 61% of output produced by companies of 50 employees
12. According to the IEA, reducing the discount factor (including cost of capital and risk premium)
from 10% to 5% can reduce the levelized cost of electricity generation from highly capital-intensive
assets (such as wind and solar power) by up to 30% over the entire lifetime. Projected costs of
generating electricity, International Energy Agency (2010). See also: Towards triple-A policies, RE-
Shaping project, Ecofys et al. (2011).
13. The German KfW’s concessional loans for renewable projects (with interest rates starting at 1%
for up to 20 years) are generally considered a good example. The preferential interest rate is
achieved through the provision of low-cost finance through international markets and limited public
support to further reduce interest rates.
14. Source: Eurostat.
15. A partial renovation can lead to a suboptimal situation where a full renovation is no longer
possible, thereby locking some of the potential energy savings away. 
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support programs.
On a longer-term perspective, the impact of energy renovation on growth
appears to be very dependent on future fossil fuel prices and on the modalities of
the energy renovation policies implemented. For example, a policy that promotes
deep and “one-shot” energy renovation of buildings at the same time they have
to undergo other renovation operations will be more likely to have a strong bene-
ficial impact.
Employment impact. The high labour intensity of energy renovation, esti-
mated as high as 17 full-time equivalents per million euros invested (IDDRI,
2012), is expected to support a large number of jobs creation.17 Besides, with
12 million less employed in the construction of buildings in 2012 than in 2008,
there is a large pool of unemployed qualified professionals in the sector. 
However, in a longer term, there is a need for some capacity development in
the construction industry to master the necessary skills and techniques—which
requires complementary policies to support the investment effort. Indeed,
deeper renovations require more skilled crews, with deep energy renovations
requiring an estimated 30% professionals among crews, compared with 5% in a
base renovation (Herrero et al., 2011). This increases the level of qualification of
the jobs created.
Trade impact. The European construction sector is almost entirely domestic.
The impact of investments in energy renovation would thus directly benefit the
domestic economy. The situation is comparable regarding construction materials:
with a surplus of €9 billion in 2013, the EU is a net exporter of non-metallic
minerals. Moreover, buildings account for 38% of the total EU natural gas
consumption (IEA, 2013a): energy savings in this sector would thus help reduce
the €72 billion natural gas imports bill. 
Resilience impact. The buildings sector accounts for close to 40% of final
energy consumption in Europe (IEA, 2013d) and has long been identified as the
sector offering the largest energy savings potential. Fraunhofer (2009) estimates
the full energy savings potential at 165 Mtoe when cumulated until 2030.
Further, buildings account for 38% of the total EU gas consumption (IEA, 2013a).
In particular, this proportion reaches close to 50% in most Eastern Member States,
such as Poland, the Slovak Republic or the Czech Republic, which import more
than 90% of their natural gas from Russia (IEA, 2013b). Energy savings in this
sector can therefore play a central role in the reduction of Europe’s gas depend-
ency, particularly towards Russian gas.
How to boost the investment?
State of the art
The buildings sector is highly fragmented: it comprises a large variety of
building types, which serve very different residential and non-residential needs,
16. Source: Eurostat.
17. The reduction of employment in the energy sector following the decrease in energy
consumption is expected to be small compared with the number of jobs creation in the buildings
sector, due to the very low labour intensity of the energy sector—see in particular (Quirion, 2010).
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energy efficiency of the buildings sector combines most of the main barriers tradi-
tionally identified when analysing the lack of investment in energy efficiency (IEA,
2007): the relatively low level of energy expenses in the buildings sector hampers
the effectiveness of price signals, access to capital for energy renovation remains
difficult, the incentives of owners and occupants can prove divergent (principal-
agent problem), and finally, a general lack of awareness on energy efficiency
potential benefits and best practices prevents households and commercial build-
ings owners alike to take action.
These roadblocks pose specific challenges to investment in energy renovation,
and require innovative financing arrangements. The European Union has put in
place a range of programs in the field of energy efficiency, particularly buildings
energy retrofit.
— Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas
(JESSICA). This program makes use of the Structural Funds to develop
financial engineering instruments aimed at “strengthening the urban
dimension in cohesion policy through repayable assistance”. JESSICA
operates through a series of specific funds (872 in 2013) that can offer
revolving equity,19 loans and loan guarantees to local authorities across the
EU, in order to support sustainable urban development—including energy
retrofits. These funds can be supervised by a holding fund handled by a
financial institution, such as the EIB, or directly by a national, regional or
local managing authority. As of December 2013, JESSICA had committed
€591 million for energy efficiency, mostly in the buildings sector, an
increase of 31% over 2012. However, with only 4% of the total
€14.3 billion committed in 2013, energy efficiency investments made
through JESSICA can still grow significantly.
— European Energy Efficiency Fund (EEEF). The EEEF has been put in place
in July 2011 to provide loans, loan guarantees and equity through PPPs
with European municipalities, local and regional authorities, or “private
authorities acting on their behalf”, such as utilities, public transportation
providers, social housing associations, ESCOs. Set up with an initial endow-
ment of €265 million, the EEEF had committed €146 million across
7 projects by the end of 2013, spanning energy efficiency, renewable
energy and clean urban transport. The fund targets projects in the €5 to
50 million range, suitable for the energy retrofit of large buildings or entire
districts.20 This fund could be used as a channel for further financing of
medium—to large-scale energy retrofit projects.
— European Local ENergy Assistance (ELENA). This joint EIB-European
Commission initiative assists local and regional authorities in preparing
18. More than 70% of the EU population owning its dwelling, 18.5% renting at a market price,
and 11% in social housing.
19. It should be noted that even in the case of equity investments, this program does not offer
grants—the equity provided through JESSICA is repayable over time so as to be reinvested in the
future.
20. Examples include the energy retrofit of the Jewish Museum Berlin Foundation, with €1.7 million
invested out of a €3.1 million total, or of the University Hospital S. Orsola Malpighi, with
€31.8 million out of a €41 million total.
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program for investment sensu stricto, since it provides grants covering up to
90% of the preparation costs of an energy efficiency project.21 The role of
ELENA is crucial: given the complexity of existing European financing
mechanisms, assistance is often needed for local authorities to design
eligible project proposals. Indeed, with only €49 million disbursed in tech-
nical assistance, ELENA has enabled more than €1.6 billion of investments,
an “assistance leverage” of more than 32.22 Expanding this type of
program is key to overcome the apparent lack of fundable projects often
underlined by financial institutions such as the EIB (Kollatz, 2014). 
Financing issues for today and for the future
If one remains far from the level of investment needed to conduct a deep
retrofit of the entire European building stock, the EU appears to be well positioned
to boost investments in public buildings and/or large scale commercial buildings
through its existing institutions and instruments. Indeed, boosting investment
requires ensuring: 
— First, financial support for energy renovation is tied to the performance
level of the renovation. Otherwise, there exists a risk of funding partial and
ineffective retrofits that do not capture the full energy savings potential. 
— Second, financial support must be accompanied by supporting policies to
build capacity in the buildings sector to deliver deep energy retrofits. This
entails training programs, information campaigns and technical assistance. 
The EU already is well positioned to help on all these fronts. It can enforce that
its financial arms active in energy renovation, such as the EIB and programs like
JESSICA only provide loans to renovation projects that promise a certain level of
energy savings—similar to what the KfW Energy Efficient Renovation program
offers in Germany. It can greatly expand its technical assistance program, such as
ELENA, and extend their mandate to also cover capacity building beyond the sole
local authorities, and across the buildings industry stakeholders. This two action
points would enhance the sustainability of a short-term boost to energy renova-
tion investment. To enhance it even further, the EU should develop third party
financing building on its experiments with this type of innovative schemes
through the forfeiting loans offered by EEEF to municipalities (Box 1).
However, while existing EU instruments are well adapted to support energy
renovation in public buildings and/or large scale commercial buildings, they fail to
fully support residential renovation. Investments in the latter can be unlocked
through third party financing: the EU can help develop these practices for the resi-
dential sector by supporting national or local energy efficiency institutions in the
Member States, which have the capacity to design and manage energy renova-
tion projects in lieu of the homeowners (see box below).
21. Including program structuring, business plans, energy audits, or tendering procedures and
contracts preparation. It can also fund project implementation units.
22. ELENA – European Local ENergy Assistance, EIB (2013).
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Third-party financing, where the loan financing an energy retrofit is neither
carried by the occupant nor the owner of the retrofitted building, relieves the
beneficiary from all liquidity constraints. Further, by having companies
conducting the renovation carry part of the financing loan to be repaid
through future energy savings, this kind of scheme ensures that renovation
companies’ incentives are well aligned with the ultimate performance of the
energy retrofit.
The EEEF is already experimenting with this type of financing in the field with
their forfeiting loans, used for the €1.1 million energy renovation of the Univer-
sity of Applied Sciences in Munich.
In this arrangement, the Energy Service COmpany (ESCO) commits to achieve
energy savings for the municipality through an Energy Performance Contract
(EPC) (step 1). This EPC serves as collateral to the loan financing the renovation.
The loan is to be repaid using part of the energy savings. The EEEF then
purchases part (in this example 70%) of the net present value of future munici-
pality payments (step 2), thereby taking on most of the risk on the actual
delivery of the promised energy efficiency improvement. The municipality then
pays back part of its energy savings to both EEEF and the ESCO (steps 3 and 4),
in proportions depending on the split made at step 2 between the two institu-
tions. In such a scheme, the beneficiary does not have to invest capital, carry a
loan, or master the required know-how to supervise an energy renovation.
Everything is handled by third parties, under the supervision of EEEF. 
A similar, broader financing model is being developed at the European Joint
Research Centre (JRC, 2014). It aims at being applicable at a much larger scale,
to enable deep energy retrofit for residential housing.
In this model, an Energy Renovation Agency reporting to the government will
be needed to supervise the entire energy renovation process. When a dwelling
is to be renovated, the Agency sets up a tendering process to be answered by a
cluster of companies that combines all the expertise necessary to successfully
carry out the energy renovation. To finance the renovation, the cluster of
companies takes out a long-term loan that will be reimbursed using future
Figure 3. Example of third-party financing used by EEEF
     Source: EEEF (European Energy Efficiency Fund).
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contracting between the cluster of companies and the dwelling—that is,
companies are responsible for the successful reduction in the energy consump-
tion of the renovated dwelling. It is important to note that just as in the PACE
program, the energy performance contract is tied to the dwelling itself, and is
to be transferred in case of a change in ownership. Finally, to facilitate the
involvement of commercial banks, loans granted to finance energy retrofits
would be guaranteed by an Energy Renovation Guarantee Fund, thereby miti-
gating uncertainties on the actual magnitude of future energy savings.
European funds would be essential in setting up the Guarantee Fund, and
possibly in helping funding or developing the Renovation Agency where
needed. Setting up this type of financing scheme today would establish
sustainable channels through which future European financial support can be
deployed.
Energy efficient mobility
Why investing? 
Investment gap. According to the European Commission (2011), the need
for investment in transport infrastructure development in EU Member States for
the period 2010-2030 has been estimated at over 1.5€ trillion. By 2020, the need
for investment projects of trans-European interest (the Trans-European Network
Transport projects) is about 500€ billion, half of which for what is now called the
“core network” of the EU transport system. The Commission defines the core
network as those projects “that carry the main concentration of trans-national
traffic •ows for both freight and passengers. It will ensure the effective connec-
tivity of the Eastern and Western parts of the Union and of its peripheral regions to
Figure 4. Third-party financing scheme proposal (JRC, 2014)
                 Source: JRC (2014).
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report144the central ones”. Most projects that constitute the core network are rail and port
infrastructures,23 hence contribute to a more sustainable mobility system.
However, while the need for investment is high, EC’s forecasts point the risk
of a serious financing gap if no vigorous action is taken for attracting investment.
For example, as regards the projects of trans-European interest, forecasts for the
2014-2020 period indicate an investment of 48€ billion per year, 21% lower than
what has been realised for the period 2007-2013. Similar “financing gap”
concerns exist for urban mobility projects as the share of the European population
living in cities—around 70 currently – is still growing and should reach 80% by
2035 according to the United Nations. Funding needs for operational and capital
expenditure may double by 2040 (Booz & Company, 2012) whereas local budget
are under tight constraints.
Growth impact. Transport infrastructure investments trigger economic
activity in the civil engineering sectors where the output gap is wide (see above).
This makes such investments particularly relevant to create a short term stimulus
effect on the economy. To guarantee their longer-term macroeconomic benefits,
infrastructures have to be proved to be evaluated through appropriate market
studies, to demonstrate their socio-economic beneficits. 
Employment impact. Investment in transport infrastructure triggers activity
mainly in the civil engineering sector, where employment is low currently and
where labour intensity is relatively high (see above). Beyond the construction
phase and in a longer-term perspective, it is worth noting that the construction of
trains or tramways is relatively labour intensive when compared with the manu-
facturing sector or, more specifically with the automobile industry (4.7 vs 2.7 jobs
per million euros).24
Trade impact. In the short term, infrastructure development benefit to the EU
domestic economy notably through the construction sector. Beyond the
construction phase, rail infrastructures support mostly the EU economy: as
pointed by the Commission in its White Paper on Transport in 2011, many Euro-
pean companies are world leaders in infrastructure, logistics, traffic management
systems and manufacturing of transport equipment, although this position has
still to be maintained. Moreover, the oil imports savings—that will arise if invest-
ments focus on resource efficient infrastructures in rail and water—are important
and contribute massively to the trade balance.
Resilience impact. Investments in transport infrastructures—once again if
focused on most sustainable transport modes—may increase drastically the
energy security of the EU, as the current mobility relies at 96% on oil and as trans-
port represents around 60% of the European oil consumption. From the climate
perspective, it appears that a quarter of EU greenhouse gases emissions are gener-
ated by the transport sector and that it should cut them by 60% by 2050.
Moreover, the total external cost of transport in urban areas (congestion, air
quality, accidents, noise and CO2) is estimated to be about €230 billion annually
(European Commission, 2013).  
23. Regulation of the EP and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting
Europe Facility. Official Journal of the European Union. 
24. Source: Eurostat.
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State of the art. 
Although the needs for investment are important, the transport sector risks a
financing gap be it for urban or trans-European projects. The main issue here is
that the bulk of investment in transport infrastructures has been and is provided
by the public sector, a public sector under tight fiscal constraints in the aftermath
of the financial crisis. What are the tools the EU has at its disposal in order to
increase investment in transport infrastructures? Both for trans-European projects
and for more local ones, it has a set of institutions and instruments already
in place.
In order to speed up investments in the “core” transport network of the EU,
the already mentioned Connecting Europe Facility has been created in 2013 by a
new European regulation.25 Although dedicated also to digital and energy
networks, the bulk of its financial support goes to transport projects: 26€ billion
for the 2014-2020 period, with a strong emphasis on rail. Coupled with potential
EIB loan, the support from the CEF will take mainly the form of grants, as other-
wise this type of projects of European value added would not be implemented.
Grants may amount from 20 to 50% of the project cost, and up to 85% for
specific projects in Member States eligible for Cohesion fund. European Commis-
sion expectations are to trigger around 120€ billion of investments in transport
infrastructures (European Commission, 2011),26 mostly from the public sector.
Within a context of tight budgetary constraints, the CEF is also expected to
act as a catalyst to attract funding from the private sector. That is why it will build
on the new financial instruments put in place in cooperation with the EIB, such as
the Loan Guarantee Instrument for trans-European transport network projects
(LGTT) or the Project Bond Initiative.27 For transport infrastructure, a market
uptake of 2€ billion is expected by the European Commission (2011) from these
innovative instruments, with an expected multiplier effect of 1:15 to 1:20. The use
of such instruments is supposed to be progressive: it is notably capped to 10% of
the CEF funds until 2015, and this cap may be raised to 20% at a later stage.28 
Beyond the trans-European projects considered by the CEF, there are impor-
tant investment needs in infrastructure for urban mobility. The existing EU
instruments to support these projects are:29
— The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. They are the major financial
instruments in place to support investment in mobility infrastructures. Over
25. Regulation of the EP and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting
Europe Facility. Official Journal of the European Union. 
26. The 32 billion expected for the transport infrastructure sector where supposed to leverage 140
to 150 billion.
27. “The Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative, for which the pilot phase has been launched in 2012,
is envisaged to become the main EU instrument to help the promoters of individual infrastructure
projects attract private sector investors, in particular insurance companies and pension funds. This
initiative will enable the issuance by project companies of long-term well-rated bonds instead of
relying only on bank lending. The participation of the European Commission and the EIB will
mitigate some of the risk associated with a project bond issued to finance a specific project. Member
States, infrastructure managers or companies will therefore be able to access a competitive source of
finance and consequently improve the cost of financing such projects.” CEF Brochure.
28. Communication of the Commission, 7 Jan 2014, on the building of the core transport network.
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provided by these funds, resources are also available from the EIB and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Booz & Company,
2012). Between 2007 and 2013 however, only 9% of all credits allocated
by the Structural Funds to transport (€82 billion) were dedicated to urban
transport.30 
— The JESSICA programme (see above in the building section). It enables
cities to access private finance for urban regeneration projects, but is
limited to projects that can generate a sufficient commercial return. 
— The JASPERS programme that assists cities in managing delivery of already
funded urban mobility projects. 
Financing issues for today and for the future
Be it through the CEF, the EIB or the Cohesion and Structural Funds, the Euro-
pean Union seems to have the necessary institutions and instruments to increase
investment in transport infrastructures within coming years. The CEF for example
could get more credits: the European Commission had asked for 6 billion more for
transport in its first proposal European Commission (2011). For more local trans-
port projects, the EIB and the Structural and Cohesion Funds could increase their
investment contributions. 
However, the rise in investment will hardly sustain if the investment capacity
of the public sector is not increased. Indeed, if the overall EU financial contribu-
tion could leverage many other investments, these investments are traditionally
mostly being made by the public sector, be it at the national or at a more local
level. It is worth noting that there are new innovative financial instruments trying
to attract private investors, and that there is probably again much room for them
to develop. But talking about transport infrastructures, it is likely that most invest-
ments will have to be made by public investors, and that they will have much
trouble making it as long as these investments are counted as debt.
Beyond the issue of access to funding, the long term improvement of urban
mobility requires a focus of improving the capacity of cities to use funding effec-
tively, plan and implement projects. This could be reinforced through JASPERS for
example that provides technical assistance. Booz & Company (2012) suggests
moreover that there may be a need for « the creation of a new financial instru-
ment to better address the capabilities, capacities and innovation requirements of
local agencies to deliver significant gains in urban mobility outcomes”.
 Cross-sectorial conclusions
The sector analysis above has shown that closing the investment gap in
energy supply, energy efficient buildings and transports may have a number of
macroeconomic benefits, both in the short and in the long term. In particular,
29. We do not mention here the CIVITAS program that “provides funding and technical support for
demonstration, evaluation and implementation of innovative technology led projects, but is focused
on promoting innovation rather than addressing specific needs across Europe”. 
30. Resolution du parlement européen sur un plan d’action sur la mobilité urbaine, 2009. http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2009-0199+0+DOC+
XML+V0//FR#title1
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building construction and civil engineering where the output gap is wide.  
Maybe more original is the fact that the EU appears to have a set of financial
institutions and instruments already in place, and sometimes recently estab-
lished, to effectively boost investment in these sectors. In other words, provided
additional public money is made available, the EU has the ability to trigger a
short term rise in investments in energy supply, buildings and mobility without
having to design and implement new financial tools. For the increase to be
sustained, the EU should ascribe some of this additional funding to its most inno-
vative tools, and develop new ones such as third financing for building
renovation and—most importantly for transport infrastructures—address the
fiscal constraints on public actors. 
2. A “Carbon price shock” to boost investment
Delivering the investments needed for building an Energy Union is not only
about injecting some public money from the EU and MS and try as much as
possible to have a strong leverage effect on private investments. As shown by
previous sector-specific analysis, there is a need for policies and measures to
support investments in the short and in the long run: adapted feed-in tariff for
early renewables, technical and financial assistance for housing renovation, norms
to guide and anchor expectations, appropriate road taxation to increase modal
shift to rail and waterways and so on.
More generally, in addition to the push strategy (put fresh money into an
adapted financial pipeline, target money to selected sectors which are believed to
be of strategic importance), a sound plan should adopt a complementary pull
strategy (attract financing out of the pipeline) through appropriate tax systems,
laws and norms, technical assistance. This section argues that a “Carbon fiscal
shock”—accompanied by appropriate compensation schemes—may not only
attract financing for low carbon investments, but also strongly boost both public
and private investments. By over compensation for a limited period of time (e.g.
5 years), implementation of carbon price (with a tax, an Emission trading scheme
(ETS) or crediting instruments) would be facilitated and over compensation would
provide a short term boost to the European economy, helping to fight against the
risk of deflation.
The point of this scheme is to combine the necessity to get out of the crisis,
i.e. increase activity in order to reduce unemployment swiftly, and to put the EU
economy on the track of a real carbon emissions reduction. A high enough carbon
price (see Box 2) is one of the tools to make carbon emission reduction happens. 
Recent experience has shown that carbon taxes, or carbon prices as in ETS,
may encounter serious opposition. High costs on certain individuals, lock-in in
investments and technologies that imply high cost when switching to low carbon
solutions, direct impact on competitiveness when carbon price is high in one
country but low or inexistent for competitors, a loss of competitiveness which can
also result in carbon leakage and compromise the efficiency of the carbon price.
High level of taxes and degraded balance sheets are in today’s EU another
obstacle to accepting a carbon price, not to say a high one. Positive experience of
carbon price implementation are often obtained through a full policy package
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and trends in carbon pricing).
Full carbon recycling and overcompensation would thus be constituent of the
full policy package making the pricing of carbon more desirable. It is usually
considered that a ramp approach to carbon pricing is more optimal. Slow adapta-
tion is indeed needed due to investment irreversibility and a (slowly) growing
price of carbon help to form sound expectations. The proposal made here takes
the other side of bets by calling for a rapid increase in the carbon price and then a
stabilisation at a rather high level (a stepwise increase in carbon price). What is
lost in time to adapt is gained in credibility and trust in the recycling of carbon
revenue. Nevertheless, because of an operating EU ETS, carbon price increase can
be slower for large firms than for households or scattered CO2 emissions by office
buildings. Over compensation is thus a way to offset the stepwise increase in
carbon. As it can be directed on specific individuals or maybe sectors, it allows
addressing different speed of carbon pricing for different economic agents.
Thus, over compensation is not only justified because it has a positive impact
in the short term on the economy. Over compensation, by making carbon
pricing acceptable and less costly to economic agents, is an investment for the
transition. It is not the type of investment which one spontaneously think of
when referring to an investment plan like the Juncker Plan, but, as it is increasing
the success and the ambition of engaging the economy on a path of lower
carbon emission, it can have more social return than any kind of investment. By
making private or public physical investment in low carbon equipment or infra-
structure more profitable, it provides the shock on the rate of return of capital we
are desperately seeking. Moreover, investing in the possibility of the low carbon
economy is a public investment by nature, i.e. the kind of investment private
sector is not going to finance and for which public debt is justified. We present a
financing scheme for the over compensation, where public debt is a mutualized
debt to participating countries and can be used as a monitoring method for a
cooperative carbon pricing.
This section presents the proposal of a “Carbon fiscal shock” and proposes to
address its negative effects through two measures: a Compensation scheme and a
Carbon tax on imports. A transition fund would allow for carrying public debt
generated in the transition period, debt repaid back on a longer term (e.g.
20 years), back loading the initial stimulus and accompanying policies. A simula-
tion of such an EU wide Carbon fiscal shock is then presented and discussed.
Paris Climate Summit at the end of the year 2015 could be a decisive moment
to launch such an initiative and credibly engage in climate change mitigation and
stagnation threats response.
Proposals
Proposal 1: A stepwise CO2 price increase to boost investment
The core of the proposal is a steady increase in the social price of carbon for
the EU simultaneously, from a low 5 to 10€ presently to a higher 50 to 150€ per
ton of CO2. Instead of a slow ramping in the price of carbon, the price of carbon
would be high initially and would not increase in the future. Later on, it could
even diminish, reflecting then the marginal cost of abatement of CO2. 
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higher marginal productivity of capital, inducing a loss in capital (whereas
smoothed by some compensation packages) but a boost in private investment. A
social price of carbon would have a similar impact on public investment, and
given that some flexibility is granted to Member States on the calculus of public
deficit, public investment would be a strong driver of the investment boost. 
The social price of carbon can be affected through a minimum price of carbon
on ETS and a tax for non ETS economic units. Public subsidies to green invest-
ment, lowering the cost of capital can be a second option, which may seem more
acceptable, but this option implies rising taxes in order to finance subsidies. It
raises the problem of monitoring and certifying the emission reduction content of
investment. As a (large, depending on sectors) part of emission reduction is
achieved by change in behaviour, investing in the right technology does not
necessarily deliver emission reductions. For that reason, letting the price of carbon
flow from the easily accountable sources (fossil fuels, concrete, fertilizers
consumption) to the final prices is appealing.
Addressing negative effects
A high carbon price would have negative effects that have to be considered,
mainly through 3 channels: 1. loss of consumption by high carbon emitters
among households. High carbon emitters may be poor households with low
possibility of substitution because energy is a primary good and because choices
made by households forbid rapid adaptation to a large shift in relative prices. 2.
The same effect arises for producers who cannot shift rapidly (or without depreci-
ating a large quantity of capital) on their production function when facing a
change in relative prices. The high carbon price would have a strong negative
impact on their balance sheet or on their ability to operate their business. The irre-
versibility of investment (as in the case of households) is the cause of the loss
occurred. 3. A general loss of competitiveness generated by a higher cost of
energy in the EU compared to the cost of energy in other parts of the world where
such a carbon price wouldn’t be implemented. That effect could be even stronger
if energy efficiency is improved in Europe and global energy demand is reduced as
a result. Carbon leakage, through the localisation of carbon emitting industrial
processes where they are less priced or taxed could result in an overall increase of
global carbon emissions and jobs destruction in “virtuous” countries.
Those 3 channels could be mitigated by a compensation scheme for house-
holds, a reconversion and compensation fund for firms and a carbon tax on Euro
area (or EU) imports. 
Box 2. How to estimate a monetary price for carbon?
The concept of a carbon tax is coming from the theoretical concept proposed
by the economist Pigou to address market failures and consists in levying a tax
on the goods that impose spill over costs on society which are not supported
by the externality’s source. Then adding a tax allows through private markets
reflecting the social cost in a cost-effective way. Climate change has been iden-
tified as a bad externality to the society by shaping the world in a less
welcoming way and is directly linked to greenhouse gases emissions stemming
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dioxide to reduce GHG emissions, there is still a debate on its socially optimal
price. The externality there is quite difficult to clearly identify and estimate.
Even if there is strong scientific evidence on the nature of phenomenon, there
is still an uncertainty on its magnitude. 
Giving a price to the carbon emitted today strongly depends on expected
future damage. Evaluating this damage in monetary terms requires estimating
different parameters. A various academic literature attempts to tackle this task
by proposing estimations for a Social Cost of Carbon (SCC). Using the
Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) RICE (Regional Integrated Climate-
Economy), W. Nordhaus proposed a set of different estimates (Nordhaus,
2011) for SCC and found for the year 2015 an average SCC of 43.57 $2005
associated with a standard deviation (SD) of 19.35 $2005. Some meta analyses
have been conducted and Havranek & Zilberman (2014) found range of esti-
mates that is from 0-130 $2010 per ton of CO2 (tCO2) whereas Tol (2013) found
a mean estimate of $2010196/tCO2 with a standard deviation of $2010 322 /
tCO2 in its review of 600 estimates. 
Empirical experiences have been put in place unilaterally or regionally by some
countries to price carbon and there is some evidence of relatively high carbon
price. For instance the Swedish carbon tax is up to $ 168/tCO2 and the Tokyo
Cap-and-Trade carbon price reaches $ 95/tCO2 (World Bank, 2014). However
the majority of prices in existing systems lie below $ 35/ tCO2. A recent study of
the IMF (Parry et al., 2014) calculates for the top twenty countries how much
would be the price of CO2 emissions by only taking into account the domestic
co-benefits from reducing other bad externalities such as local pollution, health
harms and transport congestions and the authors found an average, a nationally
efficient price of $ 57.5 / tCO2. In the Deep Decarbonisation report (SDSN &
IDDRI, 2014), the authors proposed, at least for France, a carbon price trajec-
tory, initially formulated by the Quinet commission31 and which is compatible
with the objectives of 75% emissions reduction by 2050 starting at EUR2008 32/
tCO2 in 2010, EUR2008 56/tCO2 in 2020 and EUR2008 100/tCO2 in 2030.
Proposal 2: Compensation scheme and full recycling of carbon revenue
Financing of the compensation would use partly carbon tax or price revenue
directly. Part of that compensation could be permanent or long term in order to
accommodate with specific situations with high irreversibility in the choices made
under the no carbon price system of relative prices. The rest of the carbon revenue
would be directed to general taxes or social contributions reduction, allowing for
a shift of taxation from labour to environment tax. But the core of the proposal is
that for a temporary period of time, (e.g. 5 years), compensation schemes would
be superior to the carbon revenue.
The compensation scheme for households could consist of a general tax
reform, a special fund for high energy consumers, low price or free non-transfer-
able fuel allowances, and an investment/third party fund for retrofitting building
with subsidies for retrofitting costs. Again, compensation can be designed as to
initially overshoot the implied costs in order to boost households’ income and to
limit the number of losers and the extent of their loses. 
31. La valeur tutélaire du carbone, Centre d’Analyse Stratégique (2009).
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consumers but already efficient could have access to free of tax energy or benefit
from grandfathering in the ETS (Emissions Trading System). The investment fund
could be reconverted in order to reduce the cost of investment or to provide
financing even to firms lacking access to financial markets because of deterio-
rated balance sheets. Energy efficiency investment could thus be separated from
any other investment.
A more ambitious approach could be based on a general tax reform. By rede-
fining the goals and the principles of taxation, by shifting taxation from some
bases to others, the implementation of a carbon price and tax could be made
more easily accepted. Over compensation, temporary in nature, can’t be a
permanent funding of a decrease in tax rates. But, reallocation of public
spending, extra revenue from the boost on the economy, benefits from the
recovery and automatic stabilizers redesign when back to normal could provide
room for fiscal reform.
Proposal 3: Over compensation
Over compensation is necessary as a temporary policy to increase the
acceptability of setting a price on carbon. The benefit of over compensating the
cost of the carbon price would be two fold.
First, it is a response to previous failed attempt to implement in some coun-
tries a carbon price and would allow for an ambitious value for carbon. The
experience of Swedish carbon price (implemented in 1991 at 27$/t, increased in
2004 to 100$/t and presently over 150$/tCO2) is that a high price can be easily
accepted when overall taxation is significantly reduced. Let us stress that a steep
increase is also preferable (as in Sweden from 2000 to 2004) because it provides a
guarantee to households and firms that the proposed deal (less general taxes
against more environment taxes) is not going to be modified in the future.
Second, it would be a boost to the EU economy and a way to bypass the
framework of treaties. For a 100€/t increase in carbon price, representing roughly
1.5% of GDP, the over compensation could amount to 0.5 to 1% of GDP and
would be decreasing over 5 years. The total amount, from 1.4% of GDP to 3% of
GDP, would be financed by a Transition fund, equivalent to European debt repaid
through member states contributions over a period to define (with an order of
magnitude of 20y). That financing channel would be similar in design to the Euro-
pean Social Fund, FEM or FEDER, except for the ability to bear debt. Repayment of
the debt would be budgeted in the Budget of the European Budget. A more
restricted fund, limited to euro area countries or even to a subset, implying a
smaller funding (reduced to 60% if limited to euro area) could be an alternative,
based on the enhanced cooperation procedure (or even open method of coordi-
nation). The flow of payment would have to be implemented from contributions
of participating members to the fund. Such a fund would be close in spirit to the
polish proposal of a European Investment Fund, able to raise debt. 
Transition fund debt would not be accounted as public debt (as proposed in
the Juncker Plan for member states participation to the European Fund for Stra-
tegic Investment32), in order to bypass the constraints of the TSCG and debt rules.
32. Enderlein and Pisani-Ferry make a similar proposition in their 2014 Reforms, Investment, and
Growth report, an agenda for France, Germany and Europe. http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/
files/PDF/rapport_enderlein_pisani-en.pdf
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at the level of the EU would necessitate an initial debt of 240b€ to 510b€. Partici-
pating Member states would be allowed to use the fund up to their share in the
fund in order to finance the over compensation of the carbon price introduction.
Monitoring of the overall process would be a condition for the funding and the
fund would therefore act as a controlling institution.
Proposal 4: Carbon tax on imports
The last point of the proposal is a carbon tax on (extra EU, extra participating
members) imports and a negative tax (subsidy) on export. Such a taxing scheme
is to be thought as similar to VAT (see Laurent & Le Cacheux (2009) for a discus-
sion). The import tax could be based on average estimates of carbon content of
imported products unless the importer can provide evidence of a lower import
content. The product of the carbon tax on import would be used for funding
investment program in emerging countries, answering actively by this way to the
protectionism accusation. Any country engaging into a carbon tax or carbon price
scheme would be exempted of the carbon tax on imports. The Carbon revenue
distribution and the exemption could be powerful tools for climate negotiation.
Taxing imports and neutralizing on export prices the impact of carbon price
scheme inside the EU is an important objective. It allows for a specific timing of
carbon pricing in Europe, one core element of the Carbon Fiscal Shock discussed
here. Stepwise carbon pricing is justified for political reasons (improving credi-
bility of the price path and the compensation package) and economic ones
(boosting the EU economy to escape the deflation or stagnation trap). Carbon
leakage and competiveness issues can destroy the political momentum of carbon
price and climate change mitigation. Even if an international agreement can be
expected in the medium term, and even if, in the medium term, carbon price can
be hoped to be global, different national price paths are the rule. Moreover,
details in the implementation of the carbon pricing scheme, addressing competi-
tiveness and carbon leakage issues can complicate the interactions of different
national carbon price systems. Facing this reality, border taxation of carbon
appears as a necessary tool.
Box 3. Literature review on carbon leakage and boarder 
tax adjustments
The issue of Carbon leakage has been addressed mainly with the creation of
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Boarder Tax Adjustment seems to be an
optimal policy to fight against carbon leakage and the existence of “pollution
havens”. However its international acceptance has not been yet fully estab-
lished and its legality within the current international trade rules is still in
debate since it aims to regulate activities undertaken abroad EU. Some criticism
arose to argue on the protectionist aspects of such a mechanism. This question
is conceptually rather difficult to address since it is seeking to compare a coun-
terfactual scenario (no introduction of carbon policy) with the observed data.
Different approaches have been used to estimate the carbon leakage effects;
the first one is based on the use of theoretical model, in general or partial equi-
librium which is calibrated with existing data. Winchester, Paltsev, & Reilly
(2011), Fischer & Fox (2012), Demailly & Quirion (2006), Burniaux, Chateau,
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the effect of implementing BCA on emissions and output and Branger &
Quirion (2013)conducted a meta-analysis on this topic. The other method-
ology relies on ex-post empirical evidence to provide econometric estimates —
this branch of the literature observes a significant carbon leakage. Aichele &
Felbermayr (2011), Baier & Bergstrand (2009) or Ederington & Minier (2003)
in particular conducted empirical studies on this issue. 
More generally, four mechanisms relating to carbon leakage have been iden-
tified. The first three are negatively oriented and has been proposed by Reinaud
(2008):
— The short-term competitiveness channel: the increase in price leads to a
reduction in the market share of the constrained industries to the benefit of
unconstrained competitors.
— The Investment channel: a unilateral mitigation action provides incentives
to firms to direct capital towards countries with less stringent policies.
— The fossil fuel price channel: It can be approximate by the “rebound
effect”; energy demand reduction conduct to a decrease of global energy
prices which ultimately triggers higher energy demand elsewhere.
A fourth channel has been identified by Dröge, Wang, & Grubb (2009) and is
linked to positive technological spill-overs: it relies on the idea that the increase
in the price of energy spurred by a more stringent climate policy could stimulate
technological progress, which in the end, improves the competitiveness of firms.
How to implement it in the European framework?
The right level of application of a carbon price is the EU. The EU ETS has been
operational and functioning for years and backed by a strong experience. Back
loading and the reserve mechanism (IDDRI, 2014) provide tool to step up carbon
price and even control carbon price.33 Moreover, implementing a border carbon
tax inside EU may be heading in a direction which is not to be whished.
Deploying a high carbon price beyond ETS could be fostered at the EU level
and backed European institutions. The transition fund would then be companion
tool that the Commission could operate, based on its knowledge and competence
of those subjects. Coordination with other funds (in particular EFSI, the Juncker
Fund) would thus be accomplished smoothly.
Enhanced cooperation could be another level of organisation if time or polit-
ical will is missing to implement an EU wide ambition. EU ETS operation and other
instrument for carbon pricing could be dissociated (in timing) and a sub set of
willing countries could engage in the Fiscal Carbon Shock, implement the transi-
tion fund (and the corresponding back loading debt). The implementation of the
carbon border tax would be more difficult and could be approximated by
compensation devices at a cost in term of readability and efficiency.
33. Currently, the logic of ETS is to give a price resulting from quantities of emission reduction
targets. This guarantees a cost effective pricing of carbon under quantity constraints. Having CO2
emissions resulting from a pre-determined carbon price constitute a different approach. Flexible and
adaptive targets for emissions reductions achieved may end in convergence of the two logics.
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In this section we assess a policy package that combines a carbon tax of
€100/tCO2 with fiscal stimulus in Europe. The carbon tax is introduced in 2015
and held constant in real terms; its revenues are recycled such that there is an
overall positive stimulus (starting at 50% of revenues and reducing over time) to
Europe’s economies. The revenue recycling takes the form of reductions in
income taxes, subsidies to energy-intensive firms and public investment in
energy efficiency.
The E3ME macro-econometric simulation model from Cambridge Economet-
rics was used to carry out the assessment. E3ME does not assume full employment
or optimal use of economic resources, meaning it is well-suited to modelling
Europe’s economies post-recession and the potential effects of fiscal stimulus.
The modelling finds that there could be short-term economic benefits from
the policy package, of up to 1.4% of GDP. One should note that this results from
a particularly large estimate of the double dividend to be expected from invest-
ment in the energy transition. Simulations made with the ThreeME model,
although demonstrating similar impacts on economic activity, are comparatively
smaller in magnitude (see Box 4).
In the E3ME simulation, employment could also increase by up to 0.6% in this
period. There are positive economic impacts in all EU Member States, but some of
the largest benefits are in countries that currently have high unemployment rates.
The modelling also finds that there are longer-term macroeconomic benefits.
These benefits are smaller than the short-term impacts and are driven by reduc-
tions in fuel imports to Europe. Employment increases in the long run as there is
some switching from energy-intensive to labour-intensive activities. 
The long-run modelling does not factor in the higher levels of debt that are
taken on at European level; these would need to be paid back at some point in the
future and could reduce GDP growth at this time. However, as Europe’s econo-
mies would still benefit from reduced fuel imports, it is reasonable to assume that,
over the projection period as a whole, results would be positive. 
CO2 emissions fall by around 14% as a result of the carbon tax and energy
efficiency measures. This reduction would put Europe close to being on track to
meet its 2030 emissions target.
The policy scenario
The policy scenario is decomposed in four sub scenarios. They are:
• S1 – A pan-European carbon tax. The carbon tax is introduced at a rate of
€100/tCO2 in 2015 and maintained in real terms over the projection
period. It is applied to energy-related and process emissions across all
sectors and replaces the EU ETS (including any revenues generated from
auctioned allowances to the power sector).
• S2 – The carbon tax plus revenue recycling to households and industry.
This scenario includes the same carbon tax as S1 but also includes revenue
recycling to households in the form of lower income tax rates (70% of the
revenues) and to industry in the form of lump-sum subsidies (25% of the
revenues). In addition, there is a short-term over-recycling of revenues,
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year period (Table 2).
• S3 – The carbon tax plus revenue recycling in S2 and investment in energy
efficiency. In this scenario the final 5% of revenues is used to invest in
household energy efficiency measures. We apply a coefficient derived from
the IEA’s World Energy Outlook to estimate additional energy savings. We
assume that all the efficiency measures lead to reductions in household use
of energy, principally gas but also electricity and heating oil. As in S2, there
is a short-term over-compensation of revenues.
• S4 – Carbon tax, revenue recycling and BTAs. In addition to the measures in
S3, in S4 we introduce Border Tax Adjustments on imports of the ‘Big 6’
energy-intensive industries (pulp & paper, refining, basic inorganic chemi-
cals, cement and lime, iron and steel, aluminium). The revenues from these
BTAs are assumed to be used to finance low-carbon development outside
the EU and do not benefit the domestic economy.
Basic modelling approach
E3ME is a simulation model based on a post-Keynesian approach. Unlike the
more common Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling approach,
E3ME does not assume optimisation and full utilisation of economic capacity,
hence allowing for underemployment.
These features make the model a suitable tool for evaluating fiscal stimulus. By
acknowledging that Europe’s economies are suffering from a shortage of aggre-
gate demand, the model can be used to estimate the effects of various measures
to boost domestic consumption. The method of stimulus here (borrowing at
European level to finance national spending) has some resemblance to a European
programme of quantitative easing (QE). However, QE would be very unlikely to
include the same targeting of spending.
Further information about the E3ME model may be found on the model
website.34
Table 2. How the carbon tax revenues are allocated, %
Scen 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
S2 Households 105.0 98.0 91.0 84.0 77.0 70.0
Industry 37.5 35.0 32.5 30.0 27.5 25.0
Energy efficiency 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 142.5 133.0 123.5 114.0 104.5 95.0
S3-4 Households 105.0 98.0 91.0 84.0 77.0 70.0
Industry 37.5 35.0 32.5 30.0 27.5 25.0
Energy efficiency 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0
Total 150.0 140.0 130.0 120.0 110.0 100.0
Source: Eurostat.
34. http://www.e3me.com
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report156The carbon tax is entered as an additional tax on fuel consumption, with the
rate depending on the fuels’ carbon contents. It is assumed that the electricity
sector passes on its costs in full but other sectors may be restricted from doing so
by international competition; if this is the case then they will likely suffer a loss of
profitability.
It is assumed that the revenues are recycled by national administrations and
there are no cross-border transfers (apart from the BTA revenues, see below). As
the EU’s Member States already have excise duties on fuels it is assumed that
there is no increase in transaction costs and all the additional revenues are avail-
able for recycling.
The policy scenario suggests that the over-recycling of revenues comes from a
central European fund and is therefore not included in national balance sheets. It
follows that we have an assumption that there is no direct crowding out of
economic activity and the stimulus is additional to everything else that is going on
in the economy. There may, however, be indirect crowding out, for example if
Member States started reaching full employment or sectors reached their produc-
tion capacity; this effect is captured by the model’s equations but, given current
growth rates, it seems rather unlikely that output will reach capacity levels.
The BTAs are modelled as an increase in import prices. The rate of the price
increase is determined by the carbon intensity of EU production and EU carbon
prices; this is added as a tax on imports of the specified products from outside
the EU.
Realistically, BTAs are only likely to be applied to a few selected products. In
our analysis we have expanded these products to cover the entire NACE 2-digit
parent sectors; even so, these sectors contribute a small share of total GVA in
Europe so we would not expect large economic impacts from this measure.
The aim of the BTAs therefore is not to improve macroeconomic results but to
offer protection to the specific EU industries that are exposed to competitiveness
issues and ‘carbon leakage’.
Macroeconomic impacts
Figure 5 shows the impacts of the full policy package on GDP (S4 compared
to baseline, over compensation break down). There is an immediate stimulus
effect worth about 1.1% of GDP, which increases up to 2017, reaching around
1.4% of GDP. Beyond 2017, the stimulus effect tails off, and GDP is around 0.8%
higher than in the baseline beyond 2020. 
The stimulus is financed by borrowing at the European level. In this scenario,
it would remain as an outstanding debt as we have not included a repayment
mechanism. However, even if the debt was repaid later in the projection period
we could still expect to see a small long-term positive effect due to the restruc-
turing that arises from the carbon tax and energy-efficiency measures.
Employment increases by around 0.6% (short run) and 0.3% (long run)
compared to the baseline, following a similar pattern over time to GDP. According
to our results, the policy package thus stimulates both higher levels of economic
activity and employment.
Green the Union: An investment strategy towards a sustainable European Union 157Table 3 shows the evolution of key macroeconomic indicators over the projec-
tion period. The pattern is one of increased consumption by households (due to
the lower income taxes) and increased investment (primarily in energy-efficient
equipment). Trade effects are quite limited in scope, although for imports this
outcome represents a combination of lower fuel imports and higher imports of
consumer goods (see below). Inflation increases, with the price level about 2%
higher in S4 than in the baseline. It would therefore be important to ensure that
low-income households are compensated for higher electricity and fuel prices.
The GDP impacts are positive throughout the projection period. In the short
term, there is a stimulus effect from the over-recycling of revenues. This stimulus is
only effective because there are unused economic resources across Europe in the
projection period; if Europe’s economies were already operating at full capacity,
inflation would likely be the result, rather than an increase in real activity.
Figure 5. EU28 GDP
 S4, in % difference from baseline 
Sources: Cambridge Econometrics, E3ME Model.
Table 3. EU28 summary of results
S4, in % difference from baseline
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2025
GDP 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.8
Consumption 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.0
Investment 2.9 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.1
Exports -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Imports 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.0
Price index 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.9
Employment 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3
Source: E3ME Model.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report158However, the modelling results also show long-term benefits. These are due to
some of the structural shifts that occur in the scenario. There are two main ones:
• There is a positive effect on Europe’s trade balance from the reduced fuel
imports—fuel consumption falls as a result of both the carbon price (S1)
and the energy-efficiency measures (S3). A large share of the savings in
imported fuels is spent on goods that are, at least in part, produced domes-
tically. This boosts domestic production levels. 
• There is a transfer from businesses to households—a large share of the
carbon tax is paid by business, more than the 25% of revenues that is recy-
cled back to industry. Some sectors, such as electricity generation, can pass
these costs on to final consumers but others are unable to pass costs on,
due to foreign competition. Lower profits in these sectors are matched by
higher real household incomes. As households have lower savings rates and
higher domestic consumption rates than businesses (e.g. multinationals’
profits may flow abroad), this creates more activity within Europe.
Table 4 shows the results for each scenario in 2020, which corresponds to
the end of the initial stimulus (although there are still some lagged benefits at
this time). In most cases the results are quite intuitive; the carbon tax reduces
GDP by 0.7% and imports fall by even more in S1. However, the effects of the
revenue recycling, including the stimulus, make these impacts positive overall in
the other scenarios.
The BTAs have a limited impact on the economy as a whole. This is because
the revenues from the BTAs are not spent within Europe but are instead assumed
to be provided to developing countries to finance low-carbon measures. The
effects of the BTA thus become a trade-off between import substitution and
higher prices for final consumers. These effects very nearly cancel out overall.
Household spending is the largest component of GDP and is an important
driver of the overall results. In S1, household spending falls due to the higher
prices and a loss of real income, but lower income taxes result in higher spending
in the other scenarios. Investment also tends to track GDP in these results but
there is additional stimulus to investment through the energy-efficiency measures
in S3 and S4.
Table 4. EU 28 summary of results, 2020
In % difference from baseline
S1 S2 S3 S4
GDP -0.7 0.9 1.1 1.1
Consumer expenditure -1.5 1.2 1.4 1.3
Investment -0.3 0.7 1.4 1.4
Extra-EU Exports -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
Extra-EU Imports -1.1 0.1 0.3 0.2
Price index 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1
Employment -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
Source: E3ME Model.
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Simulations were conducted through two models in this report one at the
European scale with the E3ME model (Cambridge Econometrics) and another
one for France with the ThreeME model (OFCE). Even if both models highlight a
positive impact of the carbon fiscal shock plan on the output, the magnitude in
the results is quite different. Beyond the fact that each model has its own prop-
erties, the question of the scale and the existence of spill over effects across
countries matters in the results. The ThreeME model has been developed in the
framework of a research convention between OFCE and the French Environ-
mental Agency (ADEME). It is a neo-keynesian Computable General Model
(CGE) that exhibits features like stickiness in the adjustments processes of prices
and quantities or a representation of the labour market through a Phillips curve
which allows taking into account a dynamic dimension in its results. Its multi-
sectorial structure in 37 sectors, in which 17 are only energy production activi-
ties leads to take into account the possible structural changes in the economy
and then lead to a more accurate analysis.
Beyond the question of the positive effect of an investment plan, the question
remains whether there is the possibility for an environmental tax to lead to struc-
tural positive effect on the economy. The existence of the double-dividend has
been since its formulation by Pearce (1991) discussed and even challenged on its
theoretical foundations. Some theoretical articles found a loss of welfare, either
through a suboptimal emissions reduction (Bovenberg & de Mooij,1994), a loss
of income (Van de Bovenberg,1994) or a reduction of employment (Bovenberg,
Goulder & Jacobsen, 2008). Paradoxically, empirical studies, which were mainly
using CGE models to assess the impact of the introduction of a carbon tax
observed a positive double-dividend. Takeda (1997) found for instance that for
the Japan economy a strong double-dividend arises when recycling of revenues
is associated with capital tax reduction. Fraser & Waschik (2013) got the same
results for the Australian economy with several mechanism designs. 
Figure 6. French GDP, Carbon Fiscal Shock simulation using ThreeME
       In % deviation from baseline
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, E3ME Model.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report160Even if the theoretical framework is not shared by all the articles on the
double-dividend question, the main argument that can explain this difference
in the results is that contrarily to empirical studies that take into account of
some realities, the theoretical articles take as granted the optimality of the
economy as a benchmark. Although environmental taxes appear to be less
distortionary than pre-existing taxes, which in the end justifies this positive
effect. 
There are no policies designed to address employment directly, so the
employment impacts are the result of changes in levels of economic activity.
There is also some shift from energy-intensive to labour-intensive activities. In this
analysis we have not considered whether Europe’s labour markets would be able
to provide the right skills to take up these additional jobs. However, from the
sectorial results discussed below, we can see that the additional jobs would fall
broadly into two categories: fairly low-skilled jobs in consumer services and more
specialised positions in installing energy-efficient products. Policy makers may
need to consider whether adequate training is provided for the latter case.
Impacts across Europe
Figure 7 shows that the GDP impacts are positive in all Member States in
2020. They are all positive and range from 0.3% in the UK to 3.6% in Cyprus.
Figure 7. S4 GDP by region, 2020
   In % difference from baseline
Source: E3ME Model.
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Green the Union: An investment strategy towards a sustainable European Union 161There are various reasons for the differences across regions. Most notably, as
the stimulus is a proportion of the carbon tax revenues, regions with higher
carbon intensity get a larger stimulus. This is the result of a fairly arbitrary assump-
tion that has been made in the modelling exercise, but explains why countries like
the UK, France and Sweden see smaller impacts.
Another issue is that the countries with the most capacity available (e.g. high
unemployment rates) are likely to gain more from the stimulus. In many cases
these are also the more energy-intensive countries so the effects are stronger in
these countries overall.
Other possible reasons for variation in outcomes include industry cost pass-
through rates, household savings ratios, the share of international trade and the
flexibility of labour markets. There can also be strong interactions between
Member States due to their trade linkages.
Impacts on key sectors
Almost all sectors benefit from the measures. The ones that see the largest
increases in output and employment are those that supply consumer services and
those that produce/install energy-efficient products.
The sectors that lose out are the energy extraction and utilities sectors. 
Table 5 shows the impact on energy-intensive industries’ (EII) output in 2020.
As expected, the carbon tax has a negative impact on most EIIs (S1). Chemicals
and non-metallic minerals appear the hardest hit. In the second scenario (S2)
some EIIs benefit from the increase in economic activity resulting from the
compensation of households and industry. The Non-metallic minerals and Basic
metals sectors particularly benefit from the introduction of energy-efficiency
measures, as they are part of the supply chain for energy-efficient investment
goods (S3). 
Figure 8. EU28 Output by sector, 2020
                               In % difference from baseline
Source: E3ME Model.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report162Non-metallic minerals benefit the most from the border tax adjustments (S4).
In general, however, the BTAs have only a small impact on domestic production,
even in the EIIs. This is partly a short-run effect as most existing plants will still be
open and producing in 2020, regardless of import prices. Decisions on relocation
of plants may frame the longer-term outcomes in these sectors but this would
require a more detailed sectorial analysis. 
Environmental impacts
Figure 8 shows the impact on emissions levels in all four scenarios. Overall we
see a reduction in emissions of around 14%.
By far the largest reduction in emissions comes from the carbon tax in S1. S2
sees some rebound, due to the higher levels of economic activity but there is a
further reduction in emissions due to the energy-efficiency measures that are
introduced in S3. The BTAs have only a small impact on emissions levels, due to
the small changes in output that they cause.
Table 5. EU28 Output by energy-intensive sectors, 2020
In % difference from baseline
S1 S2 S3 S4
Paper & paper products -1.1 0.6 0.9 0.9
Manufactured fuels -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals -1.4 -0.1 0.2 0.2
Non-metallic minerals -1.6 -0.3 0.4 0.7
Basic metals -0.3 1.4 1.8 1.9
Source: E3ME Model.
Figure 9. EU28 CO2 emissions by scenario, 
    In % difference from baseline
Sources: iAGS, E3ME Model.
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Green the Union: An investment strategy towards a sustainable European Union 163As the carbon tax is imposed on all sectors, direct emissions fall across the
whole economy. Power generation makes the largest contribution in absolute
terms and the results show some increase in renewables by 2020.
Emissions from households are also reduced by the energy-efficiency meas-
ures, which reduce domestic consumption of gas.
Table 7 shows the reduction in consumption of each fuel. Again, all fossil fuels
are affected. Consumption of gas is reduced by the energy-efficiency measures in
S3 as well as the carbon tax.
Table 6. EU28 CO2 emissions by fuel user, 2020
In % difference from baseline
S1 S2 S3 S4
1   Power generation -20.5 -19.8 -17.9 -17.9
2   Rest of energy branch -12.7 -12.6 -13.0 -13.0
3   Iron & steel          -16.3 -15.9 -15.8 -15.8
4   Non-ferrous metals    -13.6 -12.7 -12.4 -12.5
5   Chemicals             -9.4 -9.6 -9.6 -9.6
6   Non-metallic minerals    -14.8 -14.3 -14.0 -13.9
7   Ore-extraction -21.3 -21.1 -20.9 -21.0
8   Food, drink & tobacco  -13.4 -12.8 -12.7 -12.7
9   Textiles, clothing & footwear -17.0 -16.5 -16.5 -16.5
10 Paper & pulp         -12.5 -12.0 -11.8 -11.8
11 Engineering etc.      -17.2 -16.5 -16.3 -16.3
12 Other industry       -13.3 -12.8 -12.7 -12.8
13 Construction         -20.9 -20.5 -19.8 -19.9
14 Rail transport       -4.6 -4.5 -4.5 -4.6
15 Road transport       -10.3 -9.7 -9.6 -9.9
16 Air transport        -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8
17 Other transport services -10.1 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0
18 Households           -11.7 -11.1 -27.1 -27.1
19 Agriculture, forestry -28.9 -28.9 -28.8 -28.9
20 Fishing              -4.1 -4.0 -4.0 -4.1
21 Other final use      -13.3 -11.8 -11.4 -11.5
22 Non-energy use       -1.1 0.1 0.6 0.7
Sources: E3ME.
Table 7.  EU28 CO2 emissions by fuel type, 2020
In % difference from baseline
S1 S2 S3 S4
Coal -21.3 -20.7 -20.6 -20.6
Liquid fuels       -8.1 -7.5 -7.4 -7.6
Gas        -7.9 -7.2 -9.6 -9.6
Sources: E3ME.

Chapter 5DEFINING THE RIGHT INTERNAL EXCHANGE RATE
European economies need to adjust to a sustainable growth path. That
implies adjusting internal exchange rates. Since the start of the Great Recession,
euro area crisis countries (and more specifically Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
Ireland) have engaged in austerity policies in order to slash public deficits, but also
in attempt to regain lost competitiveness. These policies, by weighing on internal
demand and growth, have successively pushed euro area countries into competi-
tive disinflation policies. This non-cooperative game, whose goal is to win market
shares against euro area partners by improving the country’s price-competitive-
ness, has already had sharp disinflationary effects and runs the risk of pushing
the euro area economy into deflation, a threat already identified in last year’s
iAGS report. 
Wage deflation is producing adjustment but at a high social cost, and there is a
serious risk of overshooting. Defining the appropriate target is thus critical. In this
chapter, we attempt to define adjustment targets for euro area countries. To do so,
we compute the variation of the general price level of each country compatible
with a stable and sustainable international investment position, that is the balance
between a country’s foreign assets and liabilities. We take into account the fact that
economies have not yet recovered from the crisis as this influences long-run trade
balances. The simulations also include the simultaneous determination of import
and export prices, which determines the final real effective exchange rate of each
country endogenously. They rely on recent econometric estimates of trade elastici-
ties (see Ducoudré and Heyer, 2014). 
This chapter is a first attempt at calibrating a cooperative and coordinated
price/wage policy in the euro area in a unified framework. Even though a substan-
tial readjustment has been achieved since 2011, much still remains to be done.
A rebalancing strategy should rely on maintaining inflation differentials within the
euro area over an extended period, with higher inflation in Germany and lower
inflation in crisis countries; deflation is not required in the latter countries if the
readjustment is implemented gradually. A nominal depreciation of the Euro would
facilitate the rebalancing by making it compatible with a higher inflation rate.
Deleveraging in some countries would also ease the adjustment.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first part studies the external imbal-
ances of the euro area countries, by looking at structural trade balances. It
emphasises the role of wage deflation in the effective exchange rate adjustments
that occurred since 2008 as a way to correct external imbalances. The second part
briefly presents the model, and discusses the simulation results.
1. External imbalances adjustments since 2008
To assess the need for adjusting to internal exchange rates, we start the
analysis by looking at current trade balances in euro area (EA thereafter) countries.
Next we point to the adjustments already achieved in EA countries. To do so, we
carefully look at labour costs, relative prices and trade flow variations since 2008.Revue de l’OFCE — iAGS (2015) Third Report  
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Since the start of the 2008 crisis, the current account of the euro area has
strongly increased, starting from a current account deficit of -1% of GDP in 2008,
to a surplus of +3% of GDP in 2013 (Figure 1). This apparent improvement mainly
comes from the harsh reduction of current account deficits in southern countries:
Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal. A tentative analysis would stop here and
conclude that external imbalances have been corrected, France being the last
country needing to correct this. However, high unemployment and depressed
internal demand account for an important part of the adjustment. Austerity poli-
cies weigh on internal demand and imports, explaining a substantial part of the
improving trade balances. On the other side, the shrinkage of exports due to
trade partners' internal demand collapse worsens the trade balance. Moreover,
these current account surpluses, once business cycle effects are taken into
account, may not be compatible with sustainable trajectories of international
investment positions.
Starting from these remarks, we try to assess current external disequilibria in EA
countries taking into account the fact that these countries and the world economy
have not yet recovered from the crisis. The external disequilibrium of a country can
be assessed by computing the gap between the structural trade balance (the trade
balance obtained when output gaps are closed—STB thereafter, see Box 1 for
computation details) and the trade balance that stabilizes the net international
investment position (NIIP thereafter) at a desired level expressed as a % of GDP1.
The structural trade balance of a country depends on the output gap of the
economy: a negative output gap signals a weak internal demand that diminishes
Figure 1. Current accounts developments in the euro area since 2000
 In % of EA GDP
Source: Eurostat.
1. Clearly, given that a negative NIIP (normally) implies an outflow of interest, dividend and other
payments, which burden the current account, a persistent rise in the NIIP is not sustainable.
Although the constraints are not as binding in the case of surpluses, it is usually inadvisable to pile
up increasing net foreign assets as this creates imbalances that can lead to capital losses.
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Defining the right internal exchange rate 167imports. Closing the output gap would then worsen the trade balance of that
country. The structural trade balance also depends on the output gaps of trade
partners: if they face a negative output gap, they import less from the country.
Closing their output gap would then improve the trade balance of the country.
In Table 1 we report the STB for eleven EA countries. STB are generally lower
than current trade balances, since almost all EA countries face a more negative
output gap than that of their partners. Greece, the most extreme case, has an
actual trade balance near to 0 in 2013 (-0.2% of GDP), but its STB amounts to -
11.4% of GDP due to its strongly negative output gap (-13.3% of GDP). On the
contrary, Germany has a STB (8.3% of GDP) higher than its trade balance (6.2%
of GDP) in 2013, since its output gap is nearly closed while the one of its main
trading partners is on average larger. 
We also report the STB target, i.e. the STB compatible with a stable NIIP. It is
computed as the current NIIP adjusted by the gap between the potential growth
rate and the long run real interest rate, and corrected for the gap between the
current account and the trade balance. Defining the target of the external adjust-
ment of EA countries is a critical task. It is clear that an ever increasing or
decreasing external position is not sustainable in the long run. Stabilizing the NIIP
is therefore a necessary condition, but the level at which that position becomes
unsustainable is not clearly quantified in the literature. In this part, for sake of
simplicity we stabilise the NIIP in the long run at its current level. In the second part
of the chapter, we define different constraints on long run NIIPs.
Table 1. Trade balance gap for 11 euro area countries in 2013
% of GDP
Net interna-
tional 
investment 
position
Current 
account
Trade 
balance
Output 
gap
(%)
Potential 
growth
(%)
Weighted 
output gap 
of trade 
partners
(%)
Structural 
trade 
balance
Structural 
trade 
balance 
target*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) = (3) – (6) + (4)
(8) = 
[(5) – r] x (1) 
– [(2) – (3)]
AUT 1 2.7 3.7 -2.9 1.5 -2.0 2.8 1.0
BEL 46 -1.9 -0.1 -1.9 2.0 -2.7 0.7 2.2
FIN 16 -1.1 0.3 -3.1 2.0 -2.0 -0.8 1.5
FRA -17 -1.3 -1.3 -2.9 1.7 -2.5 -1.7 0.0
DEU 48 7.5 6.2 -0.6 1.1 -2.6 8.3 -1.2
GRC -121 0.7 -0.2 -13.3 1.5 -2.1 -11.4 -1.5
IRL -105 6.6 23.3 -8.7 2.0 -2.4 17.0 15.6
ITA -30 1.0 2.6 -5.6 0.9 -2.2 -0.8 1.6
NLD 46 10.9 10.6 -4.3 1.8 -2.2 8.5 0.1
PRT -119 0.5 1.7 -7.2 1.6 -3.0 -2.6 0.5
ESP -98 0.8 2.9 -5.3 1.7 -2.8 0.3 1.3
* The structural trade balance target is the structural trade balance that is compatible with NIIP stability at its 
2013 level. We assume that the gap between the current account and the trade balance (revenues and current 
transfers) is constant. We assume r = 1%.
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook 95, IMF WEO October 2014, Oxford Economics, IMF International Financial Statis-
tics, Eurostat, iAGS calculations
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and stable NIIP needs a positive STB insofar as the gap between the potential
growth rate and the real interest rate is positive. Second, a higher real interest rate
than the potential growth rate implies NIIP and STB with reverse signs, which is
the case for Italy here. Third, the gap between the current account and the trade
balance (revenues and current transfers in % of GDP) is assumed to be constant in
the long run and has then to be compensated by a higher or lower STB. This last
point is for instance very important for Ireland.
We now analyse more carefully the gap between the STB and its target in
Table 2. Results show that situations differ from one country to another. Some
countries need to strongly increase their STB to achieve the target. This is the case
when the last column of Table 2 reports a positive TB gap. It concerns first and
foremost Greece: a strong improvement in Greek competitiveness is needed to
improve its trade balance in the long run and stabilise the NIIP. Finland, France,
Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain are concerned to a lesser extent. Conversely,
Germany and the Netherlands, which already have the highest NIIP, should
reduce their STB, since the current ones imply ever increasing NIIP. 
To a certain extent, these results come from the countries’ responses to the
crisis. Column 10 in Table 2 shows the evolution of STB between 2008 and 2013.
This provides a way to gauge the effort made by EA countries to reduce external
disequilibria since the start of the crisis. Four country groups emerge. The first one
consists of Spain, France, Belgium and Austria who have made a part of the adjust-
ment. These countries have completed about 60% of the required adjustment
(90% for Spain). The second one refers to countries (Portugal, Finland and Italy)
that were in excess STB before the crisis and the hit from the crisis has resulted in a
decreasing NIIP, i.e. a too low STB. The crisis has brought these countries in the red
zone. The third group includes Ireland and the Netherlands, who have increased
Table 2. Structural trade balance adjustment since 2008
% of GDP
Structural trade balance Structural trade 
balance target
Variation
2008-2013
Trade balance 
gap2008 2013
(9) (7) (8) (10) = (7) – (9) (11) = (8) – (7)
AUT 6.1 2.8 1.0 -3.3 -1.8
BEL -1.6 0.7 2.2 2.3 1.6
FIN 5.8 -0.8 1.5 -6.6 2.3
FRA -4.3 -1.7 0.0 2.6 1.6
DEU 7.0 8.3 -1.2 1.3 -9.5
GRC -2.6 -11.4 -1.5 -8.8 9.8
IRL -7.3 17.0 15.6 24.3 -1.4
ITA 10.5 -0.8 1.6 -11.3 2.4
NLD -1.3 8.5 0.1 9.8 -8.5
PRT 10.1 -2.6 0.5 -12.7 3.1
ESP -11.6 0.3 1.3 11.9 1.0
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook 95, IMF WEO October 2014, Oxford Economics, IMF International Financial Statis-
tics, Eurostat, iAGS calculations.
Defining the right internal exchange rate 169their STB too much and have overshot the target. Finally, during the crisis
Germany and Greece increased imbalances, but in opposite fashions. These two
countries are symmetrical in a sense: rapidly increasing NIIP for Germany and
rapidly decreasing NIIP for Greece, in structural terms. 
These results emphasize that the massive external trade surplus in Germany is
a concern for the EA, since without a German adjustment other countries cannot
adjust as well. First, a large NIIP for Germany can imply large negative NIIP for the
rest of the EA if the euro exchange rate is in a way sensitive to EA wide NIIP.
Second, increasing NIIP dynamics, even larger when STB is higher than current
TB, thus indicates a strong increase in NIIP is to be expected unless price adjust-
ment is done. 
The strong compression of internal demand in Greece has had no significant
effect on the competitiveness of the country until now. More generally, over-
shooting and increasing imbalances of seven countries out of eleven stresses that
macroeconomic policies conducted during the crisis have not been well-designed
to correct external imbalances among EA countries in the sense that they do not
favour stabilising NIIPs. 
Box 1. Computing structural trade balances
Structural trade balances can be computed by correcting trade balances from
the differentiated effects of business cycle among countries. The intuition is to
estimate trade balances with closed output gaps, while neglecting the effect of
relative prices adjustments, that is to say that we assume constant market
shares in the long run (this assumption is relaxed in the second part of the
chapter). 
Assume that the volume of exports xi of country i depends on the total
foreign demand diEX :
xi = diEX
Similarly, the volume of imports mi of country i depends on the domestic
output yi:
mi = yi
The long run volume of imports is equal to the potential domestic output
mι = yι. It follows that mι = mi – (yi – yι).
As bilateral trade imposes mij = xji we deduce:
where wxij is the share of country j in the exports of country i.
The structural trade balance is then STB = xι – mι = xi – mi +
= ∑ = ∑   and  = ∑  
( ) ∑  
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As shown in Table 2, some countries with a high STB in 2008, like Austria and
Finland, have decreased their surplus since the beginning of the crisis and coun-
tries with high deficits have reduced them (Ireland and Spain). Intra-EMU trade
figures also attest for decreasing imbalances (see Box 2). This tendency to the
rebalancing of current account imbalances has been supported by labour cost
developments, and for some authors, among them Buti and Turrini (2012)2,
wage adjustments have been one of the main drivers of the correction of external
imbalances. 
Before the inception of the crisis (2000-2007), nominal compensation per
employee grew faster in peripheral countries of the Eurozone (+3.6% annual
mean growth, Figure 2) than in core countries (+2.3%), generating a divergence
of competitiveness among Member States. This tendency has been reversed since
2010. Between 2010 and 2013, nominal compensation per employee has slowed
down very significantly in peripheral countries (+0.8%) while it has accelerated,
modestly, in core countries (+2.6%). 
As can be seen from Figure 3 and Table 3, the evolution of nominal wages is
heterogeneous among countries. The magnitude of wage moderation has been
closely linked with the extent of the slack in the labour market, as measured by
the increase in the unemployment rate. For example, in Greece, where the adjust-
ment of employment was extreme, nominal wages have decreased at an annual
2. See Buti and Turrini (2012). 
Figure 2. Evolution of nominal compensation per employee (total economy)
  Annual growth, in %
Note: peripheral countries group includes Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Core countries group
includes France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Finland. Within a group, national evolutions
are weighted according to their respective nominal GDP.
Sources: Ameco, iAGS calculations. 
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Defining the right internal exchange rate 171rate of 3.5% since 2010. Wage moderation was also pronounced in Ireland, Spain
and Italy. Since the crisis, nominal wages have stagnated in Ireland, contrasting
with their pre-crisis dynamism (+6.0% per year between 2000 and 2007), and a
similar pattern is observable in Spain (+0.7% average yearly growth since 2010,
contrasting with +3.7% before 2008). Wage growth has also moderated, but to a
lesser extent, in countries preserved from sovereign crisis, as can be seen in
France, Belgium, Austria and Finland. In a context of rising employment and
falling unemployment, the acceleration of German wages (+2.5% of average
yearly growth since 2010, compared to +1.0% between 2000 and 2007) consti-
tutes a noteworthy exception among euro area states.
However, macroeconomic data may underestimate the magnitude of the
process. The effects of the crisis were more severe among young and unskilled
workers, whose wages tend to be lower than the average. According to several
studies that use micro-data, composition effects have had a positive contribution
to average wages since the start of the crisis3, which is hidden in macro-data. This
is true in both core countries and peripheral ones.
Focusing exclusively on nominal wages might be incomplete in order to
assess the magnitude of the adjustment. In the presence of downward wage rigid-
ities, firms may adjust their wage bill by cutting jobs. According to the “Wage
Dynamics Network” survey made by ECB4, this was precisely the main strategy
3. See for example, ECB (2012) which focuses on the start of the crisis. For the Spanish case see
Puente et Galan (2014) and Verdugo (2013) for the French case.
Table 3. Nominal compensation per employee (total economy)
In %
2000-2007 2008-2009 2010-2013
Core countries 2.3 2.1 2.6
FRA 2.8 2.2 2.4
DEU 1.0 1.2 2.5
NLD 3.5 3.2 1.9
BEL 2.8 2.4 2.6
AUT 2.5 2.8 2.0
FIN 3.1 3.1 2.7
Peripheral countries 3.6 3.8 0.8
ESP 3.7 5.6 0.7
ITA 3.0 2.9 1.5
IRL 6.0 2.1 0.0
PRT 3.8 2.5 0.4
GRC 5.9 3.3 -3.5
EA 2.6 2.7 2.0
Sources: Ameco, iAGS calculations.
4. For a summary of the results, see Lamo (2013). Firms that answered the survey come from 9 EU
countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria and Poland.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report172used by firms. Two thirds of firms reacted to the demand shock associated with
the start of the crisis by cutting costs5 and among those firms, 66% did it by
reducing labour costs despite the inability to cut wages6. Hence, 24% of firms
reduced the number of temporary employees, 17% permanent employees and
14% decreased the number of hours worked. 
Unit labour costs (ULC) measure the labour cost per unit of added value,
which is a better indicator of labour cost adjustment as it takes into account simul-
taneously the dynamics of nominal compensation per employee and the one of
employment through its accounting impact on productivity. 
Between 2000 and 2007, important divergences contributed to the emer-
gence of external imbalances. Euro area ULC increased by 12 points during this
period—rather less than the increase in consumer prices—but this figure masks
heterogeneity across Member States. Before the crisis, ULC increased significantly
in peripheral countries as Ireland (+40 points), Spain (+28), Italy (+23) or Portugal
(+20). The evolution was close to the euro area mean in France (+17), Belgium
(+14) and the Netherlands (+17). Finally, ULC growth was moderate in surplus
countries like Austria (+5) and even decreased in Germany (-4).
As discussed in the 2014 iAGS Report, since the start of the crisis ULCs have
adjusted but very asymmetrically. The trends identified in last year’s report
continue. The crisis countries (except Italy) have all by now (Figure 4 includes the
5. This share reached 78% if the shock was judged to be strong and to 94% if it was coupled with
credit constraints.
6. Only 1% of firms declare a decrease of base wages and 10% of firms a cut on flexible wages.
Figure 3. Evolution of unemployment rate and nominal compensation per employee
Sources: iAGS calculations on Ameco data.
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Defining the right internal exchange rate 173first two quarters of 2014 for most countries) adjusted so as to return to the trajec-
tory of average ULC growth in the currency union (+24 points between 2000 and
Q2 2014). Nevertheless, a positive gap persists in Italy (+34 over the same period),
Belgium (+33) and France (+29). Although German ULC started to increase after
the crisis, it has only increased by 9% since Q1 2000, which remains 15 points
below the average of the Eurozone. In interpreting these figures it is important to
recognise that the EA average ULC increase has lagged behind the benchmark
given by the target inflation rate of the ECB.7 A ULC increase in line with this
target (1.9% a year) would amount to over 30% between 2000 and 2014. 
As it can be seen in Figure 5, all of the crisis countries except Italy actually
achieved negative ULC growth between 2008 and 2012. For some countries the
cut in ULC is very significant as in Ireland (-19%) or Spain (-6%). While the period
following the crisis is characterized by nominal compensation moderation, most
of the decrease of ULC in deficit countries can be explained by the surge of labour
productivity (Figure 5): employment adjustment was higher than the output drop
which translates into an observed rise of productivity that, for given labour costs,
results in the increase of firms’ profitability. 
On the other hand, Germany has experienced a ULC growth since the crisis
(+12%), that contrasts with the decrease observed before. Since 2008, its ULC
growth rates have been broadly in line with the EMU average (+10%): in other
words, while it is no longer opening up a competitiveness gap vis-à-vis the other
EMU countries, neither is it closing the accumulated gap that had built up in
previous years. Nominal compensation accelerated in Germany in 2012, but this
momentum was not maintained, the rate weakening in 2013 and improving only
slightly in 2014 (Herzog-Stein and al., 2014). Meanwhile labour productivity still
grows faster than the euro area average. Austria, by contrast, has been steadily
closing the gap with the EMU average from below, offering an example of
successful symmetrical adjustment. 
7. See e.g. Watt (2007).
Figure 4. Unit labour costs (total economy)
Q12000 = 100
Sources: iAGS calculations on Eurostat data.
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the euro area (with the notable exceptions of Italy and Germany), the analysis of
cost-competitiveness needs to compare the relative labour cost adjustment with
respect to the evolution of the labour cost of competitors. The simultaneity of the
adjustment reduces the amplitude of relative cost adjustments in many countries.
Even in Ireland (which reduced ULC by -31%), the relative ULC (Figure 6) gains
with respect to competitors based in the rest of the euro area are lower, although
they remain significant (-20%). A similar effect is observable in some countries of
Eastern Europe (like Slovenia) where labour costs reductions offset each other.
Among big countries only Spain has improved its cost-competiveness signifi-
cantly. This is explained not only by the decrease of domestic ULC (by 6 points
since 2008), but also because its principal partners, most of them in core countries,
have increased, even if moderately, their own labour costs (Figure 7). At the end
the Spanish relative ULC decreased by 14 points. On the other side, French and
Italian competitiveness have not deteriorated significantly since 2008 in spite of the
fact that their nominal ULC have remained relatively dynamic, thanks to the persis-
tence of wage dynamics in other core countries, like Germany after 2009.
While recent labour market developments seem to support the correction of
imbalances, their impact should not be overstated. EA countries have made a lot
of efforts to compress ULC since 2008. But these efforts do not spread automati-
cally into export prices as firms may restore margins instead of decreasing prices,
particularly in a context where firms have restricted access to bank loans and
suffer from damaged balance sheet after the hit of the crisis. Significant diver-
gences can arise between relative export prices and labour costs. Since 2008, in
spite of an impressive reduction in relative labour costs, export prices of goods
and services have risen in Ireland (+3.9%) and Greece (+6.3%) and remained
unchanged in Spain (Figure 8). Otherwise, the relative export price has decreased
Figure 5. Determinants of Unit labour costs evolution (total economy)
  Percentage change since Q1 2008
Sources: iAGS calculations on Eurostat data.
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Defining the right internal exchange rate 175in Finland (-4.9%) while it was the country with the highest relative ULC growth
(Herzog-Stein and al., 2014).   
Figure 6. Relative ULC (country ULC / competitors average ULC) within EMU
Percentage change since Q1 2008
Note: the competitors average ULC corresponds to the geometric mean of the reference competitors (here
Eurozone countries) weighted by a double weighting scheme that takes into account the bilateral intensity
of competition in each market.
Sources: iAGS calculations on DG Ecfin data. 
Figure 7. Evolution of relative ULC
Sources: iAGS calculations on Eurostat and European Commission data.
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competitor group is extended to euro area countries, the relative export price
decreases in most euro area countries, pointing to the role of exchange rates
in the assessment of price-competitiveness. Only Belgium (-5.1%) and Greece
(-6.0%) have lost price-competitiveness with respect to this broader group. 
It is important to signal that the gap between labour cost developments and
export prices may reflect some statistical bias: while ULC are computed for all
firms in the economy, which have adjusted severely in many countries, export
prices are, by definition, set by the group of exporters. It is now well known that
the bulk of foreign sales are concentrated among relatively few exporters. Those
firms, which have been called “the happy few”8, tend to be more productive,
produce higher quality products, are more profitable and have a better financial
situation. The crisis hit particularly small firms of which many had to close, while
the “happy few” have better resisted to the shock. This selection mechanism
favours big firms with advantages in terms of quality and reputation that are able
to set higher prices. On the other hand, small firms shut down and stop
exporting. Hence, the average export price may rise while the firm-level export
price may decrease in line with costs developments.
The gap between ULC and export prices may also suggest that firms are
“pricing to market”: irrespective of changes in their labour costs of production
they sell goods on foreign markets in line with price trends on those precise
markets. The adjustment variable is the firm margin and profitability, suggesting
that exporters may be restoring margins that had been squeezed in the pre-crisis
period. Even so, the gap between ULC and export price developments suggest
that export growth could have been stronger if price rises had been restrained. 
While labour market dynamics might contribute to the correction of imbal-
ances in euro area, the social and economic costs of this strategy seem too high.
The ULC decrease in crisis countries is explained mostly by the rise of productivity
which is linked to a massive surge of the unemployment rate (See chapter 1). By
September 2014, unemployment had increased by more than 7 million people
since the start of the crisis. Unemployment has decreased at a moderate pace
lately, but the scars of the “Great Recession” will last. First, the impact of the
unemployment gap on wage negotiations will last, as a Phillips curve analysis
suggests. Second, this kind of adjustment transfers revenues from workers—and,
among them, the most vulnerable with higher propensity to consume—to firms.
In a context of low investment, this transfer will weigh on aggregate demand.
Third, the ULC reductions have not been sufficiently offset by higher ULC and
price inflation in Germany. Together, these developments increase deflation risks,
notably in peripheral countries, in a period where private and public actors are
seeking to repair their balance sheets. The wage deflationary pressures will
then continue and may even strengthen if expectations re-anchor to a defla-
tionary equilibrium. 
8. See Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
Defining the right internal exchange rate 177Box 2. Adjustments of euro area countries regarding Germany
Another way to assess the correction of imbalances is to look at bilateral trade
between EA countries (Figure 9). So we consider Bundesbank data for the bilat-
eral trade and payments relations between Germany–the largest economy and
by far the most important surplus country in the currency area–and ten other
EA countries including the biggest ones (France, Italy, Spain) and crisis coun-
tries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal). The figures are reported from the German
position, so that the line representing “Exports” to, for instance, Spain repre-
sents Spanish imports of goods and services from Germany. Overall, the
German trade surplus vis-à-vis other EA countries vanished in 2013. Germany
has maintained a current account surplus throughout the period since the crisis
with all the other countries except Ireland and Netherlands. But the current
account surpluses have fallen substantially, and Germany is now in deficit with
Spain in 2013. 
If we consider the developments of exports and imports separately, a similar
pattern emerges as evidenced for post-crisis trade relations more generally.
Initially the trade deficits were closed primarily by import compression. More
recently, though, exports from the crisis countries to Germany have picked up
somewhat. As a combined result of these two trends, the German trade
surpluses are now very limited in most cases (except for France). The fact that
the current account deficit remains considerably wider is due to the other
components of the current account (factor income and transfers) which have
tended to remain rather stable in the years since the crisis broke. This means
that, despite the improvement in bilateral trade balances with Germany, the
crisis countries still have to fund current account deficits, which implies further
increasing their net foreign liabilities vis-a-vis Germany.
Figure 8. Variation of the relative export price of merchandises
Average price of competitors / country price. 2008Q1 – 2013Q4
Note: Relative ULC (export-price) is computed as the ratio between ULC (export-price) in the country over
the average ULC (export-price) of its competitors (weighted by a double weighting that measures the
intensity of competition in world markets).
Sources: iAGS calculations based on DG Ecfin data.
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iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report178Figure 9. Bilateral trade (Goods and services) of EA countries with Germany
Millions of euros
Sources: Bundesbank, iAGS calculations.
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Defining the right internal exchange rate 179Greater import absorption by Germany on the back of expansionary policies
and measures to increase wage and price growth would have reduced the costs
of adjustment and the crisis countries would already certainly be running trade
surpluses and probably also current account surpluses against Germany,
enabling them to pay down foreign debt. It is not too late to rectify this costly
error. A corollary of shrinking bilateral current account surpluses with the EMU
crisis countries is that the continued German current account surpluses of
between 6 and 7% of GDP are due to growing net exports in trade with non-
EMU countries, for instance the US and the BRICS.
2. Correcting external imbalances in the euro area
In order to perform a more systematic and globally consistent analysis of
imbalances in the EA, we construct a small trade model that computes the
required price adjustment of every EA country. Those price adjustments are by
construction compatible with both an internal rebalancing–closing the output
gap–and an external rebalancing–stabilizing the net international investment
position (NIIP) at a sustainable level.
The core of the model consists of equations linking import and export
volumes to output variations and to competitors’ prices.9 Imports react positively
to domestic activity and to domestic prices, and negatively to competitors’ prices.
Exports react positively to foreign activity levels and to competitors’ prices, and
negatively to domestic export prices. The model also incorporates equations for
export and import prices in order to reflect the pricing strategies (in the space
between local currency pricing on one extreme and producer currency pricing on
the other extreme). A detailed description of the model and its calibration are
given in the technical appendix.
The main contribution of this modeling exercise relative to previous studies is
that a global equilibrium is computed at the EA level. Instead of computing partial
equilibrium price adjustments, i.e. those needed in one country without taking
into account the effect of domestic price changes on the equilibrium of other
countries, our methodology computes price adjustments that are compatible with
internal and external adjustment of all EA countries simultaneously. Said otherwise,
we compute the equilibrium that should be reached if all EA countries were acting
cooperatively. The rest of the world is assumed to adjust its demand for imports
according to its activity level and to the EA export prices, but to keep its own
prices unchanged.
Defining the target of the external adjustment of EA countries is the critical
task.10 Even though it is clear that an ever increasing external position is unsus-
tainable over the long run, and that stabilizing the NIIP is therefore a necessary
condition, the level at which that position becomes unsustainable is not clearly
quantified in the literature and may depend on a wide range of parameters. In our
baseline scenario, we somewhat arbitrarily assume that NIIPs are sustainable over
9. See the technical appendix for more details.
10. On the other hand, the target of the internal adjustment is naturally defined as closing the
output gap.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report180the long run provided they are within the ±50% range of GDP (the sensitivity to
that parameter is studied in alternative scenarios further below). Therefore, for
those countries whose NIIP is already within ±50%, the target of their external
adjustment is simply to stabilize their NIIP at its current level. For those countries
whose NIIP is below -50% (resp. above +50%), their target is to stabilize their NIIP
at -50% (resp. +50%) at a 20-year horizon.
Table 4 summarizes the baseline scenario. The first column presents the NIIP
targets. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are expected to improve their NIIP
and reach the -50% level, while other countries are simply expected to stabilize
their NIIP at its current level. The last two columns present the results in terms of
real effective exchange rate (REER) adjustments and in terms of value added (VA)
price adjustments. Note that VA price adjustments and REER adjustments differ
precisely because all the countries are supposed to change their VA prices simulta-
neously: the REER incorporates changes in domestic prices but also changes in
prices of multiple trade partners. All the adjustments are computed using the data
available at the end of 2013, and therefore represent what remains to be done as
of the beginning of 2014. In the baseline, export prices of countries outside the
EA are supposed to remain constant in Euro terms. The computed adjustments are
such that, if implemented immediately, all the countries would reach their
NIIP targets in 20 years from now. The prescribed adjustments cannot be
achieved instantly but will be gradually implemented, so our results in terms of VA
prices should rather be understood as cumulative inflation differentials.11 For
example, according to Table 4, Germany should increase its prices by 26.1%
while Greece should decrease them by 6.9%, corresponding to a cumulative infla-
tion differential of 33%, so the adjustment could be achieved in 20 years with an
annual inflation differential of 1.65% between Germany and Greece.12
We now discuss the results in terms of REER adjustments. Unsurprisingly,
Germany and the Netherlands need a substantial real appreciation. Greece, on
the other hand, still needs to depreciate by almost 14% despite having already
reached a balanced current account because its recent current account impro-
vement has a strong cyclical component, related to the compression of its
internal demand. The other crisis countries (Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal) have
already mostly completed their adjustment. Looking at the results in terms of VA
prices, the model predicts moderate negative price adjustments for only three
countries: Belgium, Finland and Greece, and substantial positive price adjust-
ments in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. Given that these figures should
be understood as deviations relatively to a global inflation trend, our results indi-
cate that deflation is no more needed–even in crisis countries–in order to
11. More precisely, price adjustments should be understood as cumulative inflation differentials
relatively to the average inflation rate in the EA. When we say in Table 4 that Germany should
increase its prices by 26.1%, we mean that the adjustment will be over when the cumulative
inflation differential between Germany and the EA average reaches 26.1%. In the baseline, we also
suppose that prices of countries outside the EA (expressed in Euro terms) increase at the same rate as
the average EA inflation (i.e. we suppose that the relative purchasing power parity holds). This
assumption will be relaxed when we examine changes in the Euro exchange rate.
12. If price adjustments are not done immediately but are gradually implemented over time, then
the NIIP will not reach its target in 20 years, but later. How much later depends on the speed and
profile of the adjustment. We abstract from these short term dynamics and maintain the focus on
long term equilibria.
Defining the right internal exchange rate 181achieve the adjustment; only inflation lower than the EA average is required.
Most of the adjustment should now go through inflation rates above the
average in surplus countries.
Since the model predicts price increases in most EA countries and since our
baseline scenario assumes unchanged price levels outside the EA, the model
predicts a loss of competitiveness of the EA as a whole and therefore a deteriora-
tion of its trade balance (of 2.8% of GDP, down to 0.8%). This result stems from
the chosen NIIP country targets which sum up to an almost zero aggregate NIIP
for the whole EA. As a consequence the model targets an almost balanced current
account at the EA level, and therefore predicts a deterioration of the aggregate
trade balance. Alternative scenarios with respect to the exterior position of the EA
are analyzed further below.
We explored the sensitivity of our results to various hypotheses: the degree of
internal rebalancing, the nominal depreciation of the Euro, the real interest rate,
the adjustment horizon and the NIIP target range. The main conclusion is that the
general picture given by the baseline results is robust, while other interesting
features emerge.
First, if price adjustments are computed without assuming that output gaps
are closed, then the results are broadly similar except for Greece, for the reasons
mentioned above: instead of a real depreciation of 13.7%, the country would
need an appreciation of 11.9% in the absence of internal rebalancing; the same
applies to a lesser extent to Ireland, which would need an appreciation of 19.8%
instead of 5.6% (because of its large output gap of -8.7%).
We also performed simulations in which the nominal effective exchange rate
of the Euro is allowed to change (but export prices of countries outside the EA are
still kept unchanged in foreign currency terms). The result is that REER adjust-
ments are insensitive to changes in the nominal effective exchange rate of the
Table 4. Baseline scenario
In %
NIIP target (% GDP) REER adjustment VA price adjustment
AUT 0.5 +14.9 +26.6
BEL 45.8 -16.1 -6.0
FIN 15.8 -14.3 -8.6
FRA -17.0 -4.5 +2.7
DEU 48.4 +21.8 +26.1
GRC -50.0 -13.7 -6.9
IRL -50.0 +5.6 +9.6
ITA -29.5 +5.8 +12.3
NLD 46.3 +19.5 +25.0
PRT -50.0 -3.2 +5.4
ESP -50.0 +2.9 +9.7
If Greece is to reach a NIIP of -50% of GDP in 20 years from now, it must achieve a real depreciation of 13.7%. 
This can be obtained by decreasing its VA prices by 6.9% (assuming that the other EA countries also adjust their 
VA prices by the prescribed amounts and that prices outside the EA are unchanged).
Source: iAGS calculations.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report182Euro. The intuition for this result is that long term equilibria in real variables are
invariant to nominal variables (and we do not incorporate short term adjustment
dynamics). However, adjustments expressed in terms of VA prices are affected by
the nominal exchange rate, on a one-to-one basis. For example, under the
hypothesis of nominal depreciation of the Euro of 10%, all internal prices must
increase by 10% more than in the baseline scenario. In particular, this means that
in the 10% depreciation scenario, no negative price adjustment is needed (even
relative to the common inflation trend).
The results are not very sensitive to the value assumed for the real interest rate
on foreign assets, which is 1% in the baseline.13 Again, Greece is the exception
with a required REER adjustment ranging from -22.3% (in case of a negative real
interest rate of -1.5%) to -7.7% (for a real interest rate of 3%).
We also tested the sensitivity of our results to the horizon at which the NIIP is
assumed to reach its target position. In the baseline, this horizon is set at 20 years,
which means that the target NIIP will be reached in 20 years if the countries
adjust immediately to the new internal prices and maintain that price level over
the next 20 years. Shortening or extending the adjustment horizon significantly
changes the adjustment required from those countries which are not already
within the required NIIP range (±50%), i.e. Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal.
The impact on other countries in terms of REER adjustment is small, but not zero,
because of general equilibrium effects. Results for this exercise are reported in
Table 5. The main point to be stressed is that, if we leave them 50 years or even
more to adjust, then Greece and Portugal no longer need a real depreciation in
order to reach equilibrium (as was already the case of Italy, Spain and Ireland in
the 20 years baseline).
13. In our simulations it is necessary to make an assumption for the real interest rate on foreign
assets in order to make the transition from trade balances to current accounts (and the latter is then
used for computing the NIIP). See the technical appendix for more details.
Table 5. REER adjustments as a function of the adjustment horizon
In %
Horizon 10 years 20 years 50 years Infinite
AUT +14.2 +14.9 +15.3 +15.5
BEL -16.9 -16.1 -15.6 -15.3
FIN -15.5 -14.3 -13.7 -13.3
FRA -4.3 -4.5 -4.7 -4.7
DEU +21.8 +21.8 +21.8 +21.8
GRC -43.7 -13.7 +4.3 +14.8
IRL -0.8 +5.6 +9.4 +11.4
ITA +5.7 +5.8 +5.8 +5.9
NLD +19.1 +19.5 +19.7 +19.8
PRT -17.4 -3.2 +5.3 +10.1
ESP -5.4 +2.9 +7.9 +10.6
Source: iAGS calculations.
Defining the right internal exchange rate 183Finally, we examine the influence of the target range for NIIP, which is ±50%
in the benchmark. Table 6 shows the results. On one end if we impose a return to
a zero NIIP for all countries, then the crisis countries–which currently have highly
negative NIIP–must depreciate much more than in the baseline, while the adjust-
ment required for other countries is mostly unchanged.14 On the other end, if the
upper limit on the absolute NIIP is lifted–and therefore if the only constraint is to
stabilize the NIIP at its current level–then no crisis country needs to depreciate.15
Simulations with the range ±25% give result close to those obtained with a lower
bound of -35% as it is set in the six pack scoreboard. 
The last two sensitivity exercises have shown that, for the countries with a
very negative NIIP (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain), the adjustment could be
made easier or even avoided if the constraints were relaxed (either in terms of
adjustment horizon or of NIIP target). Another way of relaxing the constraints
would be to introduce some external debt relief, which could be achieved
through a public debt relief. Though we did not quantify this possibility, it is clear
that it would translate into a smaller relative price adjustment for these countries.
So far we have presented the adjustments needed as of early 2014. But it is
possible to apply the same methodology to past data and therefore to reconstruct
the evolution over time of the internal disequilibria of the EA. We performed this
exercise for all years between 1995 and 2013 (implicitly considering the Ecu as
the single currency before 1999). Some clear historical patterns emerge from this
exercise. Germany starts from an overvaluation of about 10% in 1995 and then
14. The depreciation required for Belgium and Finland is smaller in that case than in the baseline,
because those countries currently have a positive NIIP and a trade balance deficit. Sustaining a zero
NIIP requires less effort than sustaining a positive NIIP.
15. The results for this case are similar to the results with a very large time horizon to adjust. Having
a lot of time to adjust means letting the NIIP drift very slowly, which in the medium term is almost
the same as stabilizing the NIIP.
Table 6. REER adjustments as a function of the NIIP target range
In %
NIIP target range 0% ±25% ±50% ±100% No range limit
AUT +14.8 +14.8 +14.9 +15.5 +15.6
BEL -3.9 -10.1 -16.1 -15.3 -15.2
FIN -7.3 -14.1 -14.3 -13.2 -13.1
FRA -9.9 -4.9 -4.5 -4.7 -4.8
DEU +28.9 +25.2 +21.8 +21.8 +21.8
GRC -34.9 -24.5 -13.7 +8.6 +17.8
IRL -0.0 +3.1 +5.6 +12.0 +12.6
ITA -4.0 +4.1 +5.8 +5.9 +5.9
NLD +23.7 +21.6 +19.5 +19.8 +19.8
PRT -13.8 -8.6 -3.2 +7.4 +11.8
ESP -6.4 -2.0 +2.9 +12.0 +11.9
Source: iAGS calculations.
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report184sharply reverses its position in the early 2000s to arrive at an undervaluation of
21% in 2007, which has mostly remained constant since. The Netherlands exhibit
a fairly stable pattern of undervaluation oscillating between 10% and 20% during
the whole sample. France starts from an equilibrium position in 1995, quickly
becomes undervalued by 20% by 1999, then gradually loses its competitive
advantage to arrive at a small overvaluation today. Portugal and Greece were
overvalued during the whole sample, with a worsening of their situation during
the financial crisis, followed by a marked improvement between 2011 and 2013.
Spain qualitatively follows a similar pattern, but with a quantitatively smaller
overvaluation.
In all the exercises above, the target of the adjustment has been defined in
terms of stabilizing the NIIP at its current level, or as an effort to bring back the
NIIP into a sustainable range if needed. But considering the adjustment under this
angle has some drawbacks. For example, some countries (Belgium and Finland)
today have current account deficits but a positive NIIP. Stabilizing their NIIP at its
current level means turning their current account deficit into a surplus. But one
could argue that shrinking the deficit down to a level compatible with a negative
—but sustainable—NIIP would constitute an acceptable adjustment, which actu-
ally happens to be more sensible because less painful. This observation led us to
consider another type of global EA readjustment in which the price adjustments
are minimized, under the constraint that all NIIPs are stabilized in a sustainable
range over a given horizon. More precisely, we computed the vector of price
adjustments that minimizes the quadratic sum of price deviations weighted by
country GDPs, under the constraint that all NIIPs converge in the range of ±50%
of GDP within 20 years. Table 7 shows the results. The optimal NIIP targets are
different from those of the baseline; in particular, only Greece will reach the lower
bound of -50%, while three countries—Austria, Germany and the Netherlands—
will reach the upper bound of +50%. 
Turning to REER adjustments and VA price adjustments, one can see that
the magnitude of bilateral readjustments is globally the same as in the baseline,
but with a lower average price level (i.e. this scenario requires a lower average
Table 7. Alternative scenario: Minimization of price deviations
In %
Long-term NIIP(% GDP) REER adjustment VA price adjustment
AUT 50.0 +2.1 +5.8
BEL 37.4 -14.8 -9.2
FIN -5.5 -6.8 -3.7
FRA -5.4 -7.2 -4.6
DEU 50.0 +22.2 +22.2
GRC -50.0 -13.6 -11.1
IRL 50.0 -7.5 -5.6
ITA 8.0 -6.1 -3.2
NLD 50.0 +17.9 +20.1
PRT -32.8 -5.6 -4.1
ESP 6.9 -7.3 -5.2
Source: iAGS calculations.
Defining the right internal exchange rate 185inflation in the EA). The baseline was biased towards inflation because it was
based on a shrinking of the current account surplus of the EA, itself needed
because the aggregate NIIP target of the EA was close to zero; in this alternative
scenario where price deviations are minimized, the average price deviation is
close to zero, and therefore the aggregate trade balance shrinks by less (it shrinks
by 1.8% of GDP, down to 1.7%).
The last scenario that we examined is also based on a minimization of the
price deviations, but under the additional constraint that the REER of the whole EA
should remain unchanged. The results are reported in Table 8. The general picture
is that this scenario calls for even less inflation on average, especially for France
and Italy which are additionally asked a much larger devaluation relatively to
Germany. The consequence is that the aggregate trade balance is shrunk by only
1.3% of GDP, down to 2.2%. Note that this scenario still predicts a degradation of
the trade balance–even though the real exchange rate of the EA is kept constant–
because the EA has a larger output gap than the rest of the world at the end of
2013 and will therefore import relatively more when output gaps are closed.
Of course this exercise has its limitations. It is based on a crude model of the
trade behaviours of EA countries, and it abstracts from many important issues:
short and medium term dynamics, non-price competitiveness, sectoral disaggre-
gation, valuation effects on the NIIP, feedback effects on the rest of the world. In
particular, a Euro depreciation should further reduce the adjustment because of
the expected positive valuation effects on the NIIP.16 Further effort is therefore
needed to obtain more precise estimates of the disequilibria within the EA. We
nevertheless believe that our estimates provide a good starting point and are
useful enough to draw some policy conclusions.
Table 8. Alternative scenario: Minimization of price deviations, 
under stable aggregate REER
In %
Long-term NIIP (% GDP) REER adjustment VA price adjustment
AUT 50.0 -2.8 +3.0
BEL 3.6 -7.2 -4.7
FIN -15.5 -3.4 -1.5
FRA 34.9 -18.9 -17.3
DEU 50.0 +21.9 +20.1
GRC -50.0 -13.5 -13.1
IRL -10.2 -1.8 -0.9
ITA 25.8 -12.1 -11.2
NLD 50.0 +16.6 +17.8
PRT -50.0 -1.3 -2.8
ESP 10.6 -7.3 -8.5
Source: iAGS calculations.
16. See for example Pupetto L. and Sode A. (2012).
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report186The main conclusions can be summarized as follows. First, even though a
substantial readjustment has been achieved since 2011, much still remains to be
done. The price disequilibria between overvalued and undervalued countries
within the EA could be as much as 35% under reasonable assumptions. Secondly,
a rebalancing strategy should rely on maintaining inflation differentials within the
EA over an extended period, with higher inflation in Germany and lower inflation
in crisis countries; deflation is not required in the latter countries if the readjust-
ment is implemented gradually. A coordinated wage policy, with substantial
wage increases in Germany, would definitely be needed in order to achieve the
rebalancing while limiting adjustment costs. Third, a nominal depreciation of the
Euro would facilitate the rebalancing by making it compatible with a higher infla-
tion rate even in crisis countries. Fourth, public debt relief in some countries–at
least in the smaller crisis countries like Portugal, Greece and Ireland–would also
ease the adjustment.
This year's iAGS report does not contain a detailed analysis of wage policy. We
refer readers to last year's report, in which a coordinated setting of minimum
wage increases in accordance with macroeconomic considerations in each
country was shown to have a significant potential in achieving balanced adjust-
ment of competitiveness within the euro area without imposing the high costs
associated with deflationary policies.
More generally, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure offers, in prin-
ciple, an opportunity to reach a “grand bargain” centred around a golden wage
rule.17 This would increase the capacity of social partners and governments to
deliver balanced wage outcomes that respect the need for growth and competi-
tiveness while avoiding a dangerous race to the bottom. This requires, rather than
the destruction of collective bargaining institutions, on the contrary, joint national
and European initiatives to develop the institutional capacity for wage setting that
takes macroeconomic outcomes as a firm basis for outcomes.
17. See Watt, A. (2012).
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The model
The first step is, for given NIIP targets, to compute the corresponding trade
balance targets. Let i denote the country index, TBi the trade balance to GDP
ratio of country i, CAi the current account to GDP ratio, NIIPi the NIIP to GDP
ratio, r the real interest rate, π the inflation rate. We compute the part of the
current account Ri (expressed as a ratio of GDP) that is not explained by trade or
by interest payments on the external position:
Ri = CAi – TBi – (r + π)NIIPi
That residual is non zero either because of transfers (remittances, debt cancel-
lation…), errors and omissions, or because the assumed interest rate r does not
correspond to the effective average interest rate on the net external position.
Then, given potential growth gi, the adjustment horizon h and the NIIP target
NIIPι , the target trade balance is defined by:
This target trade balance is such that, if the country were adjusting to this
new value today, then the NIIP would reach the target NIIP in h years, provided
the hypotheses on growth, real interest rate and inflation are realized.
It is important to note that this calculation incorporates several other assump-
tions. First, the residual Ri is assumed constant over time; as a side effect, if the
value that we assumed for r is wrong, then our interest payment computations are
wrong only on the difference between the initial NIIP and its target. Second, we
assume that changes in the NIIP are only due to current account surpluses or defi-
cits and not to valuation effects: this seems like a reasonable approximation since
there is no time pattern or trend in those valuation effects over time (see Pupetto
and Sode, 2012, p. 30 for more details).
We now describe the trade model that is at the core of the computation. All
the endogenous variables denoted by lower letters are log-deviations from a refer-
ence level (defined as the actual values at the end of 2013).
The volume of exports xi of country i depends on the foreign demand diEX
and on the difference between piEX, the index of competitors’ prices on export
markets of country i, and piX, the export prices of country i:
xi = diEX + εiX(piEX – piX)
where εiX is the price-elasticity of exports. Note that the elasticity of exports with
respect to the foreign demand is equal to one, which means that this is a specifi-
cation in terms of market shares.
Similarly, the volume of imports mi of country i depends on the domestic
output yi and on the difference between domestic VA prices piVA and import
prices piM:
mi = yi + εiM(piVA – piM)
=
∑
− R  
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report188where εiM is the price-elasticity of imports. Again, the elasticity with respect to
demand is equal to one, which is necessary to ensure homogeneity.
The foreign demand diEX faced by country i is a function of import volumes of
trade partners and of the output of the rest of the world yRoW (the latter being a
proxy for the imports of the rest of the world):
where wxij is the share of country j in the exports of country i.
The price piX of exports of country i depends on domestic VA prices and on
competitors’ prices on export markets:
piX = (1 – εiPX)piVA + εiPX piEX
where εiPX is the price-elasticity to competitors’ prices. On one extreme if εiPX = 1
then the producers of country i entirely adjust to competitor’s prices, potentially
at the expense of their margins. On the other extreme if εiPX = 0 then the
producers focus exclusively on their margins, potentially at the expense of their
competitiveness.
Similarly the price piM of imports of country i depends on domestic VA prices
and on a price index piEM of exporters to country i:
piM = (1 – εiPM)piVA  + εiPM piEM
where εiPM is the price-elasticity to export prices. On one extreme if εiPM = 0 then
the exporters to country i entirely adjust to domestic prices, potentially at the
expense of their margins. On the other extreme if εiPM = 0 then the exporters
focus exclusively on their margins, potentially at the expense of their
competitiveness.
The index of competitors’ prices on export markets of country i is defined by:
where e is the nominal effective exchange rate of the Euro, and the weights wcij
are computed by double weighting. Note that we make here the assumption that
export prices (in foreign currency) of countries outside the Eurozone do not
change, so e can be understood as non-euro competitors’ price expressed in
euros.
The price index of exporters to country i is defined by:
where wmij is the share of country j in the imports of country i.
Given the changes in exports, imports, prices and output, one can infer the
percentage point variation in the trade balance ratio, which is given by:
The solution of the model is defined as a set of vectors
x,m,pVA,pX,pM,pEX,pEM,dEX satisfying the equations of the model, under the
constraint that the trade balances reach their target (i.e.  ΔTBi = (TBι) – TBi  for all
countries) and given the assumptions for the output changes and the exchange
rate (in the baseline, the output gaps are supposed to close, so the output
 
 
 
 
Defining the right internal exchange rate 189changes y are set to the opposite of the 2013 output gaps, and the exchange rate
of the Euro is supposed to remain unchanged, so e = 0).
Finally, for a given solution of the model, one can compute the REER changes
for every country:
Note that again this calculation assumes that prices of countries outside the
euro area (expressed in foreign currencies) remain unchanged.
Calibration
The data for the 2013 NIIP, TB and CA come from Eurostat. The 2013 output
gaps come from the OECD database. The potential growth rates are the same as
those used for the iAGS model. The bilateral import and export shares come from
CEPII’s CHELEM database.
The inflation rate π is set at the ECB target of 2%. In the baseline, the real
interest rate r is 1% and the horizon h is 20 years.
Finally, Table 9 shows the values assumed for the price-elasticities of export
and import volumes and prices.I
Table 9. Price-elasticities of export and import volumes and prices
Elasticities εX εM εPX εPM
AUT 0.60 0.16 0.18 0.51
BEL 0.47 0.28 0.57 0.79
FIN 0.60 0.31 0.57 0.79
FRA 0.58 0.74 0.52 0.72
DEU 0.42 0.79 0.53 0.77
GRC 0.47 0.37 0.41 0.40
IRL 0.60 0.33 0.28 0.51
ITA 0.43 0.57 0.44 0.43
NLD 0.60 0.28 0.41 0.36
PRT 0.47 0.56 0.77 0.79
ESP 0.85 0.81 0.44 0.76
Sources: Ducoudré and Heyer (2014) for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. OECD (2005) for the other countries.
−
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